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ABSTRACT
While East Germany has been regarded since 1949 as the most
subservient of the USSR's allies, developments in the latter part.of.
the last decade, especially with regard to the West Berlin question,
worked in such a way as to impel the GDR's leadership to attempt to
assume a more important position within the Bloc.

The intention of

the Ulbricht government was not to achieve independence from the .USSR,
but rather to elevate itself to a status from which it could exercise
a veto over certain elements of Soviet policy.

The area of greatest

concern to Ulbricht was the Soviet policy toward the West.

The USSR's

pursuit of a policy of detente with the West, which required a
demonstration of Communist "goodwill" on the West

Be~lin

problem, was

viewed by the Ulbricht regime as a threat to the vital interests of
the GDR.
In the years after 1968, the West Berlin issue came to represent an
increasingly divisive matter in relations between the GDR and the USSR.
Ulbricht's reluctance to allow a demonstration of Soviet good intentions
in West Berlin ultimately led to his removal as First Secretary of the
SED in 1971.

He was replaced by Erich Honecker, a man who has

consistently exhibited his desire to bring the GDR to a position of
more thorough compliance with Soviet wishes.

In this effort, Honecker

has demonstrated, as Ulbricht also did, the close relationship between
foreign policy questions such as West Berlin and domestic

ii

.consideratio~s.

iii
The GOR's efforts to develop a sense of national.consciousness in recent
years illustrates the .impact that foreign and domestic.matters have upon
each other.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of.this

disse~tation

is to examine the West

Be~lin

issue from the East German point of view during the .so-ca11ed era.of
super-power detente.

The ,significance of this issue is derived ,from

its importance in international policies since World War TwO', an
importance that has ,been attested .to by the frequent major power
confrontations in Berlin in the years after 1945.

It is appropriate

that this issue ,be examined during the era of detente because for many
years it represented one of.the major stumbling blocks to a relaxation
of tensions in Europe.
Additional significance is derived from the fact that the .West
Berlin issue has had an especially important ef£ect on East GermanSoviet relations. during the years in which the USSR has sought a
relaxation of tensions between East and West.
Be~lin

Therefore, the West

dispute is examined here in terms of its bearing on

status within the Soviet Bloc.

th~

GDRls

While the .GDR has long been regarded

as one of the most obedient of the Soviet allies, the GDRls interest,
as interpreted by SED First Secretary Walter Ulbricht, required it to
endeavor to exercise a veto over the .po1icies of its Soviet patron.
Accordingly, what one sees during this time is an effort by

U1bri~ht

to pursue a more independent East German policy regarding certain
foreign policy questions related to the Berlin dispute.
to argue that Ulbricht sought to make the GDR an

1

This is net

independe~t

Communist

2

state but

tha~

he intenqed to have it occupy a position of greater

importance within the Bloc than in the past.

Accordingly, the GDR was

seen by Ulbricht as having the authority to "lecture" its allies,
including the .Soviet Union, on their various policies.

Ulbricht

seemed to feel especially qualified by virtue of.his seniority within
the hierarchy of.Conununist leaders and his long experience .in managing
the affairs of a state on the "fz'ont line" of socialism.
The foreign policy dimension of Ulbrich.t '.s independence was the·
most significant aspect of his "rebellion." This concern with foreign
policy provides the justification for s·electing 1968 as. the starting
point for this analysis.

This was the year in which Ulbricht became

most prominent as a would-be advisor to his allies.
of Czechoslovakia undoubtedly appeared to

Ulbri~ht

The August invasiqn
as a vindication of

his views of the GDR's role as the USSR's closest and most valuable
partne~.

The. Czech invasion is also significant because it marked the

beginning of ,a serious.Soviet effort to reconsolidate its hegemony in
Eastern Europe.

This effort soon required the USSR to overcome East

German resistance to Soviet initiatives.toward the West, initiatives
that called for a show of Communist goodwill in Berlin, Ulbricht seemed
determined to resist this policy and, as a result, in 1971 he was
replaced by Erich Honecker.

Honecker

retur~ed

the GDR to a .position

of greater compliance with Soviet wishes and began to emphasize ties
with the USSR more than ever before.

The change in.the GDR's orientation

was almost immediately reflected in the art;cles in the SED's official
newspaper, Neues Deutschland.

Whereas the last Ulbricht years has seen

3

the ,paper's preoccupation with hostile stories about West Germany and
Wes~

Berlin, under Honecker it began to stress more coverage of every

aspect of Soviet affairs.
This analysis

co~siders

the West Berlin problem in terms of.the

challenge that it poses for the GDR as well as in terms of the .function
that it serves .for the SED's leadership.

West Berlin is seen as.pre-

senting the GDR with both a threat and an opportunity.
has political, mil i tary, and economi c aspec ts .

As a

Therefore, part of this

dissertation is devoted .to an examination of the ',fundamental
the

We~t

Berlin problem.

As an opportunity, it

it

thr~at,

provid~s

natur~

of

the SED with an

element of tension and confrontation needed to compensate for 't::he lack
of a complete popular identification with the GDR as an entity.

Because

of.this consideration" an effort is made to evaluate the problem of an
East German sense of national consciousness and its effect on the .West
Berlin issue.
In the concluding chapter, an effort is made to develop various
scenarios for a possible resolution of the West Berlin issue.
purpose of this is to illustrate the

persis~enc~

The·

of the problem and

to show how East German-Soviet relations will be affected by the various
options.for settlement of this matter.

This effort should also

demonstrate how closely the West Berlin issue is linked with the·
question of reunification of the ,two Germanies.
The year 1974 is selected as the cutoff date, not simply for
convenience, but

be~ause

of its possible significance as.a turning

point and as a time for reflection on the GDR's position.

The

4

resignation of Willy Brandt in the ,spring of,l974 following the ,exposure
of one of his closest aides as an East

Ge~man

be~ause

spy is important

it reyeals something of the nature of the SED's view of detente.
Brandt's replacement by Helmut Schmidt could well mark a turn toward a
more

cautio~s

detente policy by the ,FRG in a time when there would seem

to be greater distrust of the GDR.
it is ,the twenty-fifth

a~niversary

This year,is also important
of·the founding of the,GDR.

s~nce

As such,

it has provided an opportunity for East Germany to make a special effort
to evaluate itself and its progress.
the GDR

Constitutio~

Thi,s process brought a revision of

which involved a rejection of the idea of

reunification of Germany, even after a possible Communist revolution.
This revision represents a further departure from Ulbricht's policies
which had stressed the responsibility of ,the SED for the entire German,
nation and facilitates ,the drawing of·the GDR even closer to the USSR.
The

revision has even,raised the possibility of changing the name of

the SED by dropping "Germany" and replacing it with "German Demqcratic
Republic. "
The methodology used in this analysis is

traditio~al.

It has

involved a concentration on examinations of the major East German
publications dealing with the questions ,being considered.

The principal

sources were the SED's official daily, Neues Deutschland, the SED's
theoretical monthly journal. Einheit, and the foreign affairs
Horizont.

week~YJ

For Soviet views, the Current Digest of the Soviet Press has

been most frequently relied upon.

In addition, it has considered

Western publications, dealing with East Elrropean affairs and numerous

5

Western studies of the West Berlin issue and related matters.

The

purpose, of this approach was to gain an understanding of the views of
the major East Gerrnanfigures on issues relevant to this inquiry and,
at the ,same time, an

apprecia~ion

of current ,Western analyses of

developments.
The principal advantage of this approach is that it facilitated the
accumulation of information regarding the public views ,of the figures
involved and, simultaneously, aided an effort.to examine implicit motives,
for certain policies.

This frequently required that ce:ctain elements of

public statements be discounted in favor of other analyses that seem to
more adequately explain motives or meanings of particular decisions.
Matters such as the timing of East German ,statements compared with
Soviet statements are especially important, in making such determina tioIlS.'
The absence of Soviet or East ,German statements ,has also been significant
in certain cases and has been seen as an indication of unstated
opposition to certain policies.
to examine the ,nuances of

This approach also permits an effort

vario~s,statements

in these endeavors to

understand the meanings of actions by the GDR and Soviet governments.
Other methodologies might be ,considered for their applicability to
the problem of this dissertation, but none would adequately substitute
for the traditiollal approach used here.

One might consider an approach

such as decision·making analysis fo1' this topic.

However, t1\e first

problem encountered in an effort to apply this method is the ,nature of
the East German system.
system.

Here, the ,researcher is dealing with a ,closed

In effect, he can usually know only what he ,reads in the SED

6

newspapers or journals.

There would be

n~

possibility of constructing

meticulous narratives of steps in the decision-making process ,as has
bee~

done regarding such matters as

Korean conflict.

t~~

United

,Stat~s'

entry into the

Generally, all the researcher sees in this type of

system is the ,end product.

The decision-making process i tsel,f is

totally closed thus creating a serious problem in data collection.
same difficulty would also serve as a decisive

b~rrier

The

to the application

of ,such methodologies as game theory and bargaining to a problem such,as
this.
Given the fact that the researcher on East German,affairs has
little more than the public media to rely upon, the ,most promising of
the nontraditional methodologies would be content analysis.
enable one to carefully and systematically weigh various
terms of

the~r

minor variations and to chart numerous

to illustrate shifts in policy.

However, you would

statem~nts,in

c~rves

stil~

This,would

on graphs

face the,

problem of how to consider other important elements such as the absence
of a public statement on ,a particular policy.

Also, there is the,

question of how to weigh actions such as Ulbricht's failure to appear
at the Hungarian Communist Party Congress in 1970, the ,increase in the
delays of traffic at checkpoints, or the opening of new telephone lines
between East and West Berlin.
Considering the ,numerous problems of data collection and evaluation
associated with research ,about the policies of a Communist state, the
traditional approach seems to be the most flexible and useful.
it, too, suffers from

cer~ain

While

defects, when all other factors are taken

into consideration. it is still the most appropriate.

CHAPTER I.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEST BERLIN AS AN ISSUE
OF EAST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I.

THE FALL AND OCCUPATION OF BERLIN

The "crowning achievement" of the Soviet Union's.efforts in World
War Two came on the eve of May 1, 1945 when two Soviet soldiers.hoisted
the Re4 Banner of Victory on the Reichstag building in Berlin.

This is

the claim advanced by tqe anniversary issue of·the USSR military
journal, the Soviet Military Review. l While this event signaled the
end of almost five years of fighting by the Soviet troops, it also
marked the beginning of a problem which has plagued Europe as well.as
the world for more than a quarter of a century now.
As an American war correspondent flew into Berlin in the spring of
1945, he described the city as a "great wilderness .of debris dotted with
roofless burnt out buildings that look like

litt1~

mouse traps with low

autumn sun shining through the .spaces where windows had bee~.,,2 This.
hardly conveys the impression of Berlin as a tremendous war prize.

Yet,

for years Berlin had been the ,symbol of .Nazi Germany andtne capital of

ISoviet Military ReView, No.4, 1973, pp. 8-10.

2J~hn Man, Berlin Blockade (New Yor~:
p. 9.

.,
I

Ba~lantine Books, 1973),

8

Hitler's Third Reich.

During the

lastwe~ks

of the war, Berlin became·

the central objective of the Soviet military efforts.
On April 16, 1945 the Soviet. tro()ps under . the leadership of
Marshall ZhukoV crossed the Oder River and by the .afternoon of April 21st
they

were.just.outs~de

Berlin.

At the same time, elements.of the U.S,

69th Infantry Division \'lere linking up with Soviet troops on the Elbe
River.

Meanwhile, the American advance was halted 60 miles. from Berlin

in order to allow the .Russians to take the capital city. 3

Ha4 the ,Americans desired to take part in .the capture of. Berlin,
they could.have done so.

Yet they did not.

played a part in this decision.

Several consideratiolls

One of the ,most important reasons·was

that the occupation zones of Germany had already been agreed upon so
further advances would not mean more territory to be·held by the
American occupation authorities after the war. 4 U.S. troops had
advanced fifty miles into the area which was to have
by

t~e

Russian forces by

thi~

time.

been.libe~ated

A second consideration was an.
.

increasing American concern for maximizing its forces in Bavaria instead
of the Berlin allea!

There was a preoccupa1;ion in the ,U.S. command for

the need to occupy the .birthplace of the Nazi ideology and an.area which
was· seen as the likely last stronghold of the Nazi command.

American

tactical thinking in the last weeks.of the war was shaped by the Goebbe+s

3William L. SlUrer, The Rise .and Fan of the Third Reich (New· York:·
Simon and S~huster, 1960), p. 1106.
4Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 142.

9
threat, which turned out to be

l~cking

in.substance,

th~t

the Nazis

would use Bavaria as the "Natio~al Redoubt" of the Third Reich. S And,
finally, some,U.S. military leaders saw Berlinas nothing more than a
prestige objective which was hardly worth the lives that would

b~

lost

in the effort to take the city.6
In spite of the apparent willingness of the Western Allied powers
to hold back ,while the Russians ,took

Berl~n,

some

Sovie~

accQunts insist

that the Americans and British were in a race with the Soviet troops to
German capital city.

e~ter,the

The disposition of American troqps by

the ,second week of April certainly did raise the possibiltty of an
Ameri~an

entry into Berlin prior to the ,Russians.

After covering up to

thirty miles a day, on April 11, the U.S. Ninth Army reached the Elbe
River

nea~

Magdeburg and on the next day crossed it.

within sixty

mile~

The Americans were

of Berlin with only a few scattered and disorganized

German units blocking their way four days before the Russians had
crossed the Oder River. 7 The Russians undoubtedly felt that their fears
might be justified.

According to

a~

account by Soviet Marshall Ivan.

Konev who participated with Zhukov in the Berlin operation, on April 1,
1945, Stalin informed him and Zhukov that the U. S. -British command ',was

staging an operation to capture Berlin with the intention of depriving
the Soviet forces of the opportunity to occupy the Nazi capital.,

5

General Omar Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York:
Schuster" 1951), p. S36.

Konev

Simon and

6

Man, pp. 11-14.

7Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945 (New York:.
and Company, 1967), pp. 90-92.

Norton

10

writes that: Stalin asked .them, "Who. is going to take,

Ber~in,

we or, the

Allies?" Their. response, of course, was that the ,Soviet forces, were
going to take the city.

Kanev says that plans were immediately made for
an operation which be put fully into effect on April 16. 8 The completion
of· this plan came within two weeks when the Soviett:roops did in fact
occupy Berlin.
Thus, from the very first,
of Berlin were

chara~terized

W~stern-Soviet

relations

t~e

American General Omar

Bradley at the time of the Berlin campaign were, in.the

matte~s.

distru~t

the question

by a certain degree of suspicion. The

first meetings ,between Marshall Konev and

tinged.with

on

K~nevaccount,

on even the smallest and most seemingly trivial

Konev, for example, insis.ts that General Bradley tried

t~

pass

off a world-famous ,violinist as an American soldier during a SovietAmerican party.

On another occasion Konev charges that Bradley did not

believe his explanation about how a troupe of Russian dancers happened
to be at the front. 9 This mistrust on minor matters was.to be.exten.ded
to much more
Th~

impqrt~nt i~sues

in the coming weeks.

primary concern of the Western allies after the fall of Germany

was to establish an Allied Control Council which would be responsible
for matters affecting Germany as a whole· and for each of the occupying
powers to assume responsibility for his own zone of

occupatio~.

In

order to carry out these plans. a meeting was scheduled for June 5, 1945

8V • Sevruk, editor, How Wars End (Moscow:
1969), pp. 9-11.

9 Ibid ., pp. 121-124.

Progress Publishe.rs,

11

in Berlin between the ,three Western ,commanders and
Marshall Zhukov.

Three documents were signed at

th~

th~s

Soviet

comma~der,

meeting.

One

dealt with the assumption of supreme authority in Germany by the Allies,
,

the second,with the
Berlin under joint
occupatio~

divis~on

of Germany into four,occupation zones with

occupatio~,

control machinery.

and the ,third with the ,establishment of
After these

doc~ents

were finally

sig~ed,

General Eisenhower,suggested that they begin steps to install the Contrql
Council in Berlin.

Zhukov insisted that this issue could not even be

disucssed until all troops in Germany had returned to their proper zones.
His main intention, of course, was that

th~

American and British troops

be ordered to withdraw from Saxony and Thuringia, those areas of the
10
Soviet zone which they had occupied in the last days of combat~
On June 15, despite Churchill's strong objections, the American
and British commands jointly informed Stalin of

their,intentio~

to
Stal~n

withdraw their,troops from Saxony and Thuringia.on June 21st.
replied that they would still not be ,able to come to ,Berlin for
establishment of the Control Council even though Zhukov had
~hat

such a move would be possible.

impl~ed

Stalin's explanation was that

Berlin had still not been completely cleared of land mines and that
Zhukov was going to have to be in Moscow for a parade and, therefore,
be unable to return to Berlin before the end of June.
set as the date to begin joint

occupatio~.

Thus,

Ju~y

1 was

However, another possible

explanation for the Soviets desire for delay could have been their

lOJean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin (Baltimore:
Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 75-76.

Johns

,

12
determination to allow sufficient ,time for the
gover~ent

es~ab1ishment

of a

ci~y

in Berlin which would be amenable.to Communist control.

This

suspicion is supported by accounts of Walter Ulbricht's activities in
Berlin shortly after his return from the USSR with the .so-called
"Ulbricht Group."

During this time the members of the group were at

work finding suit~ble.people to serve in the new Berlin borough
administrations.
administrations
appearance

Th~

goal of this

sympathe~ic

"
0 fb e~ng

search was to establish

~alent

to the .Communists while giving the

d emocratlc
""
.~n t h"
e~r

delay in beginning j9int occupation

wo~ld

have been an extremely.

valuable extension of time for the Ulbricht Group.
possible reason for the Soviet delay

The ten day

"
"11
or~entat~ons.

migh~

Still

have been

wanted more time to .remove "war booty" ,from Berlin. 12

tha~

anothe~

the ,Russians

This would have

been consistent with Soviet behavior throughout the other regions of
Germany that they occupied.
Prior to the

actua~

withdrawal of British .and

the·Soviet zone, the Americans insisted that some

Ameri~an

provision~

regarding access rights to Berlin by the Western.powers.
the British and American commands

ha~

troops from
be made

However, since

already announced their

inten~ion

of withdrawing from Saxony and Thuringia, their bargaining position with
the Russians was weakened.
of the negotiations.

11

This weakness was reflected in.the difficulty

In spite of the Western

Carola Stern, Ulbricht (London:

pp. 98-100.
l2F e~s,
.
p. 144 .

de~and

for several air,

Pall Mall Press, 1965),
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road, and rail corridors for use by the Western forces, the Russians
agreed to only one of each.
highway for the

Wester~

The

He1mstedt~Ber1in au~obahn

was to be the

allies and the rail connections which ran roughly

parallel to it were to serve as "their rail link with Berlin.
corridor would be on the same route

a~

The air

far as Magdeburg where ,it

divided into two ,routes, one to Hanover and one to Frankfurt/Main.
agreement was verbal and never

reco~ded

in an official document.

Thi,s
The

reason, according to the U.S. negotiator General Clay, was that they
feared the incorporation of the agreement into an official document
might be interpreted ,as a denial of Western
' 13
to Ber l In.

ac~ess,over,all

One point on which the West felt it achieve4 what it

wanted was the issue of the freedom of Western
routes.

other routes

acc~ss

over the land

The Western commanders stressed that all Allied traffic into

and out of Berlin must be free from the burden of search at the ,border.
This meant that neither civilian nor military authorities were to be
14
allowed to search Western vehicles on the ,access routes.
Finally, in the ,first days of July, 1945, the Western garrisons,
moved into Berlin as the ,American and British troops pulled out of
Sa.xony and Thuringia.

The Control Council was set up tQ administer

all of Germany and a four-power

Ko~andatura,

th~oretically

subordinate

to the Control Council, was established to administer Berlin

wh~ch

was

to be treated as a separate entity from the zones of occupation of

' h , pp. 83 - 85 .
l3Sml.t

14E'
'
Bl oc kade (N ew Yor:
k
rlC Morrls~

Norton and Co., 1962), p. 45.
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Germany.

The twenty boroughs of

~erlin

were divided into four.sectors.

The largest was the.Soviet

se~tor

consisting of eight borqughs in the

eastern part of the city.

The Americans tC?ok six boroughs.in the

southwest while the British received four in the west and the French
1S
occupied two in the north.
This division was made on the basis of
the 1920 law defining the
with the

populatio~s

admin~strativt:}

districts of Greater Berlin

of the boroughs as the .determining factors regarding

their disposition in the.respective zones.

The intention was to divide

the population of the city in accordance with the ,contributions of the
various powers who defeated Germany. 16 The Western powers ,were ,to be,
responsible for bringing in food and other supplies for their,twelve
buroughs since Zhukov had declared that the surrounding regions which
were now the .Soviet zone and formerly had supplied food for Berlin were
no longer able to support the entire city of Greater Berlin.

Thus, the,

sectors which came to be.known as West Berlin were immediately dependent
on the West for total support.
When the Kommandatura held its first

me~ting

four-power occupation of Berlin became a reality.

on July 11, the
The first. item of

business was a Soviet demand that all orders issued by the Russians
during the previous weeks.remain in effect until further notice.

The

Western representatives agreed to this and in doing so committed

lSIbid., pp. 68-69, 46.
16Wal ther Hub~ tsch, editor, The German Question (Ne~ York:
Book Center, 1967), pp. 246-249.

Hex:der
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what Western authorities now consider a serious mistake. 17 This action
has subsequently been cited by Communist sources as proof that all of
Berlin was to have been considered under the control of the Soviet
Military Administration in Germany and therefore part of what is now
the German Democratic Republic. 18
Having reviewed briefly what transpired after the fall of Berlin
and what provisions were made for the city during those first weeks, it
is important to note what the respective parties felt had evolved out of
this situation.

The Eastern view obviously differs markedly from that

of the Western nations.

For the West, the designation of Berlin as a

"special area" separate from the zones of occupation meant that it was
not part of the Soviet zone.

A succinct statement of the views of the

governments of the United States, Britain, and France was presented in
1948 in the identical notes addressed to the Soviet Union.

In those

notes, the Western powers asserted that "Berlin is not a part of the
Soviet zone, but is an international zone of occupation."

The notes

also reiterated the view that the American and British troops had been
withdrawn from the Soviet zone only on the basis of an agreement with
the USSR to guarantee Western access rights to Berlin. 19 This joint
statement reflected the uniformity of the Western positions regarding
the status of Berlin.

l7Smlt
. h ,p. 89 .
l8Yuri Rzhevsky, West Berlin (Moscow:
pp. 21-22.

Novosti Press, 1969),

19U. S. Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 205-206.
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While

publi~ations

of the .government of the Federal Republic of

· 20 Bonn has a 1so
Germany conce ded t he f our-power status 0f . Ber11n,
asserted from time to time that "West Berlin is a Land of the FRG.,,21
This view has represented the most extreme .opposite of the Communist
posi tion on the status of West Berlin.

Thi.s view has been noticeably

lacking in support from the occupying powers.
1953, 1958, and 1961 brought no

The crises of 1948-49,

changes in the positions of the FRG's

allies on this question.
The Soviet scqo1ar Yuri Rzhevsky, in evaluating the postwar
deve10pments.on Berlin, emphatically stated the
he declared". . . Berlin .

. .,

Sovie~

position when

despite the special occupation

arrangements instituted for it . . . , was not excluded from the .sphere
of ,supremacy of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, nor was it divorced
terri torially from the .Soviet zone of occupation. ,,22 The Soviets, cite
Section A, paragraph 1 of the Potsdam Agreement.in defense of their
position.

This paragraph states .that "supreme.authority in Germany"

will be exercised by each.of the occupying powers "each in his own
zone of occupatiol1." The Control Council .is to act on the ,basis of
unanimous.votes "in matters affecting Germany as a whole.,,23

For the

20A bis Z: Ein Taschen- ulld Nachschlagebuch uber den anderen Teil
Deutsch1ands (A to Z: A Fact and Reference Book on the Other Part of
Germany) (Bonn: German Federal Press, 1969), p. 93.
21 Helmut Arntz, Facts About Germanr(Bonn: Press and Information
Office of the FRG, 1968), p. 19.
22 Rzhevsky, p. 16.
23Germanr 1947-1949:

The Storr in Documents, pp. 47-48.
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Soviets, the important·contrast is

betwee~

the "supreme authority" of

the occupying powers and the .functions of "administration" which were.
tv be.he1d by the

Ko~datura

in Berlin.

The view that the .West has

the same rights in Berlin as the USSR is specifically rejected.

The

West may have the right to "administer" twelve boroughs of Berlin on a.
temporary basis, but the USSR is still the "supreme at,lthox:ity" in those.
areas accQrding to Soviet spokesmen. 24 In addition, occupation of West
Berlin by the Western powers "does not make the occupying state

t~e

soVerf'igll of the.occupied .territory.,,25
According to Soviet accounts, the Western troops, entered Berlin,
not as a result of any agreement regarding the withdrawal from Saxony
and Thuringia, but essentially as "guests" of.the
had 1iberested the city.

Sovie~

In its notes of July 14, 1948,

forces which
addres~ed

the U.S. and Britain, the Soviet government stressed that the

to

Wester~

right of access to West. Berlin was nothing more than an act of goodwill
U'
.
on t h e yart.o f t.e
nlon. 26
h SOVlet

agreement which

estab~ished

Soviet historians declare that the

four-power administration of Berlin

"d~dnot

grant the Western powers any special rights to determine the order of
access to Berlin.,,27 The agreement on access was not written down as

24 Rzhevsky, pp. 14-18.
25 Ibid ., p. 19.
26Germany 1947-1949:

The StOry in Documents, pp. 207-208.

27 B. Ponomaryov, editor, History.of Sovie~ Foreign Policy
1917-1945 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 473.
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the Western powers, for various
written agreement.
the

questio~

reaso~s,

saw no need. for a specific,

Apparently, some Westerners feared

of access rights, they might:

presence in Berlin.

That presence

itse~f

cal~

tha~

by raising

into questioJl. the Western

was seen by many as implying

' t y. 28
. hts to t h
access r1g
,e C1
After the formation of ,East Germany as a

s~ate,

the new

East·Ge~man

government adQpted a position similar to that of theUSSR.regarding the,
stat4S of Berlin.
this

way~

One East German authority described

th~

situation in

"Berlin and the Soviet occupation zone were one and the same,

there was no difference

b~tween

the Soviet occupation forces.,,29

them; b9th were under jurisdiction of
Concerning the matter ,of West Bex:lin

itself, the charge is made that "West Berlin is not

ev~n

a city, but

only part of one. II30 The implication of this is quite clear.
West

Be~lin

Since

is only part of .a city, it must be part of ,the city of

Greater Berlin.

Since Berlin and the Soviet zone were parts

o~

a single

entity, West Berlin is clearly being designated as part of the German
Democratic Republic.

Carrying this. further, the

.autho~

of these

statemeI)ts asserts that West Berlin is obviously not a Land of the
FRG. 31 The East German account repeats the Soviet version of the
Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura as mere administrative

28William M. Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin,"
Wcrld Politics, Vol. XVI (Oc~ober, 1963), pp. 23-25.
29Gerhard Kegel, Twenty Five Years After Potsdam (Berlin, GDR:
Zeit,im Bild, 1970), p. 96.

Ve~lag

30 Ibid ., p. 92.

31 Ibid ., p. 95.

19
organs

exer~ising

no real authority over the territory of Berlin.

The

four-power status of Berlin is labeled as temporary since'the Western
powers "never had and today do not have any 'original' rights . • . to
the occupation of the western sectors of Berlin." The fact that even
after the Western garrisons were moved into the city the Soviet
authorities retained control of all railway installations plus the
Berlin waterways is declared to be a practical confirmation of the
Soviet's already "unequivocal" legal position. 32
II.

DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1945 TO 1948:

THE BLOCKADE OF BERLIN

In the first months after the establishment of four·power control
in Germany it became apparent that the eastern and western zones were
following vastly different policies.

Presumably, four-power control

had been intended to facilitate unity in the .efforts to reconstruct
Germany as well as Berlin.

However, this was certainly not proving to

be. the case.
Both economic and political issues divided the four occupying
powers.

One of the first disruptive qUesticns was the matter of

reparations.

American officials objected to the fact that while their

country was spending substantial amounts to prevent the Germans from
starving the Russians were systematically taking reparations from the
current production of Soviet zone factories without consulting the,
Western powers in

accordanc~

32 Ibid ., p. 99.

with the requirements.of the Postdam
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Agreement.
Wes~

In response to

t~eseSoviet

ac1;ions, on.May 3, 1946,

halted delivery to the .Russians.of dismantled plants from

Western zones even

tho~gh,

according to

t~e

Potsdam Agreement,

th~

th~
t~ey

were entitled to 25 percent of .the dismantled factories in West Germany
,
33
as reparatlons.
In Berlin further disagreements

a~ose.because

of the

uncooperativ~

activites of·the borough administra1;ions in the western sectors of the
city.

These administrators, of course, had been appointed under the

supervision of.the Russians and under the immediate

d~rection

Ulbricht Group in the firs1; days after the fall .of Berlin.

of the

As a result

of their open defiance of tbe military authorities many of the borough.
mayors hadt 0 b e remove.
db y the ml'I'+tary . 34
Additional problems were posed in Berlin because of,the
of Soviet marauding in

th~

Western. sectors.

Allied Military Policy had

to use force to restrain the Soviets on many occasions.
West

Berline~s

conti~uation

Kidn;pping of

also became a continual thr.eat .as East Berlin agents

crosseq. into the West to get not .only ordinary .citizens~ but several
important officials also.

In addition to this, disagreement

regarding the use of Berlints press and radio facilities.

~ose

The West

believed that it was entitled to share in control of Radio Berlin and
the national German transmitter.

The Western

authori~ie$

also suggested

33John C. Campbell, editor, The United States in World Affairs,
1945-1947 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. l82-l~7.

34W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade (Princeton:.
University Press, 1958), p. 32.

Princeton
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that four-power control be established over the .newspaper of the German.
city

gove~nment,

the Berliner Zeitung.

any of these issues.

The. Soviets refused to yield on

However,. when the Bri Ush announced. their

intentions to publish a

German~language

the Russians. insisted that it would

b~

newspaper

th~mse1vesin

Berlin,

better if all of the four

occupying powers sponsored one newspaper jointly.

As it turned out,

there . was to be no jointly controlled media in Berlin.

In 1946 the
35
U.S. military government started its own radio station, R.I.A.S ..
In spite of these disagreements, for the first year four-power
ad~inistration

in Berlin proceeded without serious disruptions.

The

first major dispute came with the attempt in 1946 to merge the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Communist Party.

It became obvious that

what this amounted to was an effort to swallow up the SPD in a new
party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), 1.'Jhich would be dominated by the
Communists and manipulated by the Soviet

authoritie~.

We~tern

occupation authorities insisted that democratic procedures be used in
implementing the merger and that it be allowed only after an affirmative
vote by the membership of both parties.

The West also took measures to

protect antimerger SPD leaders who were subjected to Soviet intimidation ..
The result was that a vote was taken on March 31, 1946 in which the West
Berlin SPD voted agatost

me~ger

by a margin of 19 to 2.

Even though the

Eastern SPD under the leadership of Otto ,Grotewohl was merged with the,
Communist Party, the West Berlin SPD remained independent and, after the

35 Ibid ., pp. 32-33.
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merger, got rid of its m~st slavishly pro-Soviet eleme~ts.36

The ,SED's

party history ignores the vote by the membership of the West Berlin SPD
and simply insists ,that the leadership of the West Bex:lin SPD was in the
.
. Comm~n1sm
. " ,an d'" 1mper1a
. l'15m. ,,37
serv1ce
0 f"
, ant1-

The second,crisis of major proportions.arose over the issue of
municipal elections for Berlin.

After considerable Soviet

the date for the elections was set as October 20, 1946.

objectio~s,

During the

election campaign the ,entire resources of the Soviet cOIl)l1land in Berlin
was, thrown behind the ef.forts of. the SED. The SED was, provided with,
ample

li~erature

to distribute as well as with food and coal briquettes

to hand out to the voters,

In a further effort to pressure the voters,

in the Western sectors, the amount of electric power allowed to flow
from Soviet-controlled generators into West Berlin was sharply reduced. 38
In. spi te of this m.assive effort, the SED received only 21 percent of the
votes in the Soviet sector and even less in the Western sectors.
SED citywide total was 412,000 votes.

The

The strongest pax:ty was the SPD,

which had better than 48 percent of the vote citywide, a

tot~l

of over,

The Christian Democratic Party was second with 462,000
39
votes and a total of 22 percent of the total vot~.
The Soviet command
1,01~,OOO

votes.

responded to this defeat by

r~fusing

to allow the newly elected city

government to assume the full authorities due to it.

When it became

36 Ibid ., pp. 37~45.
370tto Reinhold, editor, Seht, welche Kraftl (See, What Strengthl)
(Berlin, GDR: Dietz Verlag, 1971) ,. p. 67 •.

38Davis~n, pp. 45-47.

39Reinhold, p. 79.
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cl~ar

that Ernst . Reuter, who was seen as

pr~ssure,

unlik~ly

to yield to. Soviet

was going to become the new mayor, the Russians refused to

allow him to take office .. As a result, BerHn had no mayor during much.
of 1947'and all of 1948. 40
As the struggle for both governmental and nongovernmental power·.
was continuing in Berlin, British, American and French representatives
met for talks in London.

The Benelux countries were invited but no
I

invitation was· ·given to the USSR .. On March 6, 1948, the conference
announced that it had agreed on further economic coordination among
the Western zones and also on plans for a federal form of government
in those areas. 4l Amid rumors that the .Soviets planned to blockade the
city, on March 20th the Soviet delegation walked out of the ,Control
Commission in protest to the actions of.the London conference.
In the following weeks there occurred a rapid sequence of

even~s

which made the USSR's intentions to apply pressure o.n West Berlin very
clear.

On March 3l.the Soviet authorities announced that inspection by

Soviet military personnel would be required before Western military
passenger trains were allowed to travel through the Soviet zone.

On

April 1 they announced.that.Soviet approval would be required before.
freight could leave Berlin.

One of the .most.serious incidents.occurred

on April 5 when a Soviet interceptor collided with a British plane While

40Davison, pp. 49-51.
4lJohn C. Campbell, editor, The United States in World Affairs,
1947-1948 (New York: Harper &Brothers, 1948), pp. 466-467.
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harrassing its entry into

We~t

Berlin.

u.s.

In May the

Army Signal

Corps personnel who ,maintained communications lines between,West.Berlin
and

Wes~

Germany were expelled

fro~

the

Sovie~

zone.

Later in May the

Soviets began to require additional documentati.on for freight coming
int.o Berlin, from the .west and

i~

'
supp1y tra1ns
were h e 1d up on

var~.ous.tec hn'

June an increasing

The climax of this series .of
Jtlne.

The Western Allies,

'

num~er

.of civilian

1ca 1"1t1es. 42

c.onfrontatio~s

rea~izing

came in the middle .of

that the S.oviets were.n.ot going to

cooperate in measures to halt the inflation that was destroying the
German ec.onomy, announced that a new currency W.ou1d be intr.oduced.

Less

than a week later, on June 24, the new currency was secretly brought
int.o West Berlin and ,replaced the city's
response was to i JllJll ediate1y halt all rail

old.curr~ncy.

tra~fic

The Soviet

int.o West Berlin.

The Western reply was the initiati.on of a massive·air1ift operati.on
for the city.

In an effort to appeal t.o West Berliners, the East

Germans made an offer in July of 1948 to give rati.on cardst.o any West
Berlinex:s who would "register" in the Eastern sector.

In spite of the

deprivations West Berliners suffered duriIlg the eleven month blockade,
the number accepting the offer never rose above 70,000 out .of the city's
population of .over two million West Berliners. 43
The apparent Soviet belief that the West would surrender West.
Berlin was dem.olished by the determined. united resistance of the Allies

42Frederick Hartmann, Germany Between East and West (Englewoo~
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc .• 1965). pp. 41-42.
43 Ibid .• pp. 42-44.
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and the citizens of West Berlin.

The fact

t~t

the USSR had

ref~sed

to

supply the Western sectors,as soon as ,the American, British, and French
garrisons moved in in 1945

actua~ly

helped the ,West ,since they. had.

already developed a system of supplying West Berlin.
met~od

simply forced them to find another
had formerly moved,by land routes.

Had

West Berlin with many essential

of bringing in supplies which

American and British aircraft became

the.alternate means of transportation in
associated with this method.

The·.b1ockade

th~

spi~e

of the many difficulties

Soviet Union not refused to supply

mat~ria1s

in 1945, the Western task

would have been much.more difficult.
After several months ,of bargaining with the Russians over a variety
of demands, the Western powers were successful.

At midnight on ,May

1949 the highways and rail lines to West Berlin were reopened.

l~,

Th~

success of the air+ift operation had made this possible without any
major Western concessions to tqe USSR.

Yet, while the West had not lost

during the bargaining, it had not gained much either.

There was still

no written guarantee of Western access rights to West, Berlin.

The

situation remained as it had been during the summer of 1945.
III.

THE 1958 BERLIN CRISIS

While the years after the ending of the blockade were free from anY
major crisis, there were several significant confrontations.

The first

was in 1949 as a result of West Berlin's inclusion in the Marshall Plan.
This was met with strong

objectio~s

by the Communists who, in a GDR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, described this as·an effort to
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develop West Berlin as an outpost ,of "imperia.lism.,,44

In ,response to

this development, the USSR imposed a processing slowdown of Western
military traffic on the ,He1mstedt-Berlin autobahn in January, 1950.
While the slowdown was not uninterr,upted, it was \ reimposed from time
to time fQr almost,two months.

In July the Soviet Union began

short-term interruptions of the ,flow of electricity into West Berlin.
In September the West Berlin powe:r plant buH t under the Marshall Plan
was able to meet the requirements

o~

West Berlin

the East, so the effectiveness of ,this

Communis~

In 1952 another trayel ban was imposed on the

witho~t as~istance

from

lever was terminated.

autobah~ aga~nst,Amer~can

and British vehicles, but was lifted within eight days after

a.stat~ment

by the U.S. Secretary of State declaring the intention of the ,U.S. to
remain in West

Be~lin.

Several days later the East German authorities

cut West Berlin's telephone service with the East and the USSR closed
the ,border between East and West Berlin to West Berliners.
of this action was to deprive over 30,000 West

The effect

of bungalows
and allotments which they possessed in the Eastern sector. 45
Be~liners

Lack of agreement between the nations ,of·the
led, in 1949, to the

completio~

a~ti-Hitler

coalition

of plans .for the creation in the Western

occupation zones of a new federal republic.

In May the ,Western Military

Governors ,approved the Basic Law for the new

Germ~n

state and elections

44Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ,GDR, How Germany Was Divided:
Documentation (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 19~6), p. 63.,
4SStefan Brant, T~e East Gepnan:Rising (New York:
p. 33.

Praeger, 1957),
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were held for the Federal Republic's par liaJl\ent in August.
resulted in

w~t

U.S. Secretary of

Sta~e

Acheson

des~ribed

The elections
as.a "victory

for moderation and common sense" and the formal establishment of a
gover~ent

for the Federal Republic of Germa~y under the leadership of.
46
Konrad Adenauer.
Adena~er himself described this develQpment and the

Occupation

which facilitated it as Germany's ,best ch~nce for
regai~ing its freedom. 47 The view from the East was somewh~t different
Statut~

regarding this development.

The official SED history describes this

event as a signal of the intention of the Western powers ,to create a
separate German state which would be a "satellite" of the United States.
Furthermore, it continues, the selection of Adenauer.to head the new
government proved the willingness of the new state to be a tool of
48
imperialism and capitalism.
The creation of the German Democratic
Republic shortly after the establishment of the Federal Republic was·
described not only as evidence of the determination of the USSR to
refuse to allow all of Germany to be. turned into a capitalist "puppet,"
but also as a1) "historic achievement" by which a "workers and peasants
state" had been created to aqvance the interests of.all "peace-loving

46Richard P. Stebbins, editor, The United States in World Affairs,
1949 (New York: Hal'per & Brothers, 1950), pp. 177-18147Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-1953 (Chicago:
Company, 1965), p. 185.
48Reinhold, pp. 95-97.

Henry Regnery
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Germans."

49

This new Soviet-oriented state was ,placed ostensibly under

the .leadership of the newly created Socialist Unity Party of Germany
(SED) •
Meanwhile, the steady flow

o~

refugees from East Germany:and gast

Berlin into West Berlin and the FRG served as
unpopula~ity

evid~nceof

of the Soviet administration in the East

acting at least partially

~hrough

the

wh~ch

the SED dominated GDR

ext~eme

was now
and

gove~nrnent

thus marl5.ing the first significant step in the evollltion of tQ.e East
German state.

The lack of popular support for this new creation became

painfully obvious when, on ,June .16, 1953, riots broke out in East
which were followed by
day.

mor~

disturbances thrqughout the zone the next

Order was restored only after Soviet military

the regime.

~erlin

interven~ion

saved

In spite of.the opportunity that these events seemed to

offer the Western powers, there was no Western effort to interfere in
East German affairs during the riots.

The failure of the. West to .show

a willingness to act with force in order to free East Germany from
Soviet domination undoubtedly' served to strengthen the inclination of
East Germans to resign

the~selves

to their

situa~ion.

In an effort to

stabilize the East German regime the ,authorities of the .GDR government
prohibited travel from East Germany to Berlin on August 1, 1953. 50
The exodus from the ,Soviet zone, however, continued in spite

o~

these

efforts.

49 B• Ponomaryov, editor, History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1~70
(Mo~cow:
Progress Publishers, 1973), pp. 198-200.

SOSmith, p. 370.
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In the years after

195~,

West Berlin served as a continual source

of irritation to the Soviet Union •. Not only was it an embarrassment,
it was a threat to the stability of.a
state.

mil~tari1y

important.sate1lite

By 1958~ the USSR felt strong enough to issue a direct challenge.

to the West on the question of West Berlin.

In a Kremlin press

conference on November 27, 1958, Khrushchev declared that ,the situation
in Berlin was

"ab~orma1"

and that West Bedin was a."convenient place"

for the Western powers to conduct an aggressive policy against
GeI:many, the USSR, and all of the Warsaw Pact states.

Ea~t

Accordingly, the

Soviet government suggested the abolition of the ,"outworn foreign
military occupation of West
demilitarized city.,,5l

Be~lin

and turning it into a free

Should the West refuse to consider this

suggestion, a separate peace treaty between the .USSR and East Germany
would be signed and Western rights in Berlin would be terminated ,without
Western consent.

Th~

plan, as presented by the Soviets, would not upset

the political order in West Berlin or alter the independence of.the
city.

The USSR would

beco~e

the guarantor of

~est

Berlin's independence

and the supplier of those materials essential to its survival.

The

Western powers would no longer be needed in Berlin and would be

compell~d

to depart from the Western sectors.
While the Soviet offer was phrased in very conciliatory terms, it
left no doubts about what rejection of this plan would mean.
Western powers refuse to sign a peace

tre~ty

Should the

with both German states

5lPonomaryov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-lQ70,
pp. 366-368.
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incorporating the plan for a "free city" of West Berlin,
sign a Separate peace with East Germany.

th~

USSR would

The result would be that East

Germany would have "sovereign rights" over West Berlin and the West
would have no access rights to the city.

A Western effort.to use force

to enter Berlin would be considered as the beginning of war by the,
Soviet Union .. This threat

wa~

coupled with a reminder a few days later

by a Soviet general that the USSR now had the military capability to
give the United States an "annihilating defeat" in the event of wa~.52
The Soviet Union had given the West a period of six
withdraw their troops' from West Berlin.
Soviets responded by

~xtending

mon~hs

to

When the deadline passed, the

the deadline.

Finally, when negotiations

were underway at Geneva on the Berlin question, the Russians could claim
that the West was in the process of fulfilling the requirements of the
ul timatum.
boasted that

Meanwhile, Otto Grotewohl,. Minister President of the GDR,
Ea~t Ge~many

had gotten de facto recognition by being

allowed to participate in the G.eneva conference in an advisory capacity
along with West Germany.

In June of 1959 another time limit for a

Western withdrawal was announced but it too was later extended for an
additional six months.

Finally, in July Soviet Politburo member Fro1

Kozlov, according to Western reports, denied while visiting the United
States that any ultimatum existed. 53 By the end of 1959, it .became
clear that the USSR had no intention of forcing a solution of.the West
Berlin problem or of.enforcing any withdrawal deadlines.

52Hans Speier, Divided Berlin (New York:
53Ibid . , pp. 33-35.

Praeger,. 1961), p. 29.
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IV.

THE BVILD:NG OF THE WALL.

The only point on which both sides were in agreement at the .end of
the Geneva conference in 1959 was the Western offer not.to station
nuclear.or rocket ~eapons in West Berlin. 54 Aside from this relatively
unimportant issue
Berlin.

not~ing

else was resolved regarding the

futur~

of

For the West, the uncertainty of access rights and the challenge

to their continued presence in Berlin remained.

For the East, the

serious drain of East German manpower through Berlin continued.

For

both sides, Berlin continued to be an important stage of.espionage
activities of all sorts.
It was the Eastern problem which most

con~ributed

of the Berlin situation over .the next two years.

to the instability

The drain· on the East

German economy caused by the steady loss of many of its most qualified
people across the border into West Berlin and the ,Federal Republic
threatened to topple the SED regime.
averaged

approxima~ely.200,000

Prior to 1958,

per year.

th~

rate o,f ,escapes

In 1953, the. number had risen

to over 330,000 while in 1951 the country had lost only 165,000 across
the frontier.

While in 1959 the figures dropped to 144,000, by early in

1961" the regime was experiencing the ,loss.of 25,000 each month,
according to West German sources. 55

54John Mander, Berlin:
Books, 1962), p. 77.

Hostage for the West (Baltimqre:

S5 Ber l'~n: C"
r~s~s an d Cha 11 enge (N ew Y
or k :
Center, 1963), p. 28.

Penguin

German Information
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East German officials described the situation as ,intolerable but in
so doing their ,references were not to the flight of East German:citizens
alone.

While it is reasonable

~o

assume that 1;his was the primary

reason for the sealing of the border in Berlin, the GDR
insisted that there was a far graver justification.
during the summer of 1961 ,sabotage and "subversionist

officia~s

It was ,charged that
activit~es",

against East Germany from West Berlin had increased to drastic
proportions.

A fire in, the East Berlin stockyards on August 7 was
56
blamed on saboteurs from West Berlin.
An even more fanta~tic ,charge

was made by SED

Politb~ro

member Albert Norden who has alleged that the

West was preparing for war against ,East

Ger~any

in 1961.

NATO is

charged with having no less than "thirty-two different plans fO,r
A military truck convoy was to challenge the .Eas1; "Gernm,n

B~rlin."

in~pectors,

the, He1mstedt-Berlin autobahn and attempt to crash through the

on

bar~iers.

If this convoy was fired on by East German guards, it was to return

fire.

If additional East German troops were brought up, a',second convoy.

wi th supporting tanks was to join the first.,

If necessd..I.'y, a I I small

atom bomb!' was to be dropped on a big concentration of Eastern troops.
Simultaneously,

the~e

were to be attacks

~n

the GDR's Baltic coast.

According to Norden, NATO had already rehearsed its attack on the East
German northern, flank.

Western troqps were

the western sectors of tQe city.

~o

enter East Berlin from

Norden concedes that many of the GDR's

most highly skilled citizens were leaving by way of West Berlin but

56How Germany Was-Divided, p. 155.
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vic~imized

insists that they were merely. being

by the, "enticements'~ of

the West which were part of the ,campaign to destroy the .GDR as a state
and incorporate it into West Germany.57
B~rlin

of the

was· filled

constru~tioll

wi~h

rumors during the weeks before the beginning

of the Wall on

Augu~t

1.3.

There were rumors that

there might be ,an explosive uprising in E.ast Germany and stories that
many East German officials.had made
Berlin.

statement~

about taking over ,West,

In spite of this atmosphere, most of the ,Western leaders did

not anticipate that something would happen until that fall.

For example,

in an interview.several years. later, former U.S. Secretary of State Dean.
Rusk said that while "we had expected the Russians to take;some measure
to halt the hemorrhage of East Germans.into West Berlin," that action
had not been expected until much 1ater. S8
The first official word
closed came in an

ear~y

tha~

the border with West Berlin had

morning broadcast on Radio GDR.

b~en

The announcement

began with a list of threats said. to be emanating from West Berlin,
including a reference to the "systematic enticement of ,GDR citizens afld
a thorough-going

tra~fic

in human beings." For these reasons, listeners,

were told, the GDR Council of

Minister~,

in agreement with the Political

Consultative Committee of ,the Warsaw Pact, had adqpted a series of
mea~;ures

.

Controls were to be introduced "along the frontiers of the

57Albert Norden, Thus Wars Are ,Made (Dresden:
1970), pp. 285-286,·290.292.

Verlag Zeit im Bild,

58E1eanor Dulles, The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 25-27.
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GDR, including those with the

W~s.tern

sectors of Greater

In

Berli~.'"

Berlin, "reliable surveillance and effective controls" were.to be.
established along the West Berlin frontiex:s "in order to block subversive
activitie$."

East Berliners.would require a special permit to go to

West Berlin although West Berliners would still be allowed to. visit the.
East.

The announcement concluded with the statement that these measures

would remain in ef.fect "pending the conclusion of a German .peace

tre~ty."

Later broadcasts went into detail 'regarding the physical arrangements
that were being made for closing certain.subway lines and the Berlin
elevated rail service, the S-Bahn.

In addition, . East German citizens

not working in Berlin were "requested to refrain from journeys to Berlin
until
.
.further notice. ,,59
\

The first measures in

const~ucting

what

~he

East·German government

referred to as an "antifascist, protective wall" consisted of barbed
wire fastened by

wood~n

wall that eventually was
East

·Be~liners

posts.

However, within a few days, the concrete

const~ucted

began to takE) shape.

who lived in houses or apartments

al~ng

On August 20,

the border were

ordered to move out as preparations began to clear a.wide area for
patro~s inside the Wall. 60 Security measures along the Wall were
steadily tightened and on August 29, the first escaping East German
61
wa~ killed by border guards.

59BBC Summary of·. World Broadcasts (hereafter noted as SWB),
August 14, 1961, EE/71S/ All 3-4.
60Arno SchQlz, Stacheldraht.um Berlin (Barbed Wire Around Berlin)
(West Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft, 1961), p. 36.
61 Ibid ., p. 74.
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Although General Lucius Clay and Vice-President ,Lyndon Johnson
arrived in West Berlin,within a few days to
concern for the ,independence of West
deliberately restrained.

Be~lin,

symbol~ze

the United

Stat~s'

the American response was

The America.n note which was delivered to the

Soviet commanders in East Berlin was not a formal protest as such, but
simply a statement of what had taken place and a condemnation of the
62
Communist actions.
One U.S. Senator, Fulbright, actually defended the
63
East German actions.
This restra~nt was typical of the reactions of
all the Western powers in Berlin.

There were massive protest rallies in

West Berlin and West Germany, but. the Western
powers
.

too~

no

comply with the West German demands to knock the Wall down.
the West saw the ,Berlin situation as explosive

an~

actio~

to

Apparently,

unstable before the

erection of the Wall and felt that by constructing the Wall, the
Communists had at least brought ,stability to a

situat~on

that had

contained the potential for erupting into war.
V.

FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL THROUGH 1967

The West ,evidently felt

tha~

Western rights in Berlin were not

endangered by the construction of the Wall.

Only after the massive

East German military concentrations were observed around the Western
64
sectors did the allied commanders put their troops ,on alert.
Finally,
62

Dulles, p. 76.

63Smith, pp. 259-260.
64 Ibid ., p. 279.

.•

they began to feel that their rights might possibly be affected.

The

threat, however, was seen in pureiy tactical, not political, terms.
The milc;lness of the Western .response doubt;less encouraged the East
Germans ,to make their measures much more

exten~ive.

After the border

was sealed, they cut the telephone ,and telegraph lines.

On August 15

West Serlin vehicles were prohibited from entering the ,East withqut
special permits by the Communist authoJ.:'ities. 65 This action represent~d
one of the first real threats to Western rights in Berlin.
While the thoroughness of .the GDRls measures resulted in an,a1most
immediate decline in trade between West Berlin and East Germany, the
East German economy up to this

tim~

had such a national orientation and

placed so little emphasis on foreign trade that litt1~ significance can
be attached to this rnatter. 66 Of greater signif~cance was the ,diminished
human contacts

b~tween

West Berlin and the East.

Shortly after the

initial East German half of regular .visits by West Berliners to the East,
it ,became apparent that the Communists intenqed to sever human ties as
completely as possible.

The only grounds.for approval of visits by

West Berliners on a routine basis, as opposed to those following from
special governmental arrangements, after ,the construction of the Wall
became that of "compassionate" reasons, to
dying relative, for example.

vis~t

a seriously ill or

The first "cqmpassionate.passes" were

65 Ibid ., p. 279.
66Wolfgang Stolper, The Structure of the East.GeI:'IDanEconomy
Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 12-13.

(Camb~idge:

·.
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granted in October of 1964 and by the .end of 1967 over 70,000 had been
.

d . 67

~ssue'

In December of 1963 the first Christmas'passes were issued· after
the completion of.in arrangement negotiated by West Berlin's·Mayor
~randt

and the East German government.

Approximately 1.2 million passes

were issued for a period of eighteen days during the .Christmas season. 68
The East used these agreements ,in an effort to extract as much
recognition as possible for the GDR government by making
demands during the issuance of the passes ~

a,vari~ty

of

Repeated demands, for

example, were ,made that higher ranking Western,officia1s deal with

the~

rather than the medium-ranked officers who were involved .inmost of the
contacts. 69
For the ,next.three years there was considerable
efforts to

renegotia~e

succes~

in the

passes for Christmas and other special days.

In September, 1964, a new pass agreement was concluded with the East
Germans.by the Bonn Erhard government which was scheduled to extend
until June, 1965.

Under the same agreement

re~ired

pensioners were

allowed to go from East Germany to visit relatives in the West fot: as
long as four weeks.

During the summer ·of 1965 another agreement ,was
70
reached on passes for the next year.

67David Shears, The Ugly: Frontier (New York:
1970), p. 200.

Alfred A. ,Knopf,

68E1eanor Dulles, Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever· (Chapel Hill ~
University of·North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 93-94.
69 Ibid ., p. 9~.

70 Ibid ., pp. 97-98.
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In spite of the occasional breaks in the East German policy of
severance of human contacts across the Wall, the political climate after
the construction of the ·Wal1 improved very little.

In October, 1961,

just as the Soviet leader Gromyko was making a speech in Moscow berating
the determination of the West to defend the rights of West Ber1in"l one
of the most serious confrontations was taking place.

On October 26,

East German border guards stopped a group of Americans in a civilian car.
with military- license plates attempting to pass through Checkpoint
Charlie.

The East Germans refused to allow the Americans to pass

without showing their military identification cards.

The American

vehicle went back to the West only to return to the Checkpoint
accompanied by an armada

of tanks as an escort.

The East German guards

stood by as the tanks proceeded with the civilian car into East Berlin.
For several days afterward combat ready Soviet and American forces faced
72
each other across the Wall.
In early 1962 another confrontation occurred when

Sovie~

began to interfere with the air corridors into West Berlin.

planes
After a

strong American and British protest the interference was finally
stopped.

Shortly afterward, in April, the Americans toyed with the

idea of having the Berlin access routes placed under the supervision
of a thirteen nation agency which presumably would have operated

7lRobert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961 (Baltimore:
Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 399.
72

Scholz, p. 80.

Johns
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through the United Nations.

When the intensity of West German opposition

to this proposal became k~own, it was promptly forgotten. 73
Political and military pressure

on.WestBerl~n

decreased

considerably after the Cuban crisis .in October, 1962.

Not only did this,

Soyiet-Ameri.can confrontation, seemingly unrelated to the West Berlin
issue, help raise the sagging prestige of the United States in Berlin,
it seemed to ,deflate the USSR's apparent
Berlin.

self~confidence

regarding

This development clearly illustrated how closely the West

Berlin issue was tied in the ,fabric of major power policies.

The Cuban

crisis of 1962, a clear defeat of an important Soyiet policy and an
apparent Western triumph, resulted in the adoption of.a more
policy by the .USSR on West
tha~

Be~lin.

Some scholars have

ca~tious

hypothe~ized

the .Soviet introduction of missiles in Cuba in 1962 was intended

as,a lever for forcing a settlement of the .Berlin and the .German
problems favorable.to the Kremlin.

The Cuban defeat, therefore, had

consequences seemingly unrelated to Cub~.74
In 1963,

W~stern st~nding

in West Berlin was further improved,by

the visit of U.S. President Kennedy to the city.

In a mass rally after

a personal visit to the Wall, Kennedy assured West Berliners that
freedom throughout the world was ,at stake in Berlin and that the U.S.
was willing to fight, if necessary, for the rights of. West

Be~liners.

In June, 1964, the Soviet Uniol1 concluded a treaty with East
Germany which was, apparently a substitute for the long-awaited separate

73Hartmann, p. 126.

74 Slusser, p. ix.
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While. it called for a ."no~~lization" of the situation in

peace treaty.

West Berlin and pledged the USSR's support in maintaining the ."integrity
of the state f:rontiers of the GDR," it did.not threaten Western rights.
Wes,t Berlin was described. in
,
75
entity."

th~

treaty as "an independent political.

When the. West German legislature held a plenary session in.West
Berlin

th~

next April, a custom it;had followed for more than a decade,

the Communist

re~ponse

was relatively restrained.

not threatened and the USSR

limited.itse~f

Access routes were

to occasional interruptions

of the .speeches in the Bundestag with sonic booms caused by the
low-flying Russian fighter planes over the building in which the session
was being he1d. 76
Aside from

th~

infrequent

cQnfronta~ions

such as

t~ose.mentioned

here, the. first six years after the construction of the Wall were
relatively peaceful.

There were many incidents ,along the .Wa1l and five

East German border guards were killed by West Berlin policemen.when they
fired on escaping refugees who had reached West Berlin territory.
During the same time over sixty refugees are known to have been killed
. Ber l'~n. 77 Meanwh'l
·
dur~ng
wou ld - be escapes ~n
~ e, over
Germans.were reportedly arrested an4 jailed by the .GDR

.

s~x

thousand Eas t

autho~ities

75Mi1estones of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967. (Moscow:
Publishers, 1967), pp. 222-223.
76 Shears., p. 198.

for

Prqgress

77Rainer Hildebrandt, Es Geschah an der Mauer. (It Happened at the
Wall) (West Berlin: Arqeitsgemeinschaft 13 August e. v., 1968), p. 60.
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attemp~ed."flight

from the Republic,". an

of£ens~

f ~'ft een months"
. ~mpr~sonment. 78

The exact. number

in their.flights is not .known.

There seems.to

approximately 16,000 escaped by going over,

carrying a
0

se~tence·of

f t hose wh0, succee ded

be.gene~al

th~ough,

agreement.that

or under the .Wa.ll,

or by crossing the .so-called "green frontier" between East and West
Germany during the first two years after .the erection of the Wall~79
During subsequent years:the number was.considerably.smaller although
there.is litt1e.agreement on just how

~arge

that number is.

MeaIlwhi1e, the East German ecqnomy finally begaIl to improve.
Wall played no small part in

thi~

improvement.

The

The importance of the

Wall to the .East German ec~nomy was· emphasized by Politburq member
Albert Norden who has written·that after August 13, 1961, the GDR was.
"at last able to put the laws of Socialism into practice without
disruption from outside.,,80

For years the open border in Berlin had

drained most of the average of over 200,000 people who left East Germany
every year.
74

Of these refugees, 50 percent were under. twenty-five and

They represented many of ·.the youngest
and best trained people in East Germany. 81 Now·that the flow had all
perc~nt

were under forty-five.

but ended, the East German economy.was freed from one of its greatest.
handicaps.

78 Ibid ., p. 75.
79 Ber l'~n:

Cr~sis

80Norden, pp. 282-283.
81 Hartmann, p. 124.

p. 28.•
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VI.

FROM 1945 TO 1967: . AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE EAST GERMANS

It was obvious. when the

Sovie~

Army entered Berlin in.1945 that the

local Germans in their zone of occupation were playing the ,most minor of
roles in a script written entirely by the Russians.
and those it recruited were clearly not.allowed to
independel)ce.

If the role of the Germans in

t~e

The Ulbricht Group
ac~.with

any

Western zones differed

it.was only to the degree that they were ignored more than their Eastern
counterparts who were acting, literally, as agents for the Soviet
Military Administration and. the Commul)ist .Party of the Soviet Union.
By the time of the .1948.Berlin blockade, the status .of the East
Ge~mans

had risen only slightly.

The creation of the People's Council.

in 1948 by the Soviet authorities as a response to Western intentions
to create·the Federal Republic of Germany assigneC;l the ,East ,Germans a,
somewhat more.important role, but it was still a Soviet-written script
in a Soviet drama.
The 1958 ultimatum by Khrushchev represented an additional increase
in the status of the East

German~.

They now, of course, had their own

government and that government had become the pivot of an important
Soviet diplom,atic and poli ~ical .offensive against, the West.
meaning of the Soviet
were.going to

b~

me~sage

The clear.

to the West was that the Western powers.

having to deal with the.East.Germans directly if they

did not cooperate.

The East Germans could.almost be .seen as a club with

which the USSR could threaten the Western powers.
The Berlin crisis of 1961 found the East Germans playing a major
role even though it is safe to venturt: that the .drama was.still of a.
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Soviet design.

Krushchev has written that he relied on Soviet forces

whil e establishing border control for East Germany.

However. the Soviet

troops were dispersed and well back from the focal point of the actions
. August, 1961. 82 A CIA agent
ln

Wh0

spent the night of August 12 in.East

Berlin is reported to have seen only one Russian jeep with two Soviet
officers actually on the scene during the preparations for sealing the
border between East and West Berlin. 83 The central roles in this
particular scene were assigned to the East Germans themselves.

They

were the ones who undertook the actual closing of the border and the
construction of the Wall.

The years after 1961 found the East Germans

continuing to play an increasingly important and, on matters such as
the Christmas passes, apparently independent role.

The

exten~

and

importance of this evolution of the SED regime will be the major concern
in the chapters that follow.

82Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (New York:
and Company, 1971), p. 506.
83
Dulles, The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts, p. 38.
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CHA.PTER II
THE WEST BERLIN ISSUE, FROM 1968 TO 1971:,

THE ULBRICHT ERA.

The period covered in this ,study, 1968to,1974, can be divided into
two phases.

The first covers the .years from 1968 up to the spring of

1971, the last years of

W~lter

Ulbricht's

4omin~nce.

The second ,phase

covers the years since Ulbricht's removal as.First Secretary of the
Socialist Unity Party, the

ye~rs

in which Erich Honecker has been the

dominant East German political figure.
phase,

th~

Before examining this first

subject ,of this chapter, the West Berlin issue must ,be

considered in its role as a central element in ,Soviet-U .,5. relations.
in recent years and what many see as the key to detente in Europe ,today.
It ,WOUld be

a~

understatement to say that the postwar

arrangemen~s

had a profound effect on the political situation in Europe.

In many

respects, the East-West confrontation in Europe, centered on what was
and what ,was not done in those months after ,the
in May, 1945.

concl~sion

of hostilities

Nowhere was the confrontation more bitter,
however, than
' .

in the case of the ,so-called German

probl~m.

The division of Germany

came to symbolize, on a small scale, the ,division of Europe.
division of Germany was, further

'.

' .

c~mpU,.cat~d

The

by the unresolved ques,tions

of the relationship between the newly-created German,statEls and the,
frontiers of Germany with Poland.

The Western-oriented Federal Republic

of Germany found considerable support in the first years ,after its
creation for a ,policy which refused to recognize either the territorial
44

4S
status quo in Europe or the permanence of the partition of
However, by the early 1960's,

th~

formal

W~stern

Germany~

commitment to

reunification and the provisional nature of,the Oder-Neisse line became
uncertain and the F.ederal Republic soon found itself increasingly.
isolated from its allies on these questions,l
The Federal Republic responded to. the threat

~f

isolation by an.

Ostpolitik which, according to then Foreign. Minister Willy Brandt, was
i'intended to help overcome the division of Europe. ,,2 The new policy
also carried with it a vision of a new role for West Germany, a role
which implied that the ,conception of the value of the Western alliance·
system might be undergoing a change.

"For centuries," Brandt declared,

"Germany was a·bridge between East and West.

We are ,striving to.build

anew the shattered bridge, better, sturdier, and more reliabl~."~ The
realization of such a goal,
soon.

ho~ever,

What was seen as a very real

was not.expected to come easily or.

.possibil~ty

in the ,near future

wa~

an improvement in the lot of the East Germans whom Brandt referred to
as "Germans.who are our countrymen."

Brandt decla1;'ed that the FGR

wanted closer relations with its "fellow ,Germans," that it wanted "the
barriers to

b~

lowered."

in the short run,

th~

If such relief for the East Germans was sought

goal of reunification was not

re~ounced

for the

lCharles R. Planck, The Changing Status of German Reunification
in Western Diplomacy, 1955-1966 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1967), pp. 57-60.
2Wi1ly Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe (Ne~ York:
and Winston, 1968), p. 105.
3Ibid ., p. 116.

Holt, R~nehart,
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long run.

The partition of Germany was described as the "source of

mischief" and something which the Bonn government wanted to eliminate
"by means of peaceful understanding.,,4
The West German hopes for gradual "liberalization" of the political
systems of the Communist Party states in East Europe were effectively
ended by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Any

illusions that might have existed about improving West German relations
with East.Europe in general and East Germany in particular without.
granting demands for an acceptance of the territorial and political
status quo in Europe were dispelled by the events

o~

August, 1968.

The

Soviet invasion was followed by a phase of West German foreign policy
characterized by acceptance of many basic Communist demands regarding
the status quo in Europe.

The first fruits of the new phase were the

treaties with the Soviet Union and with Poland.

A key point regarding

West German contacts with Poland and the other East European states was
stressed earlier by Brandt when he asserted,
The development of our relations with the other countries
of Eastern Europe should supplement the development of our
relationship to the Soviet Union, not run counter to it. s

The realization of the promise by Brandt to the USSR meant that Bonn
had effectively recognized one of the Soviet Union's most longstanding
and vital aims regarding its policy toward Europe.

What this amounted

to was that Soviet control over East Europe had been legitimized by
West German policy.

In the past, the Soviet goal of legitimization of

4Ibid ., pp. 122-123.

sIbid., p. 105.
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its control over

E~st

Europe had always been tied with a second goal,

the dissolution of the Western alliance system in.Europe.

This linkup

was no longer ,necessary, so with the West German recognition of SQviet
dominance in Eastern Europe ,came Soviet
conti~ued membership in NATO. 6

ac~eptance

,of West Germany's

Wi th ..its position in the ,Western alliance system granted by the
USSR after Bonn acceptance of the European status quo, the Federal
Republic could now concern itself with its own direct
the continuing problem of West Berlin.

inter~sts

and with

In discussing this ques1;ion,

Richard,Lowenthal has written,
From the point of view of,the Federal Republ~c,
normalization of its relations with the Soviet bloc entailed
as its corollary recognition 'by the So~iet Union and by the
East Ge~an stat~ of special ties of West Be~lin with the
political, legal, economic, and financial institut~ons,of
the Federal Republic, including the right of the Federal
Republic to negotiate on 'behalf of West ~erlin.7
Consequently, progress on improving the .position of West Berlin was
d~clared

by theFRG government to be a prerequisi 1;e for its final

approval of the .treaties with Poland and the ,USSR.
West Berlin as

t~e

key of detente in Europe.

West Bet:lin, Brandt declared.

Brandt labelled
.

,

Detente ,could not bypass

"Berlin must remain the barometer on

which ,not only bad but good weather can be read." 8 ,The signing of ,the

6peter C. Ludz in Eastern Europe. in the 1970s, edited by Sylva
Sinanian, Istvan Deak, and Peter C. Ludz (Ne~ York: Pr~eger, 1972),
p. 2317Ibid ., pp. 231-232.
8

Brandt, p. 139.
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Four Power Agreement on Berlin on September 3, 1971 signified the
realization of the progress that the Bonn government sought. 9 With the
affixing of the appropriate

signature~

on the Four Power Agreement, the

Federal Republic was in a position to continue its policy of improving
its relations with the East.
If West Berlin is seen as the key to success for the West German
government's Ostpolitik, it must not be forgotten that it is more than
that for many West Germans.
West

Ge~ans

West Berlin is an emotional issue ior many

who in the past two decades have come to view West ,Berlin

as part of the territory of the Federal Republic.

Even West German

politicians such as Brandt, who would have to be considered far more
"liberal," or re<lHstic, on the West Berlin issue, have made repeated
assertions of the ties of West Berlin to the Federal Republic.

While

Foreign Minister Brandt emphatically declared that "West Berlin belongs
to the Federal Republic of Germany,,,lO the inclusion of nonvoting
members in the Bundestag from West Berlin adds to the illusion that the
isolated city is formally a Land of the FRG.

Official government

handbooks have continuously listed West Berlin with the various Lands
ll
of the FRG when giving information about the Federal Republic.
Furthermore, even population charts list the population of West Berlin

9Neues Deutschland, September 3, 1971, p. 1.
as ND).
10

tHereafter noted

Brandt, p. 137.

IlHelmut Arntz, Facts About Germany (20nn:
Office of the Federal Republic, 1968), p. 79.
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as.resident of the Federal Republic. 12
information, family

tie~

In addition to official

link many West Germans emotionally with West

Berlin and the unofficial policy

o~

encouraging public

to visit West Berlin before completing

the~r

school.chil~ren

education insures that

young citizens have firsthand knowledge of West Berlin.

In short, West

Germans are encouraged to regard West Berlin as "theirs." The result
is an emotional attachment to ,West Berlin, the ,strength of which is
illustrated by the rhetoric of leading politicians in the Federal
Republic.
Finally,

th~

material resources of ' West

Beriincanno~,be

as an important factor regarding the Berlin issue.
makes West Berlin an

extre~ely

overlooked

Population alone

valuable region of Germany.

The West

Berlin population of over 2.1 million is larger than that of any

othe~

city in either East or West Germany.13 The commercial position of West
Berlin further enhances its importance.

Trade in ,goods

bet~een

West

Berlin and the Federal Republic amounts to 25 billion marks annually,
a figure which is about
and export

tr~de

half the ,size of the entire amount of import
14
for West Germany with all of Europe for a,year.
on~

Therefore, while the West German emotional attachment may receive
considerable attention in any examination of the Federal Republic's
policy

tow~rd

the Berlin question, it cannot obscure the very real

12Handbook of Statistics for theFRG CWiesbaden:
Statistical Office, 1970), p. 16.
I

l3 Ibid ., p. 17.
l4 Ibid ., pp. 100, 108.

Federal

SO
importance.of West Berlin to the economy of·West

Ge~many.

Bonn's,policy

is·by no·means simply a response to the demands and pressures,of those
who regard West Berlin as.a symbolic test for the West but is .also a
reflection of important ecqnomic needs of the Federal Republic.
Just as West Berlin plays a major role in affairs of the Fe4eral
Republic, it also figures prominently in East German politics.
German Democratic Republic,
problem in three ways.
and economic.

This

We~t Be~lin

represents a serious

thr~efold threa~

For the

securi~y

is political, military,

However, it should also be kept in ,mind that the present

situation of West

~erlin

also gives the East Germans one important

advantage in its relations with the ,West.
West Berlin poses ,a threat to the ,political security of East
Germany in several ways.

First, there is the

possibil~ty t~at

a

confrontation over West Berlin might erupt into an actual exchange
of fire.

While this seems unlikely at this time for a,variety

o~

reasons, the ,likelihood that any large-scale shooting incident might
lead to a nuclear exchange being the most prominent, it is ,nevertheless,
a possibility.

While such an event would be a tragedy for both sides,

the ,fact is that GDR terr,itory, along with .West Berlin, WQu1d be most
affected.

rne possibility of such a violent eruption must be considered

a thIteat to ,the political stability not only in
threaten~

th~

sense that any war,

the security of the governmental institutions on whose.

territory it occurs, but also in that it offers hope of outside
intervention for

tho~e

opposed to the regime.

within the country who might

be,viol~ntly

51

This leads to the .second way in which West Berlin represents.a
thr~at

Th~

to the political security of the GDR.

danger for the GDR

comes from the possibility of damage to the.prestige of the East German
regime

tha~

could result in

th~

event of a confrontation over Berlin

that is resolved by what looks like an Eastern retreat.

".

almost constant
West

~erlin

negotia~ions

Be~ause

of

or cQntroversies oversome . aspect of .the

problem, the .East German leadership is in a position in

w4ich,its standing in the ,community of "socialist states".is likely to.
be·measured by decisions that are made over various disputes connected
with the West Berlin issue.

In many cases, such as the

over the Four Power Agreement of 1971,

th~

negotiatio~s

East Germans are not direct.

participants .themselves but are, in effect, represente4 by
Union.

~~e

Soviet

Should. the Soviet Union not secure what can be considered a

"good deal II with regard to East German interests, the ,conclusion may be
drawn·in the West,

in.othe~

Communist

stat~s,

and even in the GDR that

the SED leadership is no longer highly regarded by its Russian patrons.
Th~

result would be a weakening of the

and abroad.

leaders~ip's

positions at home.

In the case of violent .opponents to the Communist regime

in East Germany, the GDR faces a threat in the event that such
individuals might seek to cause incidents along the Wall that will make
it necessary for the West to respond with force.
~al

In other words, politi-

opponents could provoke violent incidents with the goal of either

bringing about a certain Western response or of simply embarrassing
the regime.

The East German leadership

h~s

recognized this.possibility

on a number of occasions by referring to the desire of those. who do not
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like "the way things are going" to see border incidents,involving
. 1
. B.er l'1n. 15
v1o.ence
1n

In an ,effort to

,over~Qme.the

adverse effect of

the publicity surrounding a border shooting a few days:before the World
Yo~th F~stival

was to be held in East ,Berlin

du~ing

the

s~er

of 1973,

the East German authorities expelled an individual who was alleged to
be the .supposed shooting victim and declared that his obvious good
he,al th demonstrated the ,dishonesty of· West~rn reports about a killing
at the Wall.

While discrepancies in

th~

man's story led to speculations.

regarding whether or not he was actually the man, the East

Ge~mans'

action illustrates their.sensitivity to incidents ofthis.sort. l6

In

the twelve years following construction of the Wall, sixty-nine people
were known to have been killed in border incidents in Berlin. 17 , The
detrimental effect.of these actions on the GDR's prestige is
incalculable.
The third way in which West Berlin poses a threat to East German
political security is economic.
re~ognized

Numerous GDR commentaries have

the importance of the construction of.the Wall in bringing

stabili ty to. the East German economy. 18 Albert Norden cites .a figure
of 30 thousand million marks as the cost.of the damage to the .GDR

15

ND, July 20, 1973, p. 1.

16Ber1iner Morgenpost (West Berlin), July 22, 1973, p. 1.
17 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 13, 1973, EE/4371/Al/6.
noted .as SWB).
18ND, August 13, 1973, p. 1.

(He~eafter
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economy suffered during the time before the Wall. 19 The mass exodus
ended in 1971.

However, escapes have continued and have actually

increased in recent years.

In 1973 a total of 6,450 GDR citizens are

known to have successfully fled East Germany, usually by way of West
Berlin, an increase of 16 percent from the previous year.

While this

number is of almost no consequence when compared with the annual

n~T.ber

of escapees before August of 1961 when the Wall was built, it remains
very important

bec~use

it includes many of the best trained people in

East Germany, people who qualify for jobs in West Germany which offer
considerably more monetary-return than East German jobs bring them.
In fact, many West German firms are said to have paid the expense
involved in hiring professional escapee services to aid certain
highly-trained persons in leaving the GDR illegally.2l
the

escape~,

For most of

West Berlin is either the destination or a base of

operations from which to launch an escape.
In addition to the economic damage resulting from loss of valuable
personnel, the GDR is threatened by West Berlin in another economic way.
In the past, economic sabatoge has frequently been launched by West
Germany, according to some Western accounts , using West Berlin as a
base.

Such sabatoge involved the manufacturing of phoney bills of

19A1ber~ Norden, Thus Wars Are Made (Dresden:
1970), p. 286.
20 SWB, January, 2, 1974, EE/4489/ Al/!.

Ve~lag Zeit in Sild,

2l 0er Spiegel, No. 34, August 20, 1973, pp. 23-34.
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lading that were ,introduced into East

Germancc~~ercial de~lings,in

a way as, to sidetrack valuable shipments of certain

conunoditie~

such

and thus

damage the GDR' economy. 22 While such fantastic aciventur~s are apparently
no longer

under~aken,

GDR reports continue to

stres~

the damage to the

economy resulting from the activities of Western banks, especially those
in West Berlin, which have a, harmful effect on ,the GDR currency.
1973 East German charges of speculation in GDR currency by Western

In
ban~s

reached a peak during the time that tourist trade to East GermanY,was
reaching its highest levels.

Neues Deutschland,on November 8, 1973,

charged that West ,Berlin authorities were

toh~rat;ing

qlegal currency

transactions resulting in practices described as "basically a repetition
'
'
A
t 13., 1~6l.,,23
of those that were ~nuse
a l
ong,t~me
ago, bef
ore
ugus
The East German response to this situat;ion,was to double the amount of

GDR currency that Western tourists were
border.

~le

required to exchange at ,the

reporting that more than half,a million illegally

imported GDR marks had been confiscated during the ,last year, Nues
Deutschland
the effect

announce~

ofdecreasi~g

certain extent.
day

fo~

that the new exchange requirements shoulci have
the tourists' need for illegal ,marks to a,

The old minimum exchange requirements, ten marks a

each day of,a visit to the GDR, were declared to be insufficient

to meet the minimum needs of a tourist in East Germany.

22

John Dornberg, The Other Germany (New York:

p. 81.
23 ND , November 8, 1973, p. 2.
24 Ib l.'d .., Novemb er 5, 1973, pp. 1-2.

24

East German

Doubleday, 1968),

ss
attacks on alleged currency speculation in ,the West as a threat.to the
East German economy have

contin~edJ

a threat to its economic security.
source of ,this particular threat.
participan~

indicating that the GDR still feels
West Berlin, of course, is only one,
However, it

i~

a significant

.and for this reason can justifiably be vieit{ed as posing a.

threat to.the economic security of the GDR.
The third way in which West Berlin is a security problem for East
Germany is, mill tarily.

The possibili ty

o~

the .Western outpost sex:ving

as a focal point for the·outbreak.of war has already been mentiQned.in
another context.

However, it should be a4ded that,in

th~.

event of

conventional hostilities, assuming that such.a conflict is possible in
Europe, West Berlin would be an iI\lportant beachhead from which
operation~

could be launched early in the hostilities.

Il
. has f
r h etor1C
requent
yl
a uded to

s~c

East

mi1i~ary

Ge~man

h a ro 1e f Qr West Ber I'1n. 25

Assuming that no war erupts, West Berlin is still of military importance
for espionage directed against not only the East German military,
also the

Sovi~t

military installatiQn in the GDR.

On

tho~e

bu~

occasions

that the GDR hosts Warsaw Pact·maneuvers, West Berlin provides the
opportunity for espionage against the WTO forces in general.

In this

connection, the observation might be made that West Bex:lin is valuable
fo~

a wide variety of types of espionage, not only

~he

military type.

Espionage, of course, works two ways, and it can be expected that the.
East also uses.WestBerlin for considerable espionage endeavors.

25Norden, pp. 290-291.
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Finally, an evaluation of what· West Berlin means for East
t~t

would not be complete without making the observation
be extrelllely valuab1e.to the GDR and its Soviet ally.
Berlin to
Be~lin,

t~e

East lies in its

convenien~

Ge~many

thi.s city can

The value of West

position for blackmail.

in short, can.become a hostage in an

We~t

Ea~t-West confronta~ion~

Brandt's observation about Berlin as a.barometer for both good and bad
weather indicates this.
in

Be~lin,

Just as Communist goodwill can be

bad will can also be given expression here.

what we refer to as the .ColdWar are filled with

demo~strated

The years of

evid~nce

of West

Berlin's value to the .East as a means.of applying pressure.

In balance;

this advantage which the East

bec~use

Ge~mans

and. their allies enjoy

of

the extended, isolated position of West Berlin may outweigh all of the.
disadvan~ages

discussed above.
I.

THE COMMUNIST CONCEPTION .OFDETENTE

Both Communist and non-Communist sides.agree tha1; the.Berlin
problem is of considerable importance.to the effort to achieve detente
in Europe.

While the emphasis may differ depending on.whether the

account is an Eastern ora Western

on~,

th~re

are no

.ques~icns

raised

about the crucial nature of what happens either in Berlin or relating
to Berlin.

East German accounts typically cite such things as visits

by officials of the ,government of .the Federal Republic to West.Berlin
for the performance of official duties as proof of the West German
desire to perpetuate the Cold War. 26 Meanwhile, West German authorities
26

ND, June 23, 1968, p. 1.
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such as Claus Soenksen, counsellor ,for the FRG Embnssy in . Washingtonp.
describe successful develQpments relating to the Berlin problem as
verification of the validity of ··their policy for achieving detente .in
Europe.

27

In order 'to

bet~er

evaluate developments

i~

the disputes over,

Berlin, it is appropriate at this point to make some brief
regarding the character and·significance.of

detent~

observat~ons,

in Europe.

an expressed concern for detente has served as the public

Since

motivatio~s

for both East and West German initiatives on the Berlin problem, a
better understanding of the meaning of.detente might.improve our.ability
to view this particular issue as part of the larger pic.ture. of East-West
relations.
The events.which have been transpiring in Europe for the past five
years and are described as elamentsof·detente are not isolated instances
but are part of a worldwide trend toward accommodation with the
Union and its allies.

Sovie~

This desire for accommodation is cl.early based on

a new estimate of the reality of world power in which the United States
is seen as weaker relative to the USSR.

Th,e aftermath of Vietnam has

left the United States in a position in which it possesses the
instruments of modern warfare but seems, in the Soviet view, to lack
the will to use those weapons.

The American desire to withdraw from

global military commitments is dramatically evidenced not only by
speeches of many leading U.S. Senators, but also by the policy of

27Sinanian, Deak, and Ludz, p. 23Q.
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withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
Center for

Stra~egic

Meanwhile, as Walter Laqueur of the

and,International Studies of Georgetown University

has written recently, "while America is in
still has a global poliCy.,,28
its present commitments,

th~

le~ders

Soviet Uniot:l

In a time when the U.S. is reexamining
USSR is expanding its cQmmitments in such,

areas as the Middle East and elsewhere.
which many world

r~treat, th~

The

res~lt

is a situation in

must feel a compelling desire to reach an

"understanding" with the power whose fortunes are in apparent ascendancy.
If other nations see the United States as a power of·reduced
stature, it should not be ,surprising that
detente as

a,cons~quence

th~

Soviet Uniot:l today views

of a spiritually and militarily weakened West.

Detente iS,not considered evidence of good will on the ,part ,of the West.
In ,the words of one Soviet

autho~ity:

The deepening of the crisis ,of imperialism's foreign
policy is forcing political leaders of Western countries
tQ fo~mulate their plans and their policy towards the.
Soviet Union and other socialist states more cautious~y
than theY did until now. 29
Yet, according to

SQvie~

1eaders.and their ,East European allies, the

West has not weakened to such an extent that it .is no· longer basically
hostile.

The Soviet

autho~ity

quoted above observes that "the policies

of the chief imperialist powers are not undergoing any fut:ldamenta1 .
change." The things which some mistake for real change are in,fact

28Wa1ter Laqueur, Neo-Iso1ationism in the World of the Seventies
(New York: Library Press, 1972), p. 48.
29 Sh . Sankoyev, "Peace in Europe and the Confrontation of the Two
S}'stems," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 11, 1972, p. 14.
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only "tactical changes. II30

In discussing West German foreign policy,

the SED official newspaper Neues Deutschland ,commented that the
anti-Communist crusade of the Federal Republic was being continued but
wi th the ,utilization of "differentiated ,and selective methods. ,,31

In

short, the East feels that the policy of , detente signifies no real
change in the Western outlook but simply reflects the decline of their,
systems.

Meanwhile the ideological struggle is said to

b~

intensifying

at the very time the West talks about the end of the Cold War.
Meanwhile, during the time that western unity

s~ems

to be,declining

in many important ways, the nations of the ,Soviet bloc enjoy what

W~lter

Laqueurdescribed in 1973 to a Senate subcommi t''tee ,as detente. 32 The
Wes,t obviously enjoys no such" consensus on how to deal with the Commut:list
states.

While few would assert that there is

abso1ut~

Communist unity

on the ,question of relations with the West, the Czechoslovakian invasion
of 1968

c~rtainly

helped clarify the matter considerably.

The situation

for the West remains as difficult as ever, if ,not more so, in the wake
of the 1968 intervention in Prague.
Detente is quite properly regarded by many as, in ef~ect, a wa~ting
game. 33 Th~ goal of detente is not merely the acceptance of the status
quo in order to perpetuate the status quo indefinitely.

The goal,

30 lbid ., pp. 14-15.
31 NO, February,27, 1972, p. 4.
32Walter Laqueur, "Detente," Survey, Vol. 19, No.3; 1973, p. 74.
33Robert Bowie in Sinanian, Deak and Ludz, p. 240
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rather, seems to be more a matter of each side desiring acceptance of
the status quo for the present time in hope of altering it in the future
to its advantage.

Each side sees time as.on its side, offering the

prospect of weakening the position of the adversary.

The East looks at

the West and hopes for a historical vindication of Marxist-Leninist
predictions about capitalism.

Meanwhile, the West bases its hope on

such ideas as the theory of the eventual convergence of both systems
and the internal liberalization of the Communist party states.
sees the status quo as the most desirable of all world.s.

Neither

While the

issue of a divided Germany is not the most important question for either
the United States or the Soviet Union, that division does represent one
of the most conspicuous concerns of the East-West confrontation.

The

economic and political interests involved are considerable but
insufficient by themselves to determine the outcome of competition
between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.
In the present era of detente, the Soviet Union enjoys a definite
advantage in that the legitimacy of its empire in Eastern Europe is no
longer challenged by the major Western powers.

The only power of

consequency which refuses to acknowledge the validity of the Soviet
Union's claim of leadership over the East European states is another
Communist nation, China.

Western leaders no longer speak of a

"rollback" of Communism or the liberation of Eastern Europe.

Many give

the appearance of simply hoping that a rollback of capitalism does not
occur.

The West has placed itself in a situation in which it does not

challenge the right of its adversary to control a considerable portion
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of the earth's surface,while the adversary

continu~s

to

quest:io~

legitimacy of capitalist governments ,throughout the world.

the

The extent

of such a disadvantage for the w.est is obvious.
The East ,German ' regime has alsQ come to ef!.joy the advantage ,of
having the attack on its legitimacy withdrawn to a considerable extent.
The w.est German, foreign policy since 1967 has no longer sought to
isolate the GDR from its allies as it did in the yearsprior to tl~at
time. 34 With tras change, the ,East Germans can now negotiate for vastly
different stakes.

Earlier the situation was such that, for a variety of

reasons, the East Germans preferred not to

n~gotiate

,at a1l,.

The, GDR's

position has improved to the extent that while a few years:ago it had
diplomatic

rela~ions

with only two dozen or so nations,

mos~

of which

were , Soviet allies, by spring of 1974 it enjoyed ,full diplomatic
relations with 105 nations.
Regarding the West German Ostpolitik, it is clear that because of
its size and importa,nce, any actions of ,a West German government are"
going to have far different consequences from similar
or an Italian government.

Bonn spokesmen, including

~ctions
B~andt,

by a,French
frequently

have referred to their desire for relations with the ,Communist states
which are no more or no less than the relations of France ,and Italy to
the East European

nat~ons.

The power of the Federal Republic, however,

both real and potential, is such that its rela,tions can,never be the
same as.those of France or Italy.

The FRG simply poses too great a

34Pierre Hassner, Europe in the ,Age of Negotiations (Bever~y Hills:
Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 57~58.

62
potentia~

threat to

theEas~,

militarily,

This is true for several reasons.

economic~lly,

and politically.

The most obvious is the economic

strength of the West German· economy which ,has been so great as .to make
all of Europe stand in awe.· An additional factor has been the,
frequently stated desire of , the FRG for access to nuclear. weapons.
Given the ,economic and industrial
must s.eem to

b~

potenti~l

of the country, this desire

one· capable of fulfillment.

Finally, thex:e is the East

European memory of German aggressiveness in the past, a memory which the
USSR has done.its best to keep alive.

Since

t~e

FRG was clearly the

most powerful of the ,two Germanies, it seemed to inherit something of
the unfavorable ,German image in East Europe.

Therefore, any FRG

overtures will likely be.met by the East

a united policy .. The way

wi~h

in which the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw were achieved demonstrates
tQis.

The negotiatiqns on Berlin have

b~en

no

differe~t

so .far and no

departure from this. pattern. seems likely in the foreseeable future.
While independent action on the part of the SED leadership is possible
within certain limits, no one can seriously dispute the ,fact

tha~

there

are,very definitely limits to the freedom of action enjoyed by East
Berlin.
These considerations have

affec~ed

developments on the .entire

German.question and t4e Berlin problem, which has ,been a part of it for
the past quarter of a century. Any possible resolution of, the Berlin
problem ultimately involves consideration of the ,balance of power
between the United States and its allies and tbe Soviet; Union and ,its
allied states.

The problem is not one subject to any sort of bilateral
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resolution by

t~e

two states directly affected acting

alo~e.

The

disput~

is intimately wrapped in the fabric of East-West relations as well as
the tangled web·of·relations
II.

b~twe~n

East an4 West Germany!

ULBRICHT'S

WESTPOLITI~

Few individuals have placed their imprint on the Berlin problem in
a more personal way than Walter
century was

Fir~t

Ulbri~ht,

who for almost a quarter of a

Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party.

Befo~e

lqoking

at the GDR policies and rhetoric directed.specifically at.the issue of.
West.Berlin during Ulbricht's last years, we should first examine the
general

orientatio~

of the

Ulbricht-~ed gover~ent

general and West Germany.specifically.

toward the West in

This examination is necessary

in order to fully understand the Pankow regime's concern over West
Berlin.

After all, the West Berlin issue would assume a vastly different

nature in the .absence of a West German issue for the .GDR.

Any improve-

ment in East Germany's relations with Bonn should be expected to bring
at.least some improvement in the former's relations with West
In

t~e

same manner, a deterioration in East-West

Be~lin.

Ge~man.relations

seems

likely to signal a worsening of East German-West Berlin relations.

The

last two and·one half years. of the Ulbricht regime a):'e characterized by
a generally unpleaseant preoccupation with the Bonn OS1;.politik, the.
alleged West German military threat,and what East Berlin considered the
generally aggressive nature of the West German government.

This

preoccupation colored the GDR's relations wi1;.h West Berlin in almost
every respect.
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Walter Ulbricht's. toast on the .occasion of the 19t:h anniversary of
the GDR set the tone for East Germany's general orientat:ion toward the
West in this period.

In his toast, Ulbricht declared that it was

"necessary to be vigilant, to counter effectively and oppose the methods
of psychological warfare, of economic warfare, anq of antisQcial
activity" that characterized Western policy.35 This analysis was echoed.
by

th~

GDR Foreign

Minis~er,

Otto Winzer, in an interview in which he

declared that while imperialism had not.become st~onger in recent ye~rs,
36
it haci becQme mQre aggressive.
The East German vie\>{ was·that this
aggressiveness was reflected in. NATO policy

wh~ch,

accordingly, was

pursuing an increasingly hostile policy toward the East, a policy which·
was enjoying the support of the FRG gover~ent.37 As a consequence ,of
such policies of·Western powers, according to the GDR's Public

Prosecuto~

General, Josef Streit, there were many plots against the GDR and in
order to aid prosecution of those behind such

activitie~,

the goyernrnent

was introducing a new penal code designed to war "the spies, agents, and

s~boteurs.that in attacks against the GDR they risk their necks.,,38 Not
only did the new penal code contain.the normal strictures

again~t

such'

offenses as treason, it included specifications. for more unique crimes
such as economic diversion and sabatoge.

35'ND, October 7, 1968, p. 2.
36 SWB , January 3, 1968, EE/2659/Cl/8.
37 ND, December 12, 1969, p. 1.
38 Ibid ., January 13, 1968, p. 3.

According to a

cornrnen~aryon

6S

the new code, it was,.designed to protect; the society the GDR citizens
had constructed by incorporating the lessons,gained "41,U'ing the,
confrontation with the enemies of socialism"during the past years. 39
An additional reflection of the official atti1;ude
in the form of an or4er passed by the

GD~

towa~d

the West

cam~

Council of Ministers in March,

According to the order, in view of the harmful inf1uence,of

1969.

Western communications directed against the GOR.
A,ll citizens.are bound to protect chi~dren and young
influences which endanger or harm the~r
development as socialist personages. They are responsible
for keeping the influence of imperia1ist.ideo1ogy, especially
through the, printed word, television, and radio, from
children and yOung peop1e. 40

persons.fro~

In summary, the conception presented by official GOR sources during the.
last years of Ulbricht's administration was that the GOR was an
g~~rjSQn'which
.
• ,.1\....
~

embattl~d

was reinforcing its defenses against a hostile and

aggressive West.
The principal agent of the anti-East German campaign,
official GDR, was the Federal Republic of Germany.
press and
so~iety,

officia~s

accord~ng

While East

Ge~man.

seldom missed an opportunity tO,condemn Western

their special fury usually was.directed.against the FRG and

its policies during these

years~

The introduction of the new West

German Ostpolitik did nothing to change the East German attitude.
spite

to

of.Bonn~s

In

overtures to the East, Ulbricht insisted that it was

39Heinrich Toeplitz, "The New Penal Code," Law and Legislation in
the GDR (Berlin, GDR), No. Z, 1968, pp. 11-12.
40

NO, March 27, 1969, p. 2.
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West Germany which was blocking detente.

Th~ n~wOstpolitik

was labeled

by the First Secretary as simply another effort to change the ,territor~al
4l
status quo in Europe.
This negative evaluation was· echoed by othel:
leading figures, including Politburo members Erich Honecker and Professor
Albert Norden, who charged that the Brandt-Scheel government of the FRG
had infringed on the sovereignty of other states by threatening reprisals
if they normalized their relations with East Berlin.

According to

Norden, West Germany was, as always, still the -"troublemaker" of
Europe. 42 On March 7, 1970, the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland
editorialized that "the .much vaunted 'acconunodation' shown by the
Federal Republic these days consists of a flood of more or less
beautiful words, and nothing else."43
Ulbricht portrayed West Germany as a nation that had set itself on a
course that was certain to

l~ad

to war.

In his

opinio~

the ,West German

government was "playing with war. ,,44 A frequent E.ast German theme which
was used to reinforce Ulbricht's warning was that the .FRG was bent on
possessing nuclear weapons.

In July, 1968, Dr. Rudolf

Muen~e

of the

GDR Nuclear Research Institute said that Bonn's ,refusal to sign the.
nuclear nonproliferation

was a tactic designed to give West
45
Germany time to develop its ow~ nuclear weapon production.
This
tre~t.y

4l ND , January 7, 1968, p. 1.
42 Ibid ., February 27, 1970, p. 3.
43 Ibid ., March 7, 1970, p. 1.
44 Ibid ., January 1, 1968, p. 1.
45sWB , July 13, 1968, EE/2820/Al/2.
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picture was embellished with the additional charge that Bonn was engaged
in the development of weapons for chemical and bacteriological warfare.
In December, 1968, the GDR press aired the charges of a microbiologist
who had defected to East Germany from the FRG and who insisted that West
46
Germany was making plans for chemical and bacteriological warfare.
The nature of the West German Bundeswehr was also cited by East
German sources as evidence of the danger posed by the FRG.

A pamphlet

distributed by the GDR charged that the West Germany military was an
instrument for changing the territorial status quo in Europe and that
it was being prepared for a blitzkrieg against the East.

Helmut

Schmidt, who was then West German Defense Minister, was described as
a person who was committed to the "abolition of the socialist order in
the GDR.,,47

In May, 1969, the East German news agency bolstered another

common Ulbricht theme when it reported that, according to the account of
a Bundeswehr major who had defected to the GDR, the West German military
was a haven for neo-Nazis and that many members of the Bundeswehr,
including officers, were leaving for that reason. 48 Also, West German
military exercises always provided what East German sources labeled
proof that the Bundeswehr was readying itself for a war against the
East and that the Bonn government had no real interest in contributing

46ND , December 28, 1968, p. 2.
47 The Bundeswehr: Spearhead of Revanchism (Dresden:
im Bild, 1970), pp. 12-16.
48SWB, May 7, 1969, EE/3067/A1/l.
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to detente and· European security.

According to Neues.Deutschland, there

could be little ,doubt that the ,military-industrial complex was in control
in both. West Germany and West Berlin. 49
The East German response to this was to assure its own
and to warn the FRG government

t~t,

populatio~

in the ,words of Major General Hans

Ernst of the National People's Army, the aggressor would receive a
"devastating blow" from the GDR military should it attack,sO Howe,(er,
lest there.be any doubt, East German military leaders ,insist that, due
to Bundeswehr "agressiveness," tqe GOR must devote more effort to
i~proving

its defenses.

According to Army General

"welcome foreign policy gestures" by the FRG were a

He~nz
clo~k

Hoffman, tqe
for increased

aggressiveness ,and necessitated even greater stress on the combat
readiness of the East Germany military.forces. sl
East German

attac~s

on the FRG went beyond. simply charging that it

was militarily aggressive.

Ulbricht added to t4is by stressing that

West Germany had developed more sophisticated means of carrying out its
aggression.

Spe~king

at Prague Castle on February 22, 1968, Ulbricht

charged that Bonn. had failed in its effort to isolate the GOR.from its
allies and was now concentrating on trying to extend its influence
toward the ,East.by the "methods of psychological.infiltra1::ion and
economic dependence. ,,52 This psychological war was said to have an

49 NO, October 1, 1970, p. 2.
sOrbid., July 9, 1968, p. 4.
SlSWB, January 19, 1971, EE/3587/Al/7.
52

NO, February 23, 1968, p. 1.
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adyan~ageover.the

traditional typeof.military exercise in that it was

more subtle and difficult to

d~tect.

Furthe~more,

it ,could be presented

as a gesture of friendship when in fact it was noth.ing more than
aggression in a new.form.
The broader attack on West German society also included a
condemnation of the country as economically imperialistic.

While such

charges are fairly standard rhetoric in the .press of Communist party
states, the extent to which the GDR press engaged in such charges was
exceptional.

"Revelations" appeared almost daily regarding t4e

activities of West German "monopoly capital •."

The impression conveyed

was that there was absolutely no.limit to West German imperialism.
Neues Deutschland on January 24, 1970, Foreign Minister

O~to

In

Winzer

charged that the FRG was. scouring the entire world for raw materials
and exploiting the underdeveloped countries which provided those
materia1s. 53 The West German imperialistic .activities were presented
as being so far-reaching that

ther~

was· probably "no trail ·of dirt and

blood" that did not lead to Bonn. 54
West German talk about a "special relationship" between East and
W~st

Germany or·about "intra-German relations ll were described as further

evidence of the generally aggressive character of the Federal Republic,
although the aggression in this case was of . a sophisticated, "legal,"
nature.

Neues Deutschland declared that the West German.desire for

53 lbid ., January. 24, 1970, p. 2.
54 Ibid ., January 3, 1971, p. 3.
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"special relations" witn tne GDR simplr amounted to.a demand for the
subjugation of EastGe~any to the Bonn government. 55 Ulbricht insisted
t4at only full diplomatic relations between the .b'o states would be
considered aS,an acceptable .basis for normalization of relations.between
the GDR and Bonn.

The notion of· "in~ra-German

~ela tiol1s"

was seen as .

nothing more than anew name for an old policy which had the annexation
of the GDR as its goal.

When the Austrian government refused entry to

an SED delegation led

~y

Politburo member Kurt Hager in 1968, Neues

Deutschland

that this was.evidence that Bonn.wanted to

a~nounced

represent Austria as well as East Germany.56

Even after several years

of the .new FRG Eastern policy, the GDR continued to insist

tha~

the,

formally renounced Hallstein Doctrine of the FRG was still being
practiced since Bonn was trying to prevent.recognition of the .GDR by
other states.

An editorial in Neues Deutschland expressed Ulbricht's

view in January of 1971,
Th~ methods.change but the substance and aim of their
policy has not changed because the chara~terof the system
has not changed. . . . The rulers of the Federal Republi~
are.devious and aggressive, whatever particular methods
may seem to s~ow. They are devious and aggressive ju~t
as German imperialists have always .been.57

Few issues of the time better illustrated the attitude of the ,GDR
government toward West Germany than that of the reforms in

55 Ibid ., May 13, 1970, p. 1.
56 Ibid . , January 17, 1968, p. 1.
57 Ibid., January 9, 1971, p. 2.
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in 1968.

Ulbricht.became one of the principal exponents of the

hard-line on.Czechos1ovakia and the West German "menace" constitute4
his central theme in discussing developments in Czechoslovakia during
the .Dubcek era.

According to an analysis by Francois Fejto,

press during this time reflected an intolerance and
.
. h
compar~son
w~t

.
which t h e Sov~et
press appeared

.
am~a

Ulb~icht's

aggressivenes~

in

bl y ~n
. du 1gent. 58

Typical comments in Neues Deutschland described develqpments in
Czechoslovakia as "dangerous for socialism" and warned about the
increasing influence of the West in Czechoslovakia. 59 The Dubcek-led
Czech Communist Party was said to be under.heavy attack by imperialists
. . . ho were attempting to smuggle "anti-Communist theories" into the
country.60 While stressing the importance of the leadership of the
Party in.the nations. of the "socialist conunonwealth," official GDR
publications charged that the Party was no longer in control in
Czechoslovakia, but had been displaced by a variety of imperialists
and Western agents. 61
The spectre of West Germany loomed large in East German accounts
of·the Czech developments.

In March, at a philosophy conference on

Marx in East Berlin, Professor Kurt Hager spoke ominously of West
German interest in the events taking place under Dubcek's administration.

58Francois Fetjo, "Moscow and its Allies," Problems of Communism,
Vol. 18, November-December, 1968, p. 36.
59
ND, May 12, 1968, p. 4.
60 Ibid • , May 24, 1968, p. 1.
61 Ibid ., May 11, 1968, p. 2.
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Czech Minister Josef Smrkovsky was singled out as one of several Czech
leaders whose attitudes gave the West Germans "hope that Czechoslovakia
will be drawn into the whirlpool of revolution
the Springer Press uses the word.,,62

in the sense in which

The East German daily, Berliner

Zeitung, charged that not only had Western and West German influence
grown in Czechoslovakia, but that West German and U.S. troops were
actually in the. country.

According to an account in Berliner Zei tung

in May, a number of West German troops plus three FRG tanks were
actually in the western part of Czechoslovakia.

While the official

excuse for their presence was the filming of a movie, "The Bridge at
Remagen," the real reason, according to the paper, was to begin the
West German occupation of Czechos1ovakia. 63
East German accounts gave regular warnings against the types of
activities which GDR leaders asserted were taking place in Czechoslovakia.
"Tourists of a special kind" were said to be pouring into Czechoslovakia.
The "most illustrious amoung these 'tourists'" was said to be Professor
Zbigniew Brzezinski from the United States.
Deutschland, "All this, of course, is not

According to Neues

ac~idental"

but is part of

the counterrevolutionary plans of the imperialists' powers.

The events

in Czechoslovakia were compared with those in Hungary in 1956 and
antisocialist elements were declared to be in "open attack."

The

situation was viewed as particularly disturbing because the "vital

62 SWB , March 29, 1968, EE/2733/Cl/7.
63Ber1iner Zeitung (Berlin, GDR), May 9, 1968, p. 1.
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interests" of the GDR were at stake just as much as those of
Czechos1ovakia. 64 As t~ climax of the Czech drama neared, East German
charges accelerated with intensified attacks on the "policy of
interference and subversion conducted by Bonn".and almost daily reports
of the discovery of Western arms caches in the'Czech countryside. 6S On
the day of the Warsaw Pact invasion in August, Neues Deutschland called
for a defeat for imperialism similar to the defeat that the GDR had
given imperialists when it built the Berlin Wall in August, 1961.

"The

socialist camp," the SED paper hinted, "is preparing the ,same fate.for
the new variants of the policy of interference. ,,66
The official East German attitude on specific issues related to
West Berlin during the period from 1968 to Ulbricht's ,retirement was
consistent with the attitude on the West and the Federal Republic during
this time.

The same tone which was used in

characte~izing

the West

German foreign policy, the Bundeswehr, West German society in.general,
and the events in·Czechos1ovakia was evident in the rhetoric surrounding
matters relating to West Berlin.
III.

ULBRICHT ON THE WEST BERLIN QUESTION

Just as Ulbricht had charged that the West had: "hardened Germany's
division and built a high political wall between the two German
64

ND, July 13, 1968, pp. 1-2.

65 Ibid ., September 17, 1968, p. 1.
66.Ibid., August 20, 1968, p. 1.
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states, ,,67 he also accused the United States, Great Britain, and the
"right wing Social Democratic leaders" of West Berlin on responsibility
for the division of Berlin.

Speaking on the occasion of the presentati,on

of the draft of the new GDR constitution in February, 196$, Ulbricht
declared that the present division of Berlin was not necessary and would
not have occurred if the "right wing Social Democratic leaders" had not
been subservient to the Americans and the British who were determined to
" t he C1ty
"
sp11t

0f

Ber l'1n. 68

Continuing the theme of Western responsibility for the present
division of Berlin, Ulbricht charged that the West also bears.the
~esponsibility for what West Berlin has become today.

While the West

was speaking of·West Berlin in connection with the economic "miracle"
that the

~ederal

Republic was enjoying,

charging that WestBerli~

th~

East German officials were.

had become an outpost of anticommunist

subversion directed against the .GDR and other communist states in
Eastern Europe.

For Ulbricht and his ass.ociates West Berlin represented

a menace, a threat to the peace in Europe, not \<lhat the West Germans
described as a city of "vi tali ty" where one could benefit from the ,full
"enjoyment of life.,,69
Utilizing the theme that West Berlin was a threat to the peace in
Europe, on the twentieth year of the existence of the GDR East German

67 Ibid., March- 8, 19~O~ p. 2.
68 Ibid ., February 16, 1968, p. 2.
69Berlin in Brief (West Berlin:
West Berlin, 1969), p. 3.
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citizens were exhorted by Ulbricht and his associates ,to "resolutely
oppose" all aspirations of the West for extending West Berlin as "a
center of provocation and aggression against the GDR and other socialist
states."

The GDR declared determination to prohibit the development of,

any situation in which there could bea more serious threat to the
"foundations of world peace."

The building of the Wall in 1961 and the

intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were cited as proof of this
determination. 70
The relationship between Bonn and West

Be~lin

adding to the danger to peace posed by West Berlin.

was pictured as
A constant,theme

of the GDR leadership was that Bonn was the "main troubl,emaker in
Europe" and, therefore, the consistent support that the West Berlin
Senate gave to the Federal Republic made West Berlin a "principal stooge
of this troublemaker." 71 The description of West Berlin as ,a "stooge",
is indicative of the belief in official GDR circles that ,it was not West.
Berlin itself which was the cause'of the danger, but rather those who
were misusing West Berlin.

West Berlin's error, in the East German

vie~,

lies in allowing itself to be misused by West Germany and its allies.
The primary vi Uian, in Ulbricht's conception, was, the Federal Republic,
which insisted on using West Berlin as a base for attacks on the GDR.
The West Berlin Senate, of course, was attacked for permitting the West
Germans to, in effect, occupy West Ber1in. 72
70 ND, January 16, 1969,
p. 1.
71 SWB, August 13, 1969,
EE/ 3150/ AI/I.
72 ND , February 1, 1968, p. 3.
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The specific abuses that Ulbricht and his associates were concerned
about were the performance of official functions by West,Germqn officials
and governmental bodies in West Berlin, the use of the ,city as a base
for espionage activities, and a variety of activities considered both"
disruptive and insulting by,the East German authorities.

Walter

Ulbricht frequently reminded the ,West Germans that "no West German
official has the right to carry out any official actiQn in.West
Berlin,,,73 yet ,a continuous procession of West German officials.visited
West Berlin for the purpose of performing various
capacity as officials.of the Bonn government.

functio~s

in their

Almost every week of the

period under examination saw a visit to West Berlin by either a.
legislative committee from Bonn; a minister of the

governmen~,

or some

other prominent FRG officia.l such as President Heinemann, who. was,a
particularly frequent visitor.

One of the most serious ,incidents of

this type occurred in 1969 when the West German government. announced
that the Bundestag would be meeting in West Berlin in March for the
purpose of electing the West German head of state.
declared that such a meeting would be a grave

The East Germans

international·provocatio~

and would also illustrate the continuing West German desire to
incorporate West Berlin into

t~e

Federal Republic.

Such a meeting, they

charged, would lead to neo-Nazi, revanchist activities and, furthermore,
would involve "an abuse of ,the access roads" to West Berlin.

The West

Berlin population, they concluded, would suffer as a result of this

73 Ibid ., March 14, 1968, p~ 1.
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meeting.

74

On this occasion Ulbricht enjoyed the support of the Sovie~

Union and was able to enlist Soviet assistance in measures designed to
prohibit the West German Bundestag from having its West Berlin meeting.
However; although such measures included the ,closing of the

,He1msted~-

'

Berlin autobahn before and during the time of the Bundestag meeting,
they proved unsuccessful.

The Bundestag did meet and elect West

Germany's new President in West Berlin.
The second alleged abuse with which the Ulbricht leadership was
concerned regarding West Berlin was the use of the city as a base for
espionage activities by Western agents.

In 1969 the publicity

surrounding the trial of West German agent Klaus Thalmann was used to
make the point that West Berlin was serving as a base for Western spies
against the GDR.

In a report after Thalmann's indictment, the East

German news agency, ADN, charged that "West ,Berlin is the sluice gate
for spies, terrorists, agents, provocateurs, and subversive elements"
working against the interests of East Germany and its allies.

In

another report West Berlin was referred to as an "Eldorado for
"
"1"~st
~mper~a

"
,,75
secre tserv~ces.

Even ,the British Broadcasting

Corporation was viewed with suspicion by the East German leadership.
The GDR foreign affairs weekly Horizont accused BBC of working with
British espionage groups and using its West Berlin offices ,for meetings
of agents.

Even innocent-appearing news and musical programs played a

74SWB, February 8, 1969, EE/2995/A1/1.
75Ibid ., February 20, 1969, EE/3005/A1/1.
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part in

activities since they were allegedly used to convey
76
information to agents.
This obsession with West Berlin as.an espionage
espio~age

center permeates East German discussions of the city and is frequently
used as justification for measures taken to isolate the western sectors.
of Berlin.
The third principal concern of the East German leadership during
Ulbricht's last two and.one half years was the issue of the disruptive
and insulting activities for which West Berlin was alleged to have been
used.

Here the East German objection was to frequent incidents of an

anticommunist nature, meetings and other activites by right wing
political groups, and certain types of so-called "legal" disruptions
that, in fact, simply amounted to legal discrimination against East
Germany.
The East German news media gave considerable

atte~tion

during this

period to incidents involving violence directed against either the GDR
or the Soviet Union.

A bombing attempt against the sections of the

GDR-operated S-Bahn in West Berlin were declared to be part of a
conspiracy to inflict violent injury to personnel wor.~ing for East
Germany and property owned by the GDR. 77 When one of the Soviet
soldiers guarding the .Soviet War Memorial in the Tiergarten near the
Brandenburg Gate was shot, the East Germans charged the West Berlin
Senate with responsibility for the incident, since it had allowed

·
76Horlzon,
t N0 .2, 1969 ,pp. 3-7.

77 ND , December 17, 1970, p. 6.
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"fascist terror groupsll to operate within the city.78

Incident~ such as

these and others along the Wall, including escape attempts, were never
allowed to pass as individual incidents, but were consistently declared
to be part of a conspiracy directed against the GDR.
The second type of disruptive activity with which the .Ulbricht
leadership was concerned consisted of meetings, rallies, and other
activities by right wing political groups such as the National
Democratic Party and the more conservative of the two major West Germany
parties, the Christian Democratic Union.

For example, when the COU

announced in the fall of 1968 that it would hold its sixteenth congress
in West Berlin, the East German government declared that this action was
a violation of the independent political status of West Berlin and would
"increase the tension in Europe." The GDR insisted that the CDU cancel
the congress and avoid "poisoning the political atmosphere."
charged that the holding of the CDU congress.in West

Be~lin

It also
would result

in misuse of the GDR communications to and from West Berlin, the same
charge which it made regarding the Bundestag session which elected the
79
Federal president.
The extreme right wing NPD was a constant source
of irritation to the East Germans.

Not only NPD meetings, but almost

any NPD activity was seen as threatening by the GDR.

The SED newspaper

charged that the NPD had infiltrated the West Berlin police force and
was working to increase extremist political actions in the city.

78 Ibid ., November 7, 1970.
79 SWB , November 2, 1968, EE/29lS/Al/1.
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activities, the paper warned, constituted a menace to the well-being
of the population of West Berlin. 80 Another complaint of the GDR
leadership was the activities of expellee organizations such as the,
West.German "Youth of the East."

When this organization announced plans

for a West Berlin rally, the East Germans once again charged that the
.
..
81
C1' t Y was b e1ng
used f or revanc h'1st, neo- N"
aZ1 act1v1t1es.

The East

German complaints, however, frequently went beyond attacks on groups
whose programs were of an openly anticommunist nature and were aimed
at those groups for whom one might have expected a more tolerant East
German attitude.

The announcement by the Conference of Chairmen of the

Social Democratic Party of the FRG that they would hold a meeting in
West Berlin provided an example of this.

The East Germans accused the

SPD of not only wanting to make trouble, but of wanting to make "massive
trouble."

The conference was described as a "deliberate disturb,ance"by

the SPD, a violation of the sovereign rights of the GDR, and an effort
to prove that the ,SPD "can stage provocations. just as well or even
better" than the CDU. 82
The Allied Travel Office in West Berlin represented what Ulbricht.
and the East German leadership were concerned about in terms of official
or "legal" disruption by the West in West Berlin.

If an East German

wished to visit a NATO country and his government permitted him to do
so, he had to apply at the Allied Travel Office for a Temporary Travel.

80

ND, November 10, 1970, p. 7.
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Document.

This procedure was required because no NATO country, at that

time, recognized an East German passport.

The East German government

viewed this as a serious disruption of East German travel rights.
Brandt's support of the Allied Travel Office operations was cited by
the East Germans as proof that the FRG was unwilling to contribute to
83
better East-West German relations.
In the opinion of the East
Germans, the presence of the Allied Travel office in West Berlin
constituted one'more example of the use of that city to disrupt the
normal existence of the GDR.
The most consistent East German position during this time on the
status of West Berlin was that West Berlin was an independent, separate
political entity.
1968.

This view first began to be voiced with frequency in

Ulbricht and other GDR officials very emphatically denied that

West Berlin was or ever could be a part of the Federal Republic.
According to them, it was not possible to concede that while West Berlin
had originally not been intended to be part of the FRG, its status had
been changed through the years to a point where it had become a de facto
part of West Germany.

Before the 1969 Bundestag session in West Berlin,

the East German government announced:
. . . Senate politicians talk about an "evolved status"
But unlawful acts do not cre~te rights, however often they
may be repeated. All that has evolved as a result of the
ties with Bonn--which aI"S contrary to West Berlin's status
as a separate political entity--are uncertainty and' 84
insecurity . . . for the inhabitants of West Berlin.

83SWB, March 19, 1970, EE/3333/Al/S.
84 ND , February 14, 1969, p. 1.
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However, the question of the four-power status of.the city has
tended to vary from time to time.

In 1968 Ulbricht, following an.

argument used by the USSR, denied that a four-power status existed for
all Berlin.
Berlin.

The section excluded from such status, of course, is East

The issue of Berlin, especially from the East

view, is a question of the status of.West.Berlin.

Ge~manpoint

of

For them, one does

not properly speak of the Berlin issue, but rather of the West Berlin
issue.

The term "East Berlin" becomes, in this context, a revanchist

attack on the GDR.

As Neues Deutschland pointedly declared, !'East

Berlin is a city that does not exist." What does exist is Berlin, the
capital of the sovereign GDR and West Berlin which is a separate,
independent political entity.8S
The East German description of West Berlin as a separate political
entity during the last years of the .Ulbrichtregime is tinged with what
must be described as a.certain reluctance.

Writing on this question in

a book published in 1970, Albert Norden explained that Berlin, all of
Berlin, was intended to be a part of the
"f
permanent We~tern occupat1on
0 part

0f

Sovie~

zone of Germany.

Ber 1"1n was·env1sage
" d . 86

No
Th e

decision to regard West Berlin today as an independent political entity
is described as a "concession"by the East Germans in return for Western
pledges that the city cease to be used as a "factor for insecurity in
the world." 87 The implication that the West has not lived up to its

85 Ibid ., March 7, 1970, p. 1.
86
Norden, p. 244.

87 Ibid ., p. 260.
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part of this arrangement is clear and all that is left to conjecture is
the matter of what the GDR would like to do now that. the perfidy of the
West has been proven.

An indication appeared in the East Berlin

Berliner Zeitung in March of 1970.

dai1~

In an article entitlecl "Berlin is

the Capital of the Sovereign GDR," the Western attempt to create a "West
Berlin myth" was attacked as an effort to violate the status of Berlin.
All of Berlin, East and West, according to Berliner Zeitung, is part of
the German Democratic Republic.

The Western demand for guaranteed

access rights to West Berlin was described as a "new 'Danzig corridor'"
88
and another Western effort to violate the rights of the GDR.
Questions
of traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, Ulbricht
insisted in a TV interview in 1970, had nothing to do with the .FRG or
any of the Western powers who were part of the West
force.

Be~lin

occupation

The West, he insisted, had no right to demand guaranteed access

because that was a matter to be handled by the GDR authorities and the
West Berlin Senate alone. 89 From such statements as these, one can only
conclude that the East German designation of West Berlin as an
independent political entity comes grudgingly and; as other evidence
would indicate, at the insistence of the Soviet Union.
While the official East German attitude.toward West Berlin could
best be described as hostile during this time, the period was. not devoid
of nonhostile appeals to the West German population.

88Berliner Zeitung, March 25, 1970, p. 1.
89sWB , November 10, 1970, EE/3530/i.
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occasion of the presentation of the draft of the new GDR constitution in
1968, Ulbricht declared that he and his associates "feel linked with the
workers of West Berlin, with its intelligentsia, its students, with all
progressive forces of West Berlin."

Ulbricht's conception here was that

the ,best friends the West Berlin population had were those in leadership
o
pos1t1ons
1n East Germany. 90 tho1S t herne was constantly stressedOE
1n ast
0

0

German protests against certain West Berlin activities which were
condemned for being contrary to the interests of the West Berlin
residents.
The principal vehicle for the East German appeal to the West Berlin
residents was the West Berlin-based Socialist Unity Party which was led
by Gerhard Danelius.

The GDR press gave considerable attention to the

efforts of the SEW ,to influence West Berlin public opinion.

The program

of the SEW has as its goal the building up of support in West BerlinEast German relations.

Accordingly, the SEW, while either offering

candidates for the Senate ,or simply addressing itself to current issues,
has presented itself as the alternative to the cold war, an alternative
involving the establishment of a neutral,

self~governing

West Berlin

free from West German political influences and the military
9"

of the United States, England, and France. -

prote~tion

Dane1ius says that this

would enable West Berlin to "playa pC';3i tive role, in German and

90 ND, February 16, 1968, p. 2.
91 Junge Welt (Berlin, GDR), March 11, 1971, p. 7.
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international politics" and provide the population of the .city with
security which it does not enjoy today.92
The Ulbricht government.offered several proposals to the West
Berlin Senate for improving the West

B~rlin

situation during this time.

Most related either to the question of the political presence of the
Federal Republic in West Berlin or to the disruptive
above.

activitie~

discussed

The first major proposal dealing with West Berlin was presented

in June; 1968 as part of a plan for improving East-West German relations.
The plan, offered in the name of the GDR Council.of State

h~aded

by

Walter Ulbricht, called on both East and West German governments to sign
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, to renounce the storing of nuclear
warheads on their territories, and to agree to an
renunciation of the .use of force.

inter~ationally

valid

The offer was tied to a rejectiqn by

the FRG of any claims on West Berlin.

Acceptance would require the West

Germans to avoid any· future "intrusions" into West Berlin's affairs and
to refrain from any future "hostile activities" regarding East Germany
and. its allies.

While the proposal did not specify exactly what it

meant by "intrusions" and "hostile activities" it was coupled with a
denunciation of the presence of the West German NPD in West Berlin and
a charge that the Brandt Ostpolitik constituted a threat to the East. 93
Speaking several days later at the opening of the .eleventhannual Baltic.
Week, Ulbricht reaffirmed the proposal and said that if West Germany

92ND , October 31, 1970, p. 5.
93 Ib.l.· d ., J une,
23 1968 , pp. 1-2.
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was sincere in its expressed desire for an easing of tensions, it should
offer "deeds" as evidence by accepting the .East German proposal. 94
The next important East German offer came the following year.on the
eve of the Bundestag session in West Berlin.

In a letter to Brandt,

Ulbricht made an offer of Easter passes for West Berliners to visit East
Berlin if the Bundestag session would be held elsewhere.

When West

Germany insisted on a treaty guaranteeing access to West Berlin,
Ulbricht declared that the Bonn government was attempting to blackmail
the GDR.

According to the SED First Secretary, the FRG had been

maneuvered into an impasse as a result of the offer for Easter passes.
Speaking of the FRG's reaction to the offer for Easter passes, he said,
When it heard this, it immediately raised the .maximum
demands. It demanded that the Soviet Union and the GDR
should more or less recognize that West Berlin belongs to
the FRG.95
With the rejection of the offer for passes for West Berliners, the .East ,
Germans responded by, in Ulbricht's words, securing and protecting the
GDR's communic.atj ons. routes against West German provocations. 96 The
result, of course, was the closing of·the He1mstedt-Berlin autobahn
which normally carried Allied traffic to West Berlin.
Although the question of passes for West Berliners.was raised again
on several occasions, the next major indication of an East German
interest in making proposals relating to West Berlin came in Ulbricht's

94 Ibid ., July 8, 1968, p. 1.
95 Ibid ., March 4, 1969, pp. 1-2.
96 Ibid •
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New Year's mcssage on December 30, 1970.

In his speech Ulbricht spoke

of conc luding a transit agreement with the West Berlin Sena.te.

The

offer, however, was coupled with a demand that the FRG halt its
"troublemaking activities" in West Berlin.

Ulbricht presented this

offer primarily in terms of an attack on the West German government.
His first expression of interest in a transit agreement was preceded
by a statement that the time had "clearly come now to conclude agreements
which will put a stop to the troublemaking activities" of the West
Germans in order to make "normai relations" possible.

Furthermore,

the agreement that Ulbricht spoke of was to be concluded between the
West Berlin Senate and the GDR rather than with the Federal Republic
The major powers in West Berlin were also to be excluded by Ulbricht's
offer.

As advice to the FRG government, Ulbricht said that Bonn should

stop using the three Western powers as part of the effqrt to improve
· s1tuat1on.
.
.
97
tees
h W t Ber1 1n

Council of Ministers Chairman Willi Stoph added to the Ulbricht
offer scveral weeks late'!" when he affirmed that the "termination of the
political presence of the FRG and the cessation of all revanchist,
militarist, and antipeace activities" in West Berlin could lead to what
he termed a "broad development of normal good-neighborly relations"
between the GDR and West Berlin.

By good-neighborly relations, Stoph

said he meant such things as entry by West Berliners into East Berlin
and other parts of the GDR, assurance of transit traffic for goods and

97 Ibid ., December 31, 1970, pp. 1-2.
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persons to and-from West Berlin to all states, and the possible
conclusion of an agreement with the West B,erlin Senate on "frontier
adjustment" in connection. with the ,enclaves such as Steinstucken. 98
In terms of positive results, the several Ulbricht proposals were
ess~ntial1y

unproductive, especially in 1968 and 1969.

Th~

first year

was characterized by disagreement.on virtually everything regarding West
Be~lin's

relations with the GDR.

The extent of the hostility was

evidenced by disagreement on such minor matters as the West Ber.lin
sewage treatment debt to the GDR. 99 The relationship between Bonn and
East Berlin, of course, was no better.
improvement with the
b~tween

West

submi~sion

The next

ye~r

brought some

of the draft of a treaty on relations

East and West Germany which contained an article dealing with

Be~lin.

The substance, however, was such that it did not in fact

mark any dramatic breakthrough but rather simply a reaffirmation of the.
basic East German position on West Ber.lin. 100 Yet, the submission of
the draft of a treaty attempting to bring some formal improvement in,
relations must be considered a step above the sort of polemics that were
generally characteristic of relations between East Berlin, West Berlin,
and the third member of the triangle, Bonn.

This year also saw the East

German trade organization, the FDGB. make an effort to achieve a detente

98
99

February 4, 1971, p. 3.
January 20, 1968, p. 7.

100"Draft Treaty on the Establishment of Relations of Equal Right
Between the GDR and the FRG," Documents on the National and International
Policy of the GDR, No.7, 1969, p. 7.
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of its own with the West German Trade Union Federation. lOI

Although

this action was accorded very little fanfare in the East German press)
it does signify some change.

In the same sense, the September.meeting

of the FRG Action for Democratic Progress group with East German,
Polish, and Soviet officials. in Ea.st Be~lin signified a small degree
102
.
of l.mprovemen t . '. This group consisted of Bundestag members who
fayored a policy on West Berlin closer to that advocated by the East
Germans, and therefore could properly be considered little more than
part of a stage prop for an East German propaganda move.

However,

fact that the props in this case were Nest German

officials at

el~cted

th~

least made it necessary for the GDR to recognize in public that not all
West German politicians fit the stereotype depicted in most issues

o~

Neues Deuschland.
The most dramatic events of 1970 would have to be considered the
Brandt-Stoph meetings which would be expected ,to bring some improvement
in relations between the GDR and West Berlin also.

However, even ,these

meetings and the arrangement surrounding them were marked by considerable
displays of the continuing bad relations between East and West in,
Germany.

Ulbricht's evaluation was that Brandt's attitude was

"disappointing" since he was unwilling to talk about equal relations
under international law between the.two states and the acceptance of
103
the independent political status of West Ber1in.
However, in economic

101SWB, May 13, 1969, EE/3072/AI/3.
102ND , September 6, 1969, p. 2.
103 Ibid ., March 21, 1970, p. 1.
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relations there was at least the promise of improvement.

In September,

Horst Soelle, GDR Minister of External Economic Relations, speaking at
the Leipzig Trade Fair, mentioned the willingness of East Germany to
expand its trade with ~oth the Federal Republic and West Ber1in. 194
Such a statement, even while dealing primarily with economic matters,
could not be considered without important political meaning in .terms
of the relations between East Germany and West Berlin.
Ulbricht's last few months in control of the SED were marked by two
I

I

Th~

important developments in relatioIls with West Berlin.

first came in

January with the restoration of telephone links between West Berlin and
the GDR, which had been severed in 1952.

The second most important event

occurred in March following Stoph's speech on West Berlin.

This was the

opening of negotiations between the GDR and the West

Senate on

March 12.

Be~lin

The West Berlin-GDR talks were taking place at the same time

as.the talks between the Federal Republic and the GDR.
Western delegations were attacked by

t~e

While the

GDR press for making no

contribution to progress in the talks on Berlin,106 the fact that the
talks were in progress.must once again be considered an indication of
an improvement in relations.
In summation, Ulbricht's last years were characterized by both
success and failure in improving relations with West Berlin and West

104SWB , September 4, 1970, EE/3473/Al/2.
105 Ib ;d
~ .., J anuary 27 , 1971, EE / 3594/Al/3.
106ND, April 17, 1971, p. 1.
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Germany.

It is important to note that

mo~e

of, the failures occurred in

the earlier years and more of the successes in the latter.part of this
period.

This seems. to indicate that an inevitable change in relations

between East and West in Germany was,taking place.

The change can be

described as inevitable because it was, in the opinion of many leading
Western authorities on Soviet and East European affairs, dictated by the
USSR. l07 The question automatically arises then of whether or.not
Ulbricht welcomed this change..

Did Ulbricht desire an improvement in

relations. between East Germany and the .FRG and West Berlin or did he
reluctantly accede to Soviet d.emands that he take certain measures
simply in order to support the Soviet policy?
the question of Ulbricht'S retirement.

This matter also raises

Did he in reality simply resign

of his own free will or was he encouraged to do so, either by his
associates in the SED or by his Soviet allies?

Was Ulbricht, as one

might be tempted to believe, becoming "dizzy with success" as a result
of the vindication of his views on Czechoslovakia by means.of the 1968
invasion, the growing prosperity of·the East German economy, and the
personal prestige that he could claim by virtue of being one of the
world's senior Communist leaders, one of the few living contemporaries
of Lenin?
107 Peter C. Ludz, "Continuity and Change Since Ulbricht," Problems
of Communism, Vol.. 22, March-April, 1972, pp. 58-60.
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IV.

THE REVOLT OF A PUPPET?

The question to which we shall first turn is the issue of Ulbricht's
relations, with the USSR on matters of policy relating to West Berlin and
the Federal Republic.

Th~

contrast between Soviet and East German

rhetoric during Ulbricht's last

month~

as First Secretary of the SED

supports the belief that there was a clash between the policies of the
two leaderships.

The different interpretations placed on the November,

1970 Tiergarten shooting incident provides an especially telling
illustration of this contrast.

In reporting the incident, Pravda not

only observed that the crime "has provoked the indignation and anger,
of West Berliners," but also included a statement by

Mayo~

Klaus Scheutz

· express1ng
.
hi,s cond emnat10n
. . 0f t h e 1nC1
. . d ~nt. 108 The Eas t
o f Wes t Ber 11n

German·,accounts charged the West Berlin officials with responsibility
for the incident and declared that the

autho~ities

in West Berlin were

attempting to "cover up" the true facts behind the shooting .109 The
East German news media discussed the incident for days in a manner which
could only be.described as hysterical and would indicate an official
desire to use the event as a pretext for postponing the development of
improved ,relations with the West, a development which by this time
appeared inevitable.

108Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No. 45,
December 8, 1970, p. 18. (Hereafter noted as CDSP).
109ND , November 8, 1970, p. 1.
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The more optimistic Soviet coverage of the West German treaties
with Poland and the USSR provides another illustration.

While Soviet

accounts did not ignore "revanchist circles" in the FRG, the stress was
clearly placed on the promise of these developments.

The Soviet press

continually emphasized that the treaties with West Germany constituted
"an important act to promote the easing of the international
situation.,,110 Meanwhile, East German ac~ountsp1ayed down the
importance of the West German treaties and reminded readers that the
revanchists in the FRG were not simply an isolated fringe element,
highly placed individuals within the Bonn government.

bu~

The West German

leaders such as Strauss and Barze1, the GDR press warned, would never
allow the Bonn government to go so far as to implement a treaty
.
lvlng
'
..
.
E
111 . Suc h accounts.
lnvo
t h e renunclatlon
0 f f orce agalnst
t heast.

made the GDR's reluctance to support an improvement in relations with
West Germany extremely obvious.
Differences between Ulbricht and the Soviet leadership became
particularly apparent in statements regarding possible solutions ,to the
West Berlin problem.

Ulbricht's proposals, such as the 1968 offer

discussed above, involved primarily sacrifices by the West.

The 1968

plan not only would have had a detrimental effect on West Germany's NATO
position through its provisions to the prohibition of storage of nuclear
warheads, but it also required an apparently complete abandonment of

110CDSP , Vol. XXII, No. 47, December 22, 1970, p. 22.
lllND , August 8, 1970, p. 1.
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West Berlin by the Federal Republic.

The incentives offered by Ulbricht

for acceptance of his plans made the one-sided nature of the .offers even
more apparent.

The incentives consisted mostly of vague promises, such

as an "improvement" in the life of. West Berliners, and much more specific
threats, many of which the GDR carried out.

The initiation of.a passport

requirement for all travel and transit traffic to and from the FRG and
West Berlin in June of. 1968 following the passage of emergency
legislation by the FRG which was to
one such threat.

b~

applicable to West Berlin was

The refusal of the GDR postal service to handle mail

with a West German stamp marking the occasion of the election of the
FRG president in a West Berlin Bundes.tag session in 1969 and the closing
of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn at the same time are additional
evidence of the willingness of the GDR to implement many of its threats.
In summary, most of the incentives Ulbricht offered were of an
es~entially

negative character.

The Soviet attitude on West Berlin presented a sharp contrast with
Ulbricht's approach.

Not only did the Soviet Union praise Brandt's

Ostpolitik in connection with developments on easing tension in
Europe,l12 in contrast to the East German charges that the Ostpolitik
was hostile and directed against the East, but the Soviet leaders spoke
in a considerably more promising tone regarding the prospects for
progress on West Berlin.

In discussing the Soviet position, First

Secretary L. E. Brezhnev said,

112V. Shakov, "European Security Systems: Soviet Effort,"
International Affairs (Moscow), No.5, 1971, p. 36.
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We believe that normalizatiQn of the situation with respect
to West Berlin is fully attainable. For this purpose, all
that is required is that the interested parties display
goodwill and work out. decisions that will mee~ the wishes
of the West Berlin population and will tak~ into account.the
legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the German
Democratic Republic. 113
Continuing with the more moderate Soviet theme, Soviet Foreign Affairs
Minister Gromyko, speaking of the successful conclusion of the ,talks on
West Berlin and other European security matters, declared that all of
these issues "must be carried out simultaneously, without,waiting for
matter to be concluded in one area before moving on to another.,,1l4
While this statement can be considered as having application to the
FRG's insistence on progress on West Berlin's status before ratifying
its treaty with Moscow, it also applied with equal force to Ulbricht,
\'lho had been demanding diplomatic recognition of East Germany by the
FRG before continuing work on the West Berlin question.
The nature of these disagreements, plus others which have been
documente d by observers

0f

·
'
GDR- SOVlet
re I
atlons

0f

. d , 115
t h'lS perlo

clearly indicates that the most faithful of the old Soviet "puppets,"
Walter Ulbricht, had in many respects revolted against his patron.
next obvious question, therefore, is:

The

Did this revolt result in

Ulbricht's ouster or did he, in fact, simply retire due to his failing
health and advancing years?

113CDSP , Vol. XXII, No. 48, December 29, 1970, p. 23.
114CDSP , Vol. XXIII, No. 17, May 25, 1971, p. 34.
115Lu d z, pp. 56-60.
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A number of facts support the contention that Ulbricht was forced
from his office as First Secretary of the SED.

The absence of any

warning that IJlbricht ,. . as going to retire is one of the most conspicuous
indications that the move was intended to be a surprise for the aging
First Secretary.

On the eve of the Sixteenth SED Conference in May,

1971, there was no reason for anyone outside

the innermost circles of

the SED leadership to expect a change in the top leadership position of
East Germany.

It is reasonable to expect that if Ulbricht had planned

on stepping down, he would have desired some public notice in order to
facilitate the preparation of proper tributes to him for his years of
service.

If the preparations that preceded his sixtieth birthday in

1953 are any indication, Ulbricht was certainly something less than an
unassuming, humble public servant.

On that occasion, his birthday was

to be both an official state affair and a national celebration with
singing and dancing throughout the entire country. 116

It is not

unreasonable to suppose that he would have wanted his retirement to
have been marked by even more elaborate commemorations.
were none.

However, there

The matter was handled as casually as though such personnel

changes were an almost annual occurrence.

Had Ulbricht been responsible

for the move, it would certainly have been handled differently.
The matter of his advancing age would also support the belief that
the resignation was not of Ulbricht's free will.

The .iogic in this case

revolves around what must certainly have been both a Soviet and an East

116

Carola Stern, Ulbricht (London:
pp.135-l36.

Pall Mall Press, 1965),
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German· concern:

the possibility of· Ulbricht's sudden death.

Such a

demise could have required the hurried and unplanned designation of a
successor, and might have involved the installation of an individual
who .did not meet Soviet desires and expectations.

However, by moving

before the seventy-eight year old's death, the Soviet Union could plan
carefully and in secrecy by.working with selected members of the East
German ruling establistment.
immi~ent

The fact that few were aware.of Ulbricht's

replacement meant that fewer GDR politicians were in a position

to start making their moves to grab whatever.,advanced.positions they
might feel were available.
and carry out.

In short, such a move was.easier to plan

That the Soviet leaders, or anyone, would desire it to

be so is obvious.

It is also obvious that those members of·the East

German leadership who were closest to the Kremlin insiders, Honecker
being one of .them--as his. selection clearly indicates--would prefer that
the matter be handled in this manner.

Ulb:dcht' s movements in the ,three

months preceeding the party conference

e~rly

facilitated such actions.

in May would have

On February 8, Ulbricht, accompanied by his

wife, arrived in the Soviet Union f9r a vacation at the specific
invitation of· the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
117 He did not leave the USSR for his return to Berlin until
.
Unl.on.
March 14, after a meeting with Brezhnev at which "certain

ques~ions

of

the international situation" were discussed in what was described as a
"friendly and cordial atmosphere." 118 Ulbricht's five-week absence from

117CDSP , Vol. XXIII, No.6, March 9, 1971, p. 30.
118rbid., Vol. XXIII, No. 11, April 13, 1971, p. 22 ..
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East Berlin, at the invitation of the CPSU, it should be noted, gave
Honecker and his allies sufficient time to plan a move set for the
Sixteenth SED Conference set for the first week of May.

The fact that

Ulbricht and his wife were vacationing in the USSR meant that they could
be under constant, thorough surveillance where any contacts could be
monitored.

His meeting with Brezhnev just prior to his return could

have given the Soviet leader a last opportunity to determine if the
move against Ulbricht was absolutely necessary.

While the Pravda

account simply says that "certain questions of.the international
situation" were discussed, the matter of the GDR's policy toward West
Germany and West Berlin would surely have been one of them.

If Ulbircht

showed.no signs of freely altering his rigid posture on these issues it
could have served to give Brezhnev the final evidence he needed to
demonstrate that the First Secretary had outlived his usefulness.
An additional very obvious indication that Ulbricht's retirement
was not voluntary appeared almost two years after the event.

In March,

1973, the Ulbricht Stadium in East Berlin was renamed the Stadium of
World Youth.

At the same time, the nearly underground station which

had borne Ulbricht's name and the Walter Ulbricht

Ge~an

Academy for

Political Sciences and Jurisprudence at Potsdam-Babelsberg were also
11 Q
renamed.--~

Such actions may be considered strong evidence that

Ulbricht's retirement came not as a result of advancing years and
declining health, but rather as a result of diminished political
influence.

119SWB,. March 21, 1973, EE/4250/ B/5.
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The facts mentioned above are supplemented by the policy
considerations which pointed to an Ulbricht ouster rather .than a
vol~ntary

retirement.

A little ,over a month after Ulbricht's return

from the USSR, Radio GDR home service announced that the Soviet Union
had made a proposal on West Berlin which involved the acceptance of
West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic, including consent to
consular protection for the permanent residents of the city and the
representation of their interests abr9ad by the FRG. 120 This statement
clearly went against Ulbricht's publicly-stated position on West Berlin.
In the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin concluded in September, these
offers were officially agreed to by the Soviet Union and the three
Western powers in Berlin.

Their inclusion further indicates the

to which the views of Ulbricht

we~e

at variance with those of

t~e

exten~

USSR.

In such a situation it would be surprising if the Kremlin made no move
to replace Ulbricht.
However, the Soviet decision to replace Ulbricht required an
additional decision regarding the question of with whom should Ulbricht
be replaced.

Why was Erich Honecker selected as the replacement?

The

most obvious reason would be his position within the ,SED in contrast to
that of the other most frequently-cited possible successor, Willi Stoph,
within the State,apparatus.

Communist ideology dictates the predominance

of the Party over the State and the history of power struggles within
Communist Party states shows that those individuals with Party

l20 Ibid ., April 29, 1973, EE/3670/Al/l.

c~reers
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are more likely to rise to the top than individuals with careers in the
State bureaucracy.

Honecker had become a member of the Central Committee,

of the Communist Party in 1946 and continued to rise through the Party
ranks after the union with the East German Social Democrats.

In 1958 he

became a full member of the Politburo of the ,SED after considerable
experience with the East German youth organization of which he was one
of the founders, and two years of political training in the Soviet
Union.

As a Politburo member he was responsible for military affairs

and internal security, both very important matters for the GDR during
the following years. 12l In addition, Honecker had a safe, conservative
background in terms of positions he had taken during the past.

While he

had adopted stands opposing rapproachment with West Germany and was
rumored to have opposed the Stoph meetings with Brandt ,in 1970;122 he
was part,of a group among the GDR leadership noted for its f1exibility.123
Such a trait would have increased his value to the ,USSR in a time of
change in Communist policies toward

theWest~

The

fac~

that Honecker

had a long career in the SED was of further value in lending an air of
stability during a time of transition in the GDRls leadership.

For a

nation which is frequently noted for its instability, such an appearance
could be of considerable importance.

Finally, the fact that Honecker

12l Die Volkskammer (The Peoples I Chamber) (Berlin, GDR:,
Staatsverlag der DDR, 1972), pp. 354-356.
l22peter C. Ludz, "The SED Leadership in Transition," Problems of,
Communism, May-June, 1970, p. 27.
123peter C. Ludz, The GDR From the Sixties to the Seventies
(Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs,
1970), p. 49.
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was stron s within the Party but not too strong must have added to his
attractiveness for the Soviet Union.

An individual who was very weak

within his own party would have been extremely easy for the Kremlin to
control, but he could have lacked the capability, at least initially,
to command his own organization.

An individual who was too strong might,

have become independent from the USSR and could have been inclined to
carry out a purge within the Party in order to strengthen his position
further.

This would ,have not been desirable either, from the Soviet

point of view.

What was best for the USSR was a man like

strong but not too strong.

H~necker,

The fact that no ,purges of 'Ulbricht

faithfuls such as Friedrich Ebert and ,Margarete Muller occurred
indicates that Honecker's position within the ,Party is not at all
similar to what Ulbricht's was fifteen or twenty years ago.

Honecke~'s

nondominance of the SED increases his dependence of the Soviet
leadership and thereby further increases his usefulness to the USSR.
The view that Ulbricht's retirement was other than a voluntary move
on the First Secretary's part has been supported by three authorities on
East,German affairs:

MelvinCroan, Peter C. Ludz, and Heinz Lippman.

Writing shortly after Ulbricht's retirement, Croan, while not
specifically advancing the thesis that Ulbricht was ousted against his
will, presents an impressive array of justifications.for such a ,move.
In short, he argues that the SED leader was advocating foreign policies
that ran counter to detente, insisting on a special position for himself
in European bloc affairs, and presenting the GDR rather than the

102
' fef '1c1ency
,
USSR as the mod e 1 0 f econom1C
and po 1"1t1ca1 stab'1l'~ty. 124
Ludz has likewise presented a catalogue of .Soviet-GDR policy differences
in Ulbricht's last days.

Ludz hypothesizes that

U1bricht~s

"unwilling-

ness to modify his rigid posture" on a variety of issues precipitated
12
his downfall, S Honecker's biographer and former associate~ Heinz
Lippmann~

has insisted that Ulbricht's removal was brought about by a

combination of East German and Soviet efforts.

Honecker, he writes,

was reported to have been urging Ulbricht's removal as early as mid-l970.
Lippmann notes that there was conspicuous tension

and

between.Ulb~icht

Soviet Ambassador Abrassimov in the last days, and that the Berlin
Agreement had become a principal issue
obstructionist tactics.

becaus~

of Ulbricht's

He believes that the choice for the USSR

beca~e

one of either Ulbricht or the Berlin Agreement, but not ,both together.
LippmanJ:} argues that the crucial characteristic of Honecker's that
prompted the Russians to select him as the successor was his
"unconditional loyalty to the CPSU and the USSR.,,126
In order to more fully evaluate the wisdom of Honecker's selection
as well as to understand GDR policy on West Berlin since 1971, we must
next examine the developments on West Berlin and re1ate4 questions since
the Sixteenth SED Conference.

The following chapter is devoted to such

an examination.

124Melvin Croan, "After Ulbricht," ,Survey, Vol. 17, Spring, 1971,
pp. 78-81 ..
l25 Lud z, "Continuity and Change Since Ulbricht," pp. 57-58.
York:

l26Heinz Lippmann, Honecker and the New Politics of Europe (New
Macmillan Company, 1972), pp. 214-223.

CHAPTER III
HONECKER'S WEST BERLIN POLICY
The Honecker policy toward West Berlin has differed sharply from
the Ulbricht policy in terms of actual progress on issues ,relating to
the city of West Berlin.

One of the most notable of these, the ,Four

Power Agreement on Berlin, came within just a few months of Ulbricht's
replacement in May.

However, the rhetoric of the three Honecker years

has had much in common, with that of the last part of the Ulbricht era,
suggesting elements of continuity in GDR foreign policy along with
elements of change.

The tone of the East German rhetoric toward the

West in general and the FRG and West Berlin in particular, has been
characterized by a concern over the persistent negative qualities of
the Federal Republic, attacks on West German and West Berlin policies
and personalities, continued emphasis on the ,Western military threat,
and charges that West Berlin has permitted itself to be misused by the
West.
Honecker himself made the East German view that West Germany had
not changed explicit in his report on the Twenty-fourth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union shortly after the announcement of
Ulbricht's resignation.

According to the new First Secretary, the CPSU

and the SED were "agreed that nothing had changed as regards the
reactionary and aggressive character of imperialism and the Federal

103
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Republic of Germany."

1

An editorial in Neues Deutschland a few days

later was consistent with Honecker's harsh theme in its condemnatiQn of,
the current role of the FRG.

According to the editorial, the FRG was,to

"assume the old function of the German Reich since the end of World War,
Two--that is to say, form the ,spearhead of the imperialist world system
,
'1'1sm. ,,2 While such statements must be balanced with
aga1nst
SOC1a

subsequent positive developments, they do serve to establish a

pa~ter~

of continuity between the Ulbricht and Honecker regimes in terms of the
East German conception of what the

F~G

is supposed to represent.

this regard, the similarities outnumber the

In

differenc~s.

In evaluating West German policy initiatives toward the GDR,
Honecker's regime continued to pursue a ,critical attitude.

Many West

German offers were simply dismissed as "verbal compromises" lacking in
any real substance.

In the summer of 1971 ,when the Bonn government

rescinded official directives on avoiding the use of the term "GDR,"
the East Germans responded by declaring that this was no more than a
"feeble and illogical adjustment to the force of reality and a way of
yielding to the pressure of public opinion.

It does not ,indicate a

change of po1icy.II S Just as the East Germans frequently charged that
the FRG wanted to believe the worst about the ,GDR, the GDR press seemed
to insist on believing only the worst about West German intentions.
According to GDR sources, the FRG had done nothing to improve relations

1Neues Deutschland, May 4, 1971, p. 1.
2 Ibid ., May 8, 1971, p. 1.
J~~y

15, 1971, p. 2.

(Hereafter noted as ND~)

l~

with East

Ge~any.

In fact, Bonn was said to be. engaging in an

international diplomatic offensive against East Germany in order to
block its membership in the United Nations and prevent other states
from extending diplomati~ recognition to the GDR. 4 The officia~ East
German opinion was that the FRG was continuing to adhere,to the sole
representation doctrine and was engaging in an ideological crusade
against the GDR.

According to Neues Deutschland in 1972, there had

been a recent increase in anti-Communist propaganda in the FRG which
was massive and alarming.

The campaign was declared to be especially

dangerous in that it was now conducted by "differentiated ,and selective
methods" rather than by the outdated, obvious, and less effective
approaches. 5
Individuals who were associated with such policies were occasionally
singled out for personal attacks by the East Germannews.media.
Minister of Interior, Han-Dietrich Genscher was

acc~ed

As FRG

of lacking

respect for Bonn's treaties with the USSR and Poland when he questioned
East German frontier measures.

Genscher, according to tqe GDR press,

failed to recognize the existing frontiers of Europe, including those of
the GDR. 6 When members of the West German Federal Frontier Guard boarded
an East German vessel in the Kiel Canal and took the captain into custody
for several hours, the East German press portrayed the incident as one

4 Ibid ., October 16, 1971, pp. 1-2.
SIbid., Feburary 27, 1972, p. 3.
6Ibid ., January 4, 1972, p. 2.
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of maJor proportions.

No one should be surprised, it declared, tha,t

this "act ·of piracy" met with the public approval

o~

Genscher who was

said to be on record as favoring "interference in.the internal a1;fairs
of· the GDR.,,7

In a similar fashion, FRG Minister Egon Bahr has been

attacked for his alleged wish to cause the GDR "to disappear."
commenting on this,

th~

In

East German radio program, "V()ice of the GDR,"

charged that the Bahr.statement was,proof that the .FRG had no real
intention of renouncing its "revanchist" policies. 8 West BeI:lin's mayor
Klaus Scheutz was attacked in 1973 as one of "those people who maintain
that West Berlin was best governed during the days of the cold.war." A
Neues Deutschland editorial charged that Scheutz had no interest in
normalization of relations with the GDR and was acting in a manner,
inconsistent with the best interests of the West Berlin population. 9
While Brandt himself was· generally accorded
tre~tment

reasona~ly

restrained

by the GDR press during this time, he has also been the

subject of occasional severe

critic~sm.

When Brandt made what the

East German press viewed as disparaging remarks about the attitude of
the GDR officials in April, 1973, the .response was

a~

East German attack

in which it was charged that the Chancellor was hostile to the GDR and
blinded by Social Democratic anticommunism. lO The new West German

7Junge Welt (Berlin, GDR), January 12, 1972, p. 2.
8BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 16, 1974, EE/4575/Al/l.
(Hereafter noted as SWB.)
9

ND, November 7, 1973, p. 1.

10SWB, April 13, 1973, EE/4270/Al/2.
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chancellor) ,Helmut Schmidt, has been the subject of
at~acks.

n~erous

German

His work as Defense Minister has attracted most of the

criticism he received from the GDR.

In that

capa~ity,

accqrding to

Erich Honecker, Schmidt carried on the "infamcl:lS work begun by

Strallss'~

and won the praise of .Nazi elements in West Germany.ll.
Since

Honecke~'s

assumption of power in May, 1971, the GDR has

continued to stress the military threat posed by West Germany and NATO.
This theme is essentially a

continu~tion

of one which started in the

first years after the partition of Germany and was played upon in
varying degrees during the 1950s and 1960s.

The basic idea of it is

that the military power of the West is directed against the communist
party states of Eastern Europe.

The specter of a nuclear military force

under the control of the Bonn government has been a basic element of
this theme.

As Neues Deutschland editorialized in 1973,

In its military.policy the FRG is at present in theo.ry and
practice pursuing the two-fold aim of increasing the conventional strength of the Bundeswehr by arming itself and getting
ahold.on nuclear weapons,by the presence of American forces
in the FR.G.l2
Any efforts at upgrading the technical quality of the West German
military have been portrayed as a violation of the spirit of detente.
In commenting on West German military modernization plans in 1972,
"Voice of the GDR" asked rhetorically how such. plans could be

11

ND, January 7, 1972, p. 2.

12 Ibid ., July 25, 1973, p. 1.
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compatible with the West German treaties with the USSR and:Pola~d.l3
Military exercises, such as are very common within the Warsaw Pact
states, including

th~

GDR, are also cited by the East German authorities

as a contradiction of Bonn's
the East.

~vpressions

of peaceful intentions toward

The NATO exercises in 1974 were heralded by Neues Deutschland

as "proof of the unabated agressiveness" of NATO.

According to the SED

newspaper, fewer and fewer people in the ,west believe th,a t there, is a
"threat from the East" as the "anticommunist

fairy tales" assert, so

the only reason for Western ,military maneuvers must be to prepare for
aggression. 14

This image of the threat from the West is used as

justification for East German military preparedness.

In 1971, GDR

Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann, declared that peace in Europe ,had b,een
preserved, not by a balance of power, but only by a clear and growing
military superiority of the East.

Hoffmann cited the ,alliance of the

United States and the FRG as justification for continued efforts to
guarantee the military superiority of the WTO forces, including those,
of the GDR. 15
The Honecker regime has continued to stress that West Berlin
threatens the GDR.
We~t

However, since early 1971, the rhetoric about the

Berlin threat has been considerably reduced ,from its previous level

in terms of the intensity of East German attacks and charges.
13SWB, January 19, 1972, EE/3892/Al/1.
14 NO, May 7, 1974, p. 1.
lS SWB , May 13, 1971, EE/3682/B/4.
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complaint has been that West Germany.is attempting to extend its
jurisdiction to West Berlin and govern West Berlin as though it were
another Land of the FRG.

TheGDR has repeatedly

char~ed

that West

Germany is attempting to govern West Berlin through.extensions of.
certain types of legislation to the city, by drafting residents into
the Bundeswehr, and by establishing offices of the
FRG in West Berlin.

go~ernment

0;

the,

The West German plan, put forward by Genscher as

Minister of Interior, to establish a branch of the

Federa~

Environmental

Protection Office in West Berlin aroused considerable displeasure in
office GDR circles.

In August, 1973, Neues Deutschland described this

plan as "political environmental pollution" and a violation of the Four
Power Agreement on Berlin. 16 This reaction was typical of the GDR
response to West German efforts at perpetuating a political presence
in West.Berlin.

The same reaction has continually been accorded visits

by West German officials to the city for performance of. official duties
during the Honecker years.
However, these years have also brought improvements in the
political atmosphere surrounding the West Berlin issue.
developments

surpass~d

These

those of the preceding Ulbricht regime.

A clear

indication of such improvements appeared in a speech by Honecker in
January, 1972 when he said that while he was aware of the aggressive
character of the FRG, he was also taking account, "especially from
the point of view of, foreign policy, of the positive aspect of the
16ND, August 31, 1973; p. 2.
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Brandt government.,,17 Ulbricht had been unwilling to make such
concessions to the West German SPD.

East Get:Illan

awar~ness

o,f the

"positive aspect" of the Brandt government was reflected in a variety
of ways.

The return of a West German soldier who had defected to the

East, along with his army

jeep~

by the East Germans to the West Ge~an
authorities signified the change. 18 In the past, such an aotion would

have been inconceivable.

The reduction in the East-West German

propaganda war in July, 1972, was additional evidence of East Germany's,
recognition that the SPD government did possess some good
What this propaganda "ceasefire" amounted to

WaS

chara~teristics.

an.end to the display of

posters at the Berlin Wall directed at GDR border guards and the
termination of the East German "Soldatensender" propaganda brC?adcasts
to

and the sending of communist propaganda magazines
to Bundeswehr soldiers. 19 Honecker acknowledged the changed situation
Bundes~ehrsoldiers

in October, 1973 when he announced that he could see a change from the
cold war in the direction of detente. 20 The most important evidence,
however, of this change in the political climate can be seen in the
record of, proposals and negotiations during the first three years of
the Honecker regime.

l7 Ibid ., January 7, 1972, p. 2.
l8 SWB , May 9, 1972, EE/3984/Al/4.
19 Ibid ., July 14, 1972, EE/4040/Al/3.
20ND, October 27, 1973, p. 2.

III
I.

NEGOTIATIONS SINCE 1971

The most conspicuous,of the agreements

d~ing

the first three

years of Honecker's control of the SED was the Quadripartite Agreement
on .Berlin signed on September 3, 1971.

The SED press was enthusiastic

in its praise of the agreement, hailing it as "an important step towards
detente in the heart of Europe." The SED asserted that its leadership
had been "fully informed" at all times by the Soviet Union regarding
progress on the agreement and had made a "constructive contribut:i,on"
itself to the successful conclusion of the agreement. 21 Expressing the
USSR's appreciation of the GDR's role, CPSU Politburo member Piotr.
She1est, speaking in East Berlin on

th~

22nd anniversary of the GDR

the next.mon1;h, agreed that the GDR did in fact playa "great
constructive ro1e.,,22
The willingness of the GDR's leadership to support the ,USSR's
efforts to achieve detente was demonstrated by the prompt

conc1~sion

of two agreements by East Germany with the Federal Republic and West
Berlin on transit traffic to West Berlin.

The agreement with West,

Germany was signed on December 17, 1971 by Dr. Michael Kohl for the
GDR.

At the time of the signing, Dr. Kohl declared that the agreement

was significant ·for more than its material contents because it was
actually a "useful contribution to detente" which could help encourage

2l Ibid ., August 27, 1971, p. 1.
22 Ibid ., October 6, 1971, p. 3.
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the ,further normalization of relations,between the GDR and the FRG. 23
Three days later an agreement with West Berlin was
Se~retary

s~gned,

Guenter Kohrt acting on behalf of the GDR.

with

S~ate

Just. as Kohl

expressed the hope that the agreement with West Germany would lead to.
further measures to normalize relations, Kohrt declared his ,hope ,for
t4e resolution of other issues in relations between West Berlin and the
GDR. 24 It is significant that these agreements were concluded without
official diplomatic recognition of the GDR by West Germany, a demand
voiced by Ulbricht and,previously barring such progress.
seemed.content in discussing the agreement with the

F~G

Honecker
to remark that

by signing an agreement with the GDR West Germany had acknowledged East
Germany as a "sovereign state."

Honecker also commented that the,

agreements amounted to an acceptance of the principal East

Ge~an

argument on West Berlin, that the city is an independent political
entity.

The fact that Western demands for a Western controlled corridor

through the GDR's territory had been dropped was cited by Honecker as a
major victory for East

This, he argued, amounted to a further
"de facto" recognition of the GDR. 25
Germany~

The desire for a further normalization of East Germany's ,relations
with the ,FRG '<las satisfied by the successful conclusion of the Treaty on
the Bases of Re1ations,between the GDR and ,the FRG.

23The Berlin Settlement (Bonn:
FRG, 1972), p. 59.
24 Ibid ., p. 72.
25 ND , December 18, 1971, p. 2.

While the treaty
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was initialed on November 8, 1972, after a long political wrangle in
West Germany, it did not come into force until June 21, 1973.

On the

occasion of the signing of the treaty, Dr. Michael.Kohl.declared that
the GDR viewed the treaty as a.vehic1e for "bringing about; the
,,26 As a logical
.
rep 1acement 0 f t he co ld war by de t ente an d cooperat1on.
continuation of this process, negotiations began on the establishment of
permanent missions for the two Germanies in their. respective capitals.
These negotiations bore.fruit in May, 1974 when permanent missions.were
established in Bonn and·East Berlin. 27 The actual opening of the
missions had been delayed for a short time as a result of the Guillaume
spy case in West Germany.

That the delay amounted to no more than a few

days is in itself remarkable.

In an earlier time, such an incident

would have been sufficient to disrupt the entire proce$s of. normalization
between the GDR and the FRG.
The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin contained a reference to the
possible exchange of territory in the case of enclaves such as
Steinstucken and other small areas.

The first such exchange came.as a

result of an agreement in July, 1972 between the GDR government .and the
West Berlin Senate.

Under the agreement, a small piece of land near

Potsdamer Platz was transferred to West Berlin for the ,price of
thirty-one million Deutsche Marks. 28 A much more.extensive territorial

26 Ibid ., June 2~, 1973, p. 1.
27 Ibid ., May 3, 1974, p. 1.
28 Ibid ., July 20, 1972, p. 4.
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exchange was agreed to in February, 1974 involving land

for~erly

under

the control of the .GDR Reichsbahn in the Anhalter region of West
· 29
Ber1 ~n.
Another important step in the process of .normalization occurred
with the establishment of the Boundary Commission in January, 1973.
The purpose of the commission was to review and supplement the
demarcation of the East-West .German border, to prepare the necessary
documents on the actual course of the bo~ndary and to r~gulate other
problems .connected with the border. 30 Shortly after the establishment
of the Boundary Commission, Bonn and East Berlin began talks on a,public
health agreement between the two states. 31 The result of this series of
talks which lasted for almost a year was a Health Services Agreement
which was.signed in.East.Berlin on April 25, 1974.

The need for such

an agreement had been mentioned in the Treaty on the Bases of Re1atio~s
between the FRG and the GDR. 32 In September, 1973, the GDR-FRG Frontier
Agreements were signed.

One dealt with caring for damage at the

frontie~

and the other concerned the maintenance and development of the frontier
waterways and the water engineering
As a result of these agreements,

insta11~tions

provis~ons

along the frontier.

were implemented for

reciprocal information at short notice regarding events such as fires,
29

SWB, February 23, 1974, EE/4534/Al/4.

30ND , January 31, 1973, p. 2.
31 Ibid ., May 24, 1973, p. 7.
32 Ibid ., April 26, 1974, p. 2.
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gale damage, landslides, and epidemics. 33 Meanwhile, work continued on
a possible post and telecommunications agreement, a cultural agreement,
and a judicial assistance agreement between the GDR and the FRG and a
va~iety

of agreements between the GDR and West Berlin.

One of
. the most,
.
\

important of the latter is an accident assistance agreement on which
talks began. in May,

19~3.

This agreement would cover the rendering of

prompt aid after accidents on the sector boundary in Berlin.
As a means of improving contacts between the ,GDR and the FRG and
West Berlin, negotiations continued in the area of telephone facilities,
television

programs~

and press agreements.

In July, 1972, arrangments

were made for increasing and improving telephone

As a

con~ections.

result, thirty-two local exchanges in the Pots4am area could be
from West Berlin by direct dialing.

re~ched

This measure was made possible as

a result of an agreement between the FRG Post Office and the .GDR Postal
Administration concluded in September, 1971.

In the past, no call could

be placed from West Berlin to the GDR without going through an
34
operator.
In 1973 th~ prospect of an exchange of television programs
between. the FRG and the GDR was raised by Max Walter Schultz, the
vice-president of the GDR Authors' Union.

Schultz expressed his desire

to show "as much·as possible that will give a truly realistic picture of
West German conditions--on the principle of reciprocity.,,35

33

SWB, September 22, 1973, EE/4405/Al/2.

34 ND, July 25,

1~72,

p. 7.

3~SWB, April 26, 1973, EE/4279/Al/lO.
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however, there has been an absence of any higher official support for
suchan exchange of television programs.

The exchange of journalists

between the GDR and the FRG and West Berlin, in contrast, did develqp.
By 1973, provisions,had been ,made for GDR
FRG journalists in East Berlin.
in East Berlin,
with a

permanen~

West Ber1in.

36

whi~h

journalis~s

in Bonn and for

The German Press Agency (DPA) office

opened on September

25~ 19~3,

was even equipped

teleprinter line connecting it with the DPA office in
The extent to which human contacts between East and West

had improved in Germany could be seen by the statistics on travel to the
GDR in 1973.

During the year, over 3,650,000 came from the ,Federal
Republic and mo~e than 3,461,000 from West Berlin. 37 The figures for

1972 are only slightly less than these but in 1971, before the.
implementation of the transit agreement, only 3,000,000 residents of
West ,Berlin and the Federal Republic entered the GDR. 38 Telephone
contacts also increased during this time.

While in 1970 there were

only 700,000 calls from the .FRG and West Berlin to the GDR, in 1973
~o

the number,reacned 5.8 mi11ion.--

The prospects for better economic relations

improved after

Honecker.'s rise to the position of First Secretary.
36 ND, September 26, 1973, p. 7.
37 SWB, January 5, 1974, EE/4492/Al/6.
38 Ibid ., December 23, 1972, EE/4178/AI/6.
39 Ibid ., April 20, 1974, EE/4579/AI/S.
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insisted that it would not ,allow itself to

b~com,e

dependent on a

capitalist economy but trade talks continued and ,Honecker',s first full
year in control saw an increase of over 25 percent in the amount o.f West
German imports into theGDR.

This is in contrast to a slight decline in

imports in 1971 compared with 1970.

Imports from West Berlin, on the

other hand, declined sharply in .1972.

East German imports from West

Berlin dropped by approximately 25 percent in 1972 compared with 1971. 40
Meanwhile, East German exports to West Berlin rose considerably.

In

1972 they amounted to better than 495 million marks compared to only
347 million in 1971.
only slight1y.4l

Exports to West Germany declined during 1972, but

In 1973 talks between West Berlin and East Germany

regarding the possible construction of an oil pipeline from the ,GDR to
West Berlin were begun. 42 It is possible that the SED leadership may
envision

a.situ~tion

in which West Berlin might become oriented

economically toward the GDR, thus increasing East Germany's ability to
control the city.

However, no posi1;ive results have yet

com~

from the,

talks and East Germany's full intentions regarding trade with West
Germany and West Berlin remain unclear.

Yet, the fact

t~t

economic

talks have been in progress for sometime does signify a political
change in East Germany, a change in the direction of increasing contacts
with the FRG and West Berlin.

40Statistical Pocket Book of the GDR (Berlin, GDR:
der DDR, 1973), pp. 92-93.
41 Ibid ., pp. 90-91.
42SWB, July 20, 1973, EE/4351/Al/S.
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The extent of the change in GDR policy was signified in 1973 by a
meeting which Honecker held. with the chairman of the .FRG Social
Party, Herbert Wehner, and the chairman of the SPD's
43
coalition partner, the .FDP.
Given the traditionally hostile East
De~ocratic

German view of the Social Democrats, such a meeting, simply for an
"exchange of. views" rather than in the face
viewed as significant.

o~

some crisis, must.be

The fact that Honecker himself, rather than some

lower-ranking SED official, participated in the meeting further increases,
its significance.
II.

CONFRONTATIONS SINCE 1971

EVen though the overall record is one of positive

achi~vement,

Honecker period has not been without negative developments.

the

The most

prominent dispute of the Honecker regime with West Berlin and the
Federal Republic has centered around the alleged abuse of the transit
routes to West Berlin.

The first indication of this issue

c~e

in

April, 1972, following the temporary implementation of the transit
agreement by the GDR, apparently in order to improve the prospects for
West German ratification of the treaty with East Germany.

After an

estimated 300,000 West Berliners made use of the temporary facilities
for visits to the .East, GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winzer charged that
"rightist extremist and revanchist forces" had attempted to misuse the
GDR's "generous gesture of ,goodwill for evil purposes.,,44 An editorial
43

ND, June 2, 1973, p. 2.

44 Ibid ., April 6, 1972, p. 2.
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in Neues Deutschland on August 10, 1973 signalled the beginning of an
Eas'tr German campaign against the "abuse" of the transit routes, with the
primary concern being the activities of commercial escape
organizations.operating from West Berlin and the FRG.

ass~stance

According to ,the

editorial,
There are forces at work to undermine the Transit Agreement
and this is being done from the ,territory of the FRG and West
Berlin, whose citizens derive direct ,advalltage from the,
Agreement. The Transit Agreement, wh~ch is being implemented
by the GDR authorities in spirit and in letter, has recently
been increasingly misused by profiteers. From the FRG and
West Be~lin bands of criminals are at wor~ who, for fees of
DM 40,000 toDM 80,000 smuggle peopl~ across the border-people who hope for a life of luxury in the ,FRG or in West
Berlin, for instance, scientists, doctors, and other
specialists are being promised such a life by official
quarters. 45
The editorial went on to denounce the fact that such commercial services
were able to freely advertise their services in newspapers in West
Berlin and the FRG and that the activities of, such individuals were
tolerated and possibly even assisted by Western officials.

It concluded

with a demand that the authorities in West Berlin and West Germany do
their part to aid implementation of the
a~tions

Trans~t

against those responsible for the

Agreement by taking

activitie~

in question.

The NeuesDeutschland warning was followed by the implementation
of much more rigid East German checks on traffic to and from West
Berlin.

The next,month the SED repeated its demand, for stricter

controls to stop illegal crossings to the Federal Republic and West

45 Ibid ., August 10, 1973, p. 1.
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Berlin and attacked the idea of "freedom of movement" as a,cqver used by
those who simply want to escape prosecution for crimes against the GDR. 46
Within a week, the East German news agency, ADN, reported that a number.
of citizens of.West Berlin and West Germany had been. taken into custody
for violation of the Transit Agreement. 47 More.arrests followed on a
regular basis and on October 30, the GDR government began a much
publicized trial of several of the "traders >in human lives'! in East
Berlin.

Western journalists were even invited to attend the proceedings,

a very Wlique action in the GDR.

During the course of the ,trial,

th~

GDR charged that West Berlin and West German firms were actually paying
the ,expenses for the escapes of individuals who were needed in their
industries.

Officials of West Berlin and the FRG were also said to be

party to the operations of the "criminal sl!lugglers." Members of the
United States Army stationed in West Berlin were also charged with
o

to

parhc~pa ~on.
0

48

By February, 1974 a.total of 150

West Germans had been arrested by GDR
helpers.

authoritie~

We~t

Berliners and

and charged as.escape

Forty of this number had been sentenced, many of them for up

o
49
to ten years ~mpr~sonment.
0

Whol
f WeS,ern
t
~ e t h earres t so.
escape

helpers are used for maximum propaganda benefit,. the trials of GDR
citizens who have attempted to escape are kept

46 Ibid ., September 21, 1973, p. 1.
47
48
49

SWB, October 2, 1973, EE/44l3/Al/8.
ND, November 1, 1973, p. 2.
SWB, February 14, 1974, EE/4526/Al/2.
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is made ,to avoid any ,publication of the ,details of escape efforts since
this information might ,aid others who desire to attempt an escape
50
1ater.
It is also desirable that the organizations assisting in
escapes not be permitted to learn from

th~ir

mistakes.

Meanwhile, the number of escapes from the GDR to West.Berlin and
the FRG for 1973 rose by 16 percent over the previous ,year, according
to figures released by the West Berlin-based 13th August Working Group.
The total number of escapes in 1973 was 6,450.

The increase was

considered a result, of escapes via the transit routes during the first
half of the year, prior to the initiation of more stringent East German
checks.

However, the number of "frontier-breakers" was also up

considerably, 49 percent over 1972, and that also contributeq to
the increase.

A1mos~

1600 of the escapees were "frontier-breakers"

. d no aSS1S
. t ance, f
..
. d'1V1'dua 1s. 51
who,requ1re,
romt
ou '
S1 de organ1zat1onsor
1n
A related controversy during this time centered around the matter,
of currency violations by Western visitors to the GDR.

Since 1964,

visitors had been required to exchange a minimum of ten marks a day for
overnight stays in the GDR and five marks a day for one-day visits to
East Berlin.

In November of 1973 the GDR authorities doubled these

amounts and applied the new regulations to previously exempt old-age
pensioners.

The East German argument was that this action was necessary

in order to discourage the illegal exchange of their currency which

50Frankfurter Allgemeine, July 15, 1974, p. 5.
51SWB , January 2, 1974, EE/4489/A1/1.
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could be purchased in West Berlin or in the FRG at approximately
one-third of its face value.

Such exchanges, considered illegal by the

GDR, were conducted openly at many Western banks and the .rates were
regularly advertised.in the Western press as well as in the windows of
banks.

The East German leadership viewed such exchanges and the illegal

importation of currency purchased in that manner as an effort ,to return
to the situation that existed before the construction of the Wall in
1961.

These activities were said to represent

"deliber~te

the GDR and a "violation of its sovereign rights as well as
.

.

~n ~ts

damage" to
interferenc~

domest~c
. a ff'
,,52 While the East Germans objected to the sale.
a~rs.

of their currency in the .West as well as to its importation back to the
GDR, they were in no position to enforce

prohibitio~s

former, so they concentrated on attempting to prevent

against the
trave1~rs

bringing Western purchased GDR marks into East Germany.

from

Over a period

of about one year, more than 500,000 such marks were confiscated at
border crossing points. 53 The doubling of the mandatory minimum exchange
for tourists was intended to remove the incentive fol;' bringing in such
marks since it·was obviously impossible to confiscate more than a
fraction of the
new regulations.

amo~t
Th~

coming in prior to the implementation of ,the
fact that the regulations were introduceq without .

warning and were also applied to old-age pensioners visiting relatives
and friends in the ,GDR raised Western suspicions that the real intention

52
. ND, November 8, 1973, p. 1.
53Ibid ., November 6, 1973, p. 2.
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of this action was" to redu.ce: the number of visitors coming to the
country.

Whether such an intention

certainly did have that effect.

motivate~

the action or not, ,it

A survey of three checkpoints into the

GDR in Lower Saxony over,the weekend of November,30 to December 2
demonstrated the effect of the new regulations.

While the previous

weekend had seen over 6,800 travellers cross into the East, only 1,300
made the journey that weekend. 54 A survey of the number of automobiles
using all crossings into East Germany,for the three days of the ,Christmas
holiday demonstrated a similar result.

While Christmas of 1972 brought,

over 23,000 cars from West Germany and West Berlin, in 1973 only 12,600
automobiles were counted on the same days~55

Numerous protests from the

West and several meetings of representatives from the ,west Berlin Senate
with East German authorities failed to produce a return to the old,
regulations.

However, by October, 1974 a compromise was finally reached

in which the GpR agreed to require

~he

exchange of only 6.5 DM

fo~

one-day visits to East Berlin and"13 DM for longer visits to the GDR.

56

The absence of any public Soviet support for the GDRls position may have
b~en

a decisive factor in the GDRls decision.
Several other less important disputes involving the GDR and West

Berlin arose during this time.

In 1973 the GDR began to question

arrangements whereby West Berlin pumped its sewage into the Teltow canal

54SWB , December 13, 1973, EE/4475/Al/9.
55New York Times, December 28, 1973, p. 5.
56Berliner Morgenpost, October 27, 1974, p. 1.
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for processing by the East Berlin purification plant.

Th~

East Germans

accused West Berlin of disregarding the. interests of the GOR and warned
that "serious con,sequences may· stem from unilatel;'al action by West Berlin
authorities. ,,57 West Berlin authorities denied charges that they were
violating agreements with the GOR on the treatment of waste water, but,
did agree to a series of·meetings.on

th~.

question.

At.a meeting in

January in East Berlin the .GOR demanded highe~ prices for the removal ,of
waste water from West Berlin. 58 The West Berliners rejected the East
Gerw~ndemandand

the issue remained unsettled by late 1974.

An

additional dispute appeared in January when the East Germans demanded an.
incr~ase

in the price of.the lignite briquettes that they had been selling

to West . Berlin for the past twenty years .

Citing WesterJ1, inflation as

justification the GDR raised its prices ,on

th~

per ton to 92 mark,s.

briquettes from 79 marks

Rather than meet the East .German demand, West

Berlin simply halted its purchases:and prepared to endure the winter
without the GOR'S briquettes.59
In spite of these disputes, Honecker has continued to insist

o~

the,

feasibility of a complete normalization of relations between West Berlin
and the GOR.

Apparently such issues as discussed above are not intended

to wreck the develQpment of detente over West Berlin.

In an

intervie~

with the ,Associated Press on May 3D, 1974, Honecker explained with regard
to West Berlin,

57BerlinerZeitung, August 7, 19Z3, p. 2.
58
. SWBj January.2S, 1974, EE/4509/Al/5.
59Ibid ., January.lO, 1974, EE/4496/Al/l.
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If prob1e~s and difficulties arise at times' this should
not be draJ)latized, considering the complex nature of things
and the different interests which we take into account. As
far as we are concerned we do not seek a "cooling off" 'b~t
rather a warming up of·the international climate in the
interests of peace and the peop1e. 60
III.

THE HONECKER POLICY AND THE USSR

Completion of this brief review of the outlines of,Honecker's
policies pertaining to the West Berlin issue and related matters permits
some. observations, and generalizations at this point.

Wh~le

the GDR' s

domestic policy has not been radically altered since Ulbricht's
resignation, the East German foreign policy has undergone a considerable
change in emphasis since May, 1971.

According to one prominent authoz:ity

on.East,Get:Jllan political affairs, many of the positions taken by
Ulbricht during his last years were viewed by the
both irksome and disturbing.
ventured the

ob~ervation

Sovie~

leadership as

In an article in 1972, Peter C. Ludz

regarding Ulbricht that

. . . In a certain sense he was projec~ing himself as a
potential rival of Moscow iti its claim to ideological
1eader$hipj beyond that,.by stressing the GDR's independent
achievements, he was obviously try~ng to strengthen its
posi ti,?n and influence in, the international ,political
arena. 1)1
The

emph~sis

since Honecker's selection as a replacement for Ulbricht

has been very different.

Honecker has repeatedly stressed both the

60"Interview granted by Erich Honecker to the US News Agency,"
Political Documents of the GDR, No.3, 1974, p. 9.
61peter C. Ludz, "Continuity and Change Since U1b~icht," Problems
of Communism, March-April, 1972, p. 57.
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closeness of the GDR's positions. to those of the Soviet

Un~on

and. East

Germany's . unflinch~ng sl,lpport of ·the USSR as the .leader of the "socialist
co~unity
Unio~

of.nations." Honecker's recognition of a debt to the Soviet

permeates discussions of the development of the GDR.

In May,

1974.he declared that the successful development of·a socialist

st~te

in East Germany was possible only because its leadership "chose the.
right side in the great c1ass.batt1es of our ' time, the .side of the
Soviet Union and its battle-tested Leninist party.

Discussing

the position of the GDR today, Honecker was able to declare on May 12,
1974, regarding his country's relationship with the .Soviet Union,
Today relations between the GDR and the USSR have reached
such a stage that.our close, cooperation penetrates practically
every important sphere of social life • • . . We agree on all
political, ideological, and theoretical basic questions of·
social deve1opment. 63
This absolute devotion to the guidance of the USSR is in sharp
contrast with Ulbricht's talk about the independent.achievements of the
GDR, East Germany's.unique road,to socialism, and his independent
proposals.

Ulbricht's New Year Message for 1968 in . which he proposed,

independently from the US.SR, that the .GDR and the FRG conclude a treaty
on the renunciation of force and initiate talks on the .complete
disarmament of both states illustrates the extent of Ulbricht's
. depen dence. 64
1n

Honecker has avoided such displays of what the USSR

62 ND , May 30, 1974, p. 2.
63 Ibid . , May 13, 1974, p. 2.
64 Ibid ., January 1, 1968, pp. 1-2.
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would rightly consider arrogance.

In his

GDR-Sovie~

Friendship Day

speech in May, 1974 Honecker made the SED's stand regarding the .Soviet
Union's authoritative position amply c1ear.when he asserted that "every
step we are taking today" is determined: by the faith that only through
a firm alliance with

t~e

USSR could East Germany's efforts succeed.

This alliance was described as the key to the .GDR's achievements in
both. economic and foreign affairs.

Even the West,

Honecker insisted,

was aware of this and, accordingly, was trying to "malign our alleged
impairment of the sovereignty of our Republic."

However, he continued,

what the Western states fail to realize is that the East German alliance
wi th the USSR is of a "different quality from . . . [alliances] . . . of
capitalist countries." The East German-Soviet alliance, in Honecker's
view, is based on a community of. ideology, social system, anq goals.
The Soviet and GDR 1eaderships share what Honecker sees as a common
objective, namely, the benefit of the working c1ass. 65 His.position is
that such an alliance is both unique and unshakable.

Enthusiastic

reaffirmations. of this position have been liberally sprinkled through
Honecker's policy statements during the years since his assumption of
power.

These statements illustrate

th~

most important instance of

discontinuity with the last years of. the Ulbricht regime.
Wh~le

Honecker's declarations of·East German fealty to the USSR

must be considered the most obvious new trend in GDR foreign policy
since 1971, the stress on Bloc cooperation clearly constitutes the

65 Ibid ., May 13, 1974, p. 2.
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second most important pattern in.this period.

In this respect, the

Honecker statements more closely resemble those of.Ulbricht.

The first

concern regarding Bloc cooperation centers around the defense of the
GDR.

The· idea that cooperation with the Bloc provides a valuable

protective shield for the GDR has repeatedly been made clear by East
German leaders.

Honecker forcefully expressed it in his report to the

Eight.h SED Congress in June, 1971.

In his speech Honecker explained

that the alliance with the "conununity of. socialist states" was

neces~ary.

because
• •
forces
of the
German

• Through the collective defense alliance of the armed
of the Warsaw Treaty, especially by the military shield,
Soviet Army,peace and security for the people of the
Democratic Republic are.re1iab1y protected.66

By way of further invoking Bloc support, the East German leadership has·
gone. so far as to describe the defense of the GDR as the "test for the
67
East" in facing up to Western imperialism.
A second concern relating to cooperation with the Bloc
social orientation toward the East.

invo1~es

a

East Germany's. leadership is

concerned about the development of social patterns that are congruent.
with those of its allies to the East.

In a speech to the SED's Central

Committee in July, 1972 Politburo member Kurt Hager discussed the
cultural policy of· the GDR.

While explaining the need for a

66Erich Honecker, Unter dem Banner des Internationalismus.(Under
the Banner of Internationalism) (Berlin, GDR: Dietz Verlag, 1972),
p.117.
67ND , May 8, 1971, p. 1.
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cultural policy embracing the entire Socialist community, Hager
said,
The Socialist culture of the GDR occupies a firm place in
the cultural development of the Socialist countries. We
consider it one of our most important cultural tasks actively
to promote the mutual approach and fertilization of Socialist
cultures. 68
The East German government under both Honecker and Ulbricht, has
encouraged such "fertilization" through provision of ample opportunities
for contacts between its citizens and those of most of,the other East
European communist party states.
has been travel.

One of the most important opportunities

According to figures released by the GDR Travel Bureau

near the end of 1973, almost one million East Germans availed themselves
of the opportunity to visit the GDR's Warsaw Pact neighbors in 1973. 69
The Tenth World Youth Festival which was held in East Berlin in the
summer of 1973 was another important part in promoting East German
contacts with ,those who shared the SED's official outlook.

According

to the SED, the festival "was a great manifestation of ,democratic and
socialist culture and illustrated the living power of the ideas of
internationalism. ,,70
A third concern relating to the GDR's stress on Bloc cooperation
is coordination of the foreign policies of the Warsaw Pact states.

As

previously mentioned, Honecker describes relations between the USSR

68Kurt Hager, Socialist Cultural Policy (Dresden:
Bild, 1972), p. 53.
69 SWB , December 20, 1973, EE/4481/B/3.
70 ND , August 22, 1973, p. 4.
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and the GDR as

b~ing

dictated by common· interests and ideology.

The

same is considered to be true of the USSR's relations with other East
European states.

Therefore, predictably, the East German. leadership

denies that the Brezhnev Doctrine can properly be described as evidence
of coercion within the Bloc.

An

example of such a denial was a 1973

"Voice .of the GDR" broadcast in \V'hich East German Professor Joachim
Raabe proclaimed the international duty of Communists to defend socialism
as a principal determinant of the .behavior of Bloc members,
included. 71

th~

GDR

From this, one can easily infer the .necessity from the

East.German view of·a coordination of Eastern policies, especially those
regarding noncommunist states.

Th4S, the SED's leaders have sought

support. from their allies in the matter of West GermanY'$
West Berlin.

relatio~s

with

Honecker and·his associates enjoyed considerable success

in this matter in 1973 as evidenced by the lack of progress for a time
in

ta1~s

between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic.

Th~

dispute

arose from Bonn's effort to secure the right to represent .not only West
Berlin residents but also her institutions ,and associations abroad.

The

Czech leadership supported theGDR on this issue and branded the FRG's
efforts a "gross provocation not only against the sovereignty of the GDR
but also against the other socialist countries.,,72 The East Germans
viewed this also as an effort to secure from the GDR's allies what the
SED was unwilling to give and thus to play the East European states ,off

7ISWB, Octo~~r 5, 1973, EE/4481/B/3.
72Ibid ., August 21, 1973, EE/4378/A1/3.
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against each other.

Accordingly, they issued a call for Eastenl unity
in the ,face of West German "pressure." 73
TIle East German drive for a more effectiye coordination of ,Bloc
policies culminated with the call for an international Communist meeting.
On May 22, 1974, after a meeting with the General Secretary of the U.S.

Communist Party, Gus Hall, in East Berlin, Honecker noted that the
tendency towards a detente was·now predominant in world developments and
that the internatiQnal Dalance of power was increasingly altering in
favor of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Yet,
.he
,continued, the,

opponents of detente were still trying to revive the cold war· so,
therefore, there was a need for "all the world's peace forces'.' to work
harder in the joint struggle for "international detente, security, and
peace."

The positive achievements the world is enjoying today, Honecker

insisted with Hall's concurrence, were largely a product of the program
formulated at . the 1969 international. meeting of Communist and workers!
parties in Moscow.

Accordingly, both Honecker and Hall concluded,

appropriate thing would be the convocation of·a

th~

newinternat~onal

consultation by the same parties in order to develop a plan to secure
the benefits of

deten~e.

As Honecker explained,

The point now is. how to make the progress of detente
irreversiDle, in defiance of all its adversaries. At the
same time we are working for the further strengthening of
the unity and cohesion of the world communist movement. 74

73ND, September 7, 1973, p. 1.
74 Ibid ., May 23, 1974, p. 1.
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Only a series of bilateral and multilateral exchanges between all the
parties would facilitate the development of such a program, according
to the SED First Secretary.

By taking the initiative in issuing such

a call, the SED effectively demonstrated the extent of its enthusiasm
for the cause of the USSR's authority in the world communist movement
and did much to contribute to the belief that East Germany can once
more be considered the Kremlin's most faithful ally.
A final important SED concern relating to its position within the
Bloc is shown by the stress placed on economic cooperation.

Economic

integration has been a major theme of the SED under both Ulbricht and
Honecker.

Planning in the Comecon states has been one manifestation

of this policy and the current policy calls for emphasis on long-range
and complex planning among the member nations.

The GDR has been

especially active in the development of mathematical models to guide
75
Comecon planning.
The creation of joint enterprises and institutes
has been an additional manifestation of the SED's economic policy.

By

1974 there were thirty-two such examples of "socialist integration in
action" in East Germany.

While most of these involved joint efforts of

the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR, Rumania, Hungary, and
· were a 1so actlve.
.
76
Bu 1gar1a
East German attacks on Red China during the time of Honecker's
control of the SED have further advanced the GDR's status as an

75Wirtschaftswissenschaft, No.8, 1973, pp. 1176-1189.
ABSEES, Vol. V, No.1, 1974, pp. 155-156.
76Horizont, No. 41, 1974, p. 9.
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en.thusiastic proponent of Soviet domination of the international
cQmmwlist movement.

East German officials and publications

h~ve

continually denounced China's international.activities in.general as
well as the character of Peking's relations with Moscow.
1~7l,

In August,

for example the East Berlin daily Berliner Zeitung criticized

Chinese

activitie~

in

~he

Balkans, charging that such activities were

being conducted t'lith the active support of the United States.

The

Chinese leadership, according to the account, was guilty of big power
chauvinism .and was behaving ina manner hostile to ,the interests of
peace. 77 East German, charges have concentrated on Chinese-American
relations, especially since the improvement ,in these relations ,became
ob~ious.

As .the time for President Nixon's trip to China neared, the

GDR attacks intensified.

Not only was China depicted as, aiding ·the

cause of ,imperialism, but, according to Neues,Deutschland, it had
actually begun "coordinated
in ,the world . • . . "

co~lusion

The result,

t~e

with the chief force of reaction
SED paper charged, could only be

described as a "monstrous" situation in.which the .Chinese were seeking
"to anticipate every wish of the Nixon government."

78

Speaking in,

Leipzig on MarchIO, 1972, Honecker added to the charges by declaring
that Peking shared responsibility for the increased American bombing
attacks on North Vietnam because of its refusal to issue a strong
.
cond ernnat~on

0f

t he

.

act~on.

79

In this respect, the Honecker policy

77Berliner Zeitung, August 20, 1971, p. 1.
78
ND, January 22, 1972, p. 3.
79 Honecker, p. 308.
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differs ,greatly from

~hat

of Ulbricht who refused to join in the Bloc

attacks on Red China during his last. years.
Attacks on Red China
of West Germany.

~ve

occasionally been linked with criticism

On October 11, 1972, a "Voice of the GDR" commentary

charged that the improvement in West

German~Chinese.relations

signalled

an alliance between Bonn and Peking for the purpose of permitting the
FRG to secure Chinese.markets.

China, for its part, was.depictedas

attempting to join with forces. in
disrupt the process of·detente.

th~

Federal Republic in

or~er

to

The FRG'sestablishrnent of relations.

with China was· declared to be absolute proof of Chinese treachery.80
Finally, Honecker's call.for a new international communist meeting
was coupled with an attack on the Chinese.

Declaring the need for

fighting against distortions. of Marxism-Leninism, Honecker described
Maoism as·the open enemy of the world communist movement and the
nat~onal

liberation movement.

The Chinese, he

continu~d,

h~d

made

common cause with the most.reactionary forces intheir.efforts to
oppose the development of detente. 81 Such a conference, should it come
about, could once again. be used in the continuing Soviet effort to
secure a formal condemnation of the Red Chinese, something the USSR has
repeatedly failed to do.

The. GDR's assistance.in this effort,would

undoubtedly endear Honecker and his associates to the Kremlin.
conference should materialize and meet with some success, it is

SOSWB, October 13, 1972, EE/4117/A3/2.
8lND, May 23, 1974, p. 1.
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reasonable to conclude that the GDR would gain credit from the USSR,
credit that it might hope to apply toward its more pressing international
problems in the future.
It requires little imagination to anticipate what use the GDR might
wish to make of any credit it might build up in the Kremlin.

Its

ability to actually use the credit for the desired purpose could be
anotller and more difficult matter.

Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable

to conclude that the GDR's position is uncomfortable in an era of
detente.

The origins and development of the East German regime have

contributed to a political heritage which makes acceptance of detente
difficult for the SED leadership.

In discussing the development of

totalitarian systems, Friedrich A. Hayek, writing in 1944, commented
that an enemy is an indispensable requisite of a totalitarian leader. 82
While the traditional concept of totalitarianism has been
s h lp.
subject to some skepticism in recent years, its applicability to the
GDR regime of the 1950's is beyond question.

The fact that the citizens

of East Germany passed directly from the Hitler dictatorship into a
Communist dictatorship makes the totalitarian concept especially
applicable to their case.

Their experience with constant harangues

about enemies, internal and external, can be traced back to 1933.
Hitler the enemy was the international Jew.

Under

With the creation of the

Soviet Zone of Germany in 1945, the theme was continued with a new enemy,

82Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago:
Chicago Press, 1944), p. 139.
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West~rn

imperialism, which had

discourses as well.
mo~e

than any

oth~r

b~en

a frequent subject

o~

Hitler's

The personification of.the enemy.was West Germany
state.

The Communist regime in East. Germany

accustomed to tension from its very first years.

b~came

Whi,le the emphasis on

such.tension is not nearly as great under Honecker as it was under
Ulbricht, it still remains.
identity~

In the absence of a sense of ,national

the sense of confrontation.served a unifying purpose and

helped to stabilize the regime.

The SED found·

secu~ity

through

confrontation and the need for confrontatiQn continues today.

Detente

has a potentially destabilizing effect by virtue of.the expectations
that it arouses.

It leads people to anticipate change after years of

indoctrination that change would never,come.

East Germany is.not

in. the Bloc in its vulnerability to

Eyen the Soviet Union

deten~e.

itself has had to face this uncertainty regarding the new policy.

alo~e

But,

as Gerhard Wettig has written recently inOsteuropa, the .Soviet Union
has sought to develop the ideological and institutional structures that
could neutralize the politically psychological effect thai; could result,
83
from detente and c09peration between.East and West.
However, Ea~t·
German vulnerability is much greater than that of the USSR.
repeated reaffirmations of· the need for a
this~

c~osed

The SED's

frontier illustrate .

The point was, effectively made in March, 1972 by the ,SED

newspaper Leipziger Vo1kszeitung when it printed a
against illusions

th~t

cornmen1;~ry

warning

the frontier. with the ,FRG could be opened.because

83Gerhard Wettig, "Sowj et Politik zur Westeuropa" ("Soviet Policy
Towards Western. Europe"), Osteuropa, No.· 7, 1974, pp. 852-8~3.
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of detente.

The' suggestion of.open frontiers was ,described as "far

removed from political reality.,,~4
disarmament serve tne

sa~e

purpose.

there, according to the SED.

Warning against ,ideological
In a word, the enemy is.still.

The fact that the.SED so

obvious~y

a need for an enemy demonstrates the insecurity and even
the regime.

feels

in~tabili~y

of

This is not to deny the existence of a yery real rival in

the Federal Republic.

The point is that the

that the SED attributes to its West

~erman

ho~til~ty

and aggression

rival ,are exaggerated.

Security, however, as seen by the SED, requires such exaggeration and
dictates that the SED oppose detente, as Ulbricht successfully did for
sometime.
s~pport

The alliance with the

USSR~

on the other hand, now calls for

for detente ,in view of current Soviet policy.

had its way and Honecker replaced Ulbricht.

The USSR

obvio~sly

The GDR's policy became

more favorable to detente and even included West Ger.many as an object
of that policy.
can.be

expect~d

However, East

Ge~many's

instability remains and t4e SED

to offer its Soviet ally a considerable amount of very

cautious advice on how to proceed with detente, especially where it
concerns the FRG.
Honecker, of course, lacks the seniority that Ulbricht enjoyed and.
can certainly not wield the influence that his successor.must have been
able to exercise in dealings with the Kremlin.

Yet, it is ,possible that

Honecker might try to use whatever credit he can gain with the Soviet
leadership in order to

e~ther

sabotage or at least slow down detente.

84SWB , March 8, 1972, EE/3934/AI/4.

138
The. Soviet Union, however,

can~generallr

be expected to push the·GDR

into line When it appears.on the verge of straying too far afield.
Possibly, the enthusiastic support of detente being voiced,by the GDR
in May, 1974, which contrasted with the much weaker s\lpport in April,
may have resulted from Soviet
affair.
Gunte~

press~re

in the wake.of the Guillaume

As a result of ,the exposure of Brandt's close personal aide,
Guillaume, as an East Gei'1llan spy, it became known that the GDR's

State Security Service had been sending considerable ,numbers of agents
into the FRG since the early 1950's in an effort to infiltrate the West
German government.

Guillaume, who was only one of several such "plants"

who had reached fairly important posts. in the Bonn government, had
evidently been aiding the GDR's agents in an attempt to blackmail Brandt
85
as a result of an affair he had with an East German.woman.
The
Kremlin may have feared that detente in Germany could suffer as a result
of the exposure of the GDRls intensive espionage efforts in the FRG
unless Honecker adopted a particularly accommodating attitude ,in the
wake of the affair.

The Russians.may

actua~ly

have

s~spected.that

the

East Germans were trying to sabotage detente by the activities of their
Security Service.

The question of.the increased minimum exchange quota

for persons visiting the GDR illustrated the extent of the SED's shift.
Until early in the spring of 1974, East Germany assumed an

unco~promising

stance on the issue, making its refusal to alter the rates very clear to
West .Ber1in negotiators.

However, in an interview on May 30, Honecker

85Berliner Morgenpost, April 28, 1974, p. 37.
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said that the requisite de9isions "will be taken by our side," clearly
implying that the issue was.not closed after all as all GDR spokesmen
'
had b een s t ress~ng
ear I'1er. 86 Th'~s, coup1 ed

'h .th e GDR' s new and very

w~t

optimistic comments· on detente, could be evidence of Soviet pressure on
the East

Ge~mans

to prove their goodwill after

t~e

exposure of, the GDR's

espionage efforts in the FRG.
Does the selection of Honecker seem to have benefited the Soviet
Union?

As far as events up to this time are concerned, the answer.must.

be an unqualified "yes." The East German press and the new.First
Secretary have given strong public support to detente with West Germany
and West Berlin.

The GORIs support of Moscow's authority within the.

world Communist movement, support which has been

illustrate~

Honecker's call for an international meeting, is further
the wisdom of the USSR's support for Honecker.

by

evi~ence

of

The changed emphasis

in the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland provides further evidence of the
wisdom of the Soviet move in 1971.

Whereas under Ulbricht, the paper

had become preoccupied with cataloging the sins of of West Germany and.
devoted most of its foreign news coverage to stories about the .FRG,
after Ulbricht Neues Deutschland began to stress news about the Soviet
Union and to ignore the Federal Republic.

The

abs~nce

of any claims of

uniqueness for the East German path to Communism and initiation of
polemics against Maoism must also please Moscow.

The SED

und~r

Honecker

has also improved relations with Yugoslavia, something which Ulbricht

86UInterview: Granted by Erich Honecker to the US News Agency," p. 9.

140
had been reluctant to do in spite of , the USSR's rapproachment with Tito.
As mentioned earlier, the GDR has become themost.faithful of Mowcow's
allies once·again.

The replacement of Ulbricht by Erich Honecker

certainly helped make this development

possi~le

and thereby contributed

to the strengthening of the USSR's East European position.
Yet, the future remains open to some question.
the misuse of the

transitrout~s

The disputes over

and the sale of GDR currency in West

Berlin and West German banks could easily be used to disrupt the .process
of detente if the SED felt itself in a position to sabotage the USSR's
policies toward the West.

Disputes over. the GDR's handling of traffic

to West Berlin were continuing through. the fall of 1974 as East German
87
officials delayed transit traffic up to thirty hours.
Incidents such
as this and the disputes over the price of lignite and the

arrangement~

for sewage disposal could erupt into major confrontations given.the
proper combination of circumstances.
transl~tion

Disagreements over the German

of the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin could also serve as

a pretext for a confrontation between East and West over.Berlin.

The

issue of the nature of. the FRG'sties to West Berlin also could cause
an.incident between the GDR and West.Germany.
ties has yet to be df?termined.
social

tie~

The exact nature of. those

The English version of "ties" implied

as well as communication ties while the Russian word for

"ties" implied only communication.

Some Western scholars believe that

the issue has been clarified to the extent.that the USSR will accept

87Berliner Morgenpost, October 20, 1974, p. 1.
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social as well as communication ties,88 however, it seems most likely
that the issue will be resolved through,practice rather than further
agreements or formal efforts at interpretation.

The

ab~ence

of specific

guidelines for establishing what shall be considered proper West BerlinFRG ties makes the prospects for disagreement particularly good.

The

controversy over alleged "agent-hunting:! by West Germany,could also
provide fuel for future disputes with the GOR.

The SED has already

commented on the ability of this "contemptible campaign" to disturb the
89
normalization of relations with the FRG.
Furthermore, a,change of,
power in the Kremlin might enable ,Honecker to improve his status and
the~eby

his ability to veto those moves toward detente which could

affect the GDR's policy toward West Berlin.

In this event, the, SED

might disrupt the movement toward detente.
In sum, while the Soviet Union can take a considerable amount of
satisfaction in developments since Honecket's election as First Secretary,
the ,future iS,by no means secure.

While the ,Soviet Union would likely

desire a more stable and secure East German regime" the development of
such a regime could encourage Honecker to become more independent.
Ironically, the dependence that is a product of the GDRls instability
also contributes to the maintenance of the GDR as a more malleable
Soviet ally.

In any event, the GDR could not indefinitely cripple

88Gunther Doeker, Klaus Melsheimer, and Dieter Schroder, "Berlin
and the Quadripartite Agreement of 1!;)71," American Journal.of
International Law, Vol. 67, No.1, 1973, p. 59.
89 ND , May 2, 1974, p. 2.
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Soviet efforts at maintaining detente "wi;th West

,Genn~ny

However, the East Germans ,could make the maintenance of

and West Ber:lin.
So~iet

policies

toward the FRG and West Berlin much more difficult and costly in terms
of ,concessions the Soviets might have to make toward East Germany.

CHAPTER IV
EAST GERMAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS:

ITS EFFECT

ON THE WEST BERLIN ISSUE
I.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES

A recent development in the field of international relations has
been the effort to examine linkages
policies.

betwe~n

foreign and domestic.

Dealing primarily with Western democracies, work.in this area

has been advanced in the last decade by Richard C. Snyder, Wolfram F.
Hanrieder, James N. Rosenau and others.

Such an examination for East

Germany is· certain to be much more difficult than in the .case . of an open
society.

However, an examination of the linkages between domestic and

fOl'eign policies in the GDR would surely aid in understanqing the
presen1;: situation regarding the SED's policy
as possible future

developments~

to\~ard

West .Berlin as .well .

It should also c1al;'ify the question of

the re1ationshiR between GDR domestic policies and the .West Berlin
policy in terms of trends that may be common in both policies.

In

addition, it could facilitate a determination of the compatibility of
the SED's policies on foreign and domestic matters.

This chapter will

be devoted to an effort to examine the pres.ent relationship between.
domestic developments and foreign policy problems, specifically the West
Berlin issue, in

th~

GDR today,

In his recent book, Between Two Ages, Zbigniew Brzezinski makes the
observation that the foreign policy of.a Communist state,
143

ci~ing

the
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Soviet example, is affected by the domestic needs of the Communist Party
to demonstrate visible ,successes in order to enhance its prestige anq
reinforce faith in its legitimacy.

That is, a cqmmunist party rules by

virtue of its monopoly of truth and is therefore required to prove ,that
it retains legitimacy by bringing glory to the state,that it governs. 1
In a similar context, other authors have
by the

~rxist-Leninist

discuss~d

the funct,ion performed

ideology in the area of foreign policy and

concluded, as Vernon Aspaturian has, tha,t there is a direct ,ideological
.

~mpac

t on f
'
k W0 Ifram F • Hanr~e
. der
ore~gn
po l'~cy.2 I n ano ther recen t b00,

discusses the impact of the domestic political system on West German
foreign policy during the period up to 1970 and concludes that FRG
foreign policy was., affected by both, internal and external influences.

3

Considering political systems in general, Karl W. Deutsch has
hypothesized that the crucial element in a consideration of the,
relationship between foreign anq domestic policies is the "linkage
group" which he describes as a "group with links to the domestic system
and with some particular links to the international or foreign input."
Such a group, Deutsch writes, becomes more susceptible ,to the inputs

1Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages (New York:
1970), pp. 77-84.

Viking Press,

Zvernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Policy in World Politics, edited by Roy C. Macridis (Englewood,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 165.
ROW,

3Wolfram F. Hanrieder, The Stable ,Crisis (New Xork:
1970), p. 130.

Harper ,and
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fromabro~d if its ties to the domes~ic system are weakened,4
th~re

In short,

are numerous works affirming that there is an interaction between

foreign policy and

domes~ic

policy.

This mutually affective

seems to exist in botl:L communist and noncommunist states.

r~lationsbip

This:chapter

will attempt to demonstrate t4is proposition by.an examination of,
first, the. current official GDR view on reunificatiqn of .the two
Germanies
of

E~st

a~d

German

the SED's analysis of·recent history relating to a ,sense
consciousness, second,

nat~onal

th~

sort of society the

SED envisions for the GDR, and, third, the ,methods which are being
employed in an . effort to accomplish the

constructio~

of a. "sociali~t

Ge:rmany." An evaluation of the consequences of the answers. to the above
questions for East German foreign policy in

gener~l

and for the

handl~ng

of the West Berlin issue in particular will conclu4e the chapter ..
While the crucial point drawn from the stucij.es mentioned above is
that

domesticpolitic~

in a communist state affect and are affected by

foreign policy considerations, the fact that we are dealing with a
German,speaking state should not be neglected.
had a perverse bearing on East.German
faced with the

proble~

po~itics

This circumstance·has
in that. the SED has been

of establishing a feeling that

th~

GDR is a

sepsrate German state and not simply a temporarily estranged appendage·
of the Federal Republic.

The communist leadership in East Berlin

demonstrated i't;s awareness of the problem of creating a sense of

4Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal B~havior of
States," Approaches to Comparative and Internatiqnal Politics, edited
by Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966),
pp.12-13.
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natio~al

identity with the GDR by relying upon

West in order to foster unity among

i~s

confrontat~on

population.

with the

As Melvin Croan

wrote in late 1971,
Th~ regime has grown accustomed to tension under the
present leadership, as it had under Ulbricht, and,probably
still needs a degree of tension in,the absence·of,a durable.
sense of national identity that it has not been able to
manufacture in this relatively short period of time by
methods that have been essentially those of compulsion. 5

The question of the necessity for confrontation and the degree of
tension required, as well as the prospects for replacing confrontation
as,a substitute for

national·identi~y,

represent

importan~ concern~

evaluating domestic affairs in East Germany today.

•

in

The belief that the

type of society the SED seeks for East Germany and the metho4s that are
to be used to create such a society will affect the GORIs foreign policy
is a basic assumption of the following analysis.
II • ONE GERMANY OR TWO?
A consideration of the question of the development of the GDR as a
separate German state raises the issue of

nation-bui~ding

or

natio~alism,

something the SED cannot avoid in its effort·to delimit East Germany
from the FRG.
the term in

While there is no precise and acceptable

qu~stion,

definit~on

of

Boyd C. Shafer has formulated a list of beliefs,

that are associated with the idea of the nation., An

examinatio~

of the

beliefs he presents illustrates the problems facing the SED throughout

5Melvin,Croan in Eastern Europe in the Seventies~ edited ,by Sy1ya
Sinanian, Istvan Deak, and Peter C. Ludz (New York: Praeger, 1972),
p. 2 4 5 . '
'
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the recent years.

There seems to.be little serious question about,the

definition of the territory encompassed by the GDR, the common. cultural
char~cteristics

of the ,nation, t4e common dominant social

instit~tions,

or the .10veor esteem for fellow nationals present in the GDR.
it .be .denied that East Germany has a

separa~e

government.

Nor can

There is

probably even a.be1ief in a common history, although the interpretation
of that history might cause some controversy.

The fact that this

his.tory .is.a1so common to the Federal Republic is another. problem.
However, the remaining be1iefs.enumerated by Shafer cannot be readily
assumed. to have been present in the GDR during most of its history.

A

devotion to the GDR as an entity, a common pride in the achievements of
the nation, a hostility to those groups· threatening the GDRls separate
existence,. and a hope that the nation will have a. great and. glorious,
future are all elements seen as lacking in East Germany at various times
since the establishment of a separate state in the Sovie~ Zone. 6 While.
these elements may not be so visibly scarce in the GDR today,
still points.on which proof is frequently insufficient.

th~y

are

In short, of

the ten beliefs enumerated by Shafer, at least five are or have been
in doubt in the East German case.

In his analysis of

nat~on-bui1ding,

Ivo D. Duchacek stresses the importance of national spirit which is
described as a "glorification of past achievements" in order to help
overcome the lack of a sense of identity.

The SED's efforts in this

6Boyd C. Shafer, "Toward a Definition of Nationalism," in
Nationalism and Inte.rnationa1 Progress, edited by Urban G. Whitaker, Jr.
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961), pp. 4-5.
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regard will be considered shortly and demonstrate the regime's awareness
of the importance of.history.

Duchacek observes that the

natio~alist

emphasis on.past.g1ories and experiences is often ,mixed with intolerance.
or a supercilious attitude toward other nations or races!7

This

attitude has been.used with success by many leaders,

for example,

and: has contributed to development of a
because of the

GD~'s

natio~al

Ne~u,

sp,irit.

However,

position as a member of the Soviet Bloc, such

techniques are denied the East German-leadership.
The importance attached to the concepts of nation-building and
national spirit :;hould not be minimized.

According to R.. M. MacIver,

individuals realize themselves fully only as part of society.
to society that they owe their "existence, their nurture,

It is .

the~r

equipment, their habits, their thought-ways, their opportunities,
their homes, their.al1." A developed state must consist of more than
sec~e

frontiers and a capital city, according to MacIver.

It must be,

in MacIver's words, "a greater unity to which they can devote themselves .
and which gives greater dignity, greater purpose,

grea~er

meaning to

t~eir lives.,,8 The task for the SED has been more than one of , securing
frontiers, developing the economy, and insuring the GDR's place within
the Bloc.

National consciousness, while difficult to measure, is

clearly more than the sum total of the physical.attrihutes of,a state.

7Iyo D. Duchacek, Nations and Men (New York:
Winston, 1971), pp. 54-55.
8·

Holt, Rinehart, and

R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York:
1965), pp. 305-306.

The Free Press,
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The· SED's nation-building problem has been complicated by the fact
that East Germany was·. created as a result of the partition of the Third
Reich.

Not.on1y did the partition meet with the

,resistan~e

of the GDR's

popu1atiQn which resented being arbitrarily separated from friends and
relatives in Western Germany, bU,t it also
of a preexisting society.

nec~ssitate4

The typical underdeveloped

a

restructur~ng

nat~on f~ces,a

problem of creating unity but the SED had to destroy a sense of unity
between its part of Germany and the rest of the dismembered Reich.
After the ,destruction of one

sens~

of unity, the ,SED then had to provide

an alternative national consciousness.

In his study of.partition,

Ray E. Johnston has raised several questions relating to,·;the·effects
of.partition on the domestic patterns of a country.

In so doing, he

considers the relationship between partition and domestic ,changes,
implying by his questions that th~ relationship may be direct in many
cases. 9 Certainly, the GDR would seem to be such a c~se in vie~ of the
necessary restructuring of society after 1945.
the interaction between foreign and domestic

This would illustrate

po1icie~

in the East German

case.
The first question relating to nation-building for the SED in its
efforts to create a sense of national identity was the issue of
reunification.

The intentions of the USSR in the first years after the

conclusion of the war are difficult to determine and apparently the
matter of reunification remained open for more than a decade.

9

As

Ray E. Johnston, "Partition as.a Political Instr~ent,"Journa1 of
Il)ternationa1 Affairs, Vol. 27, No.2, 1973, pp. 170-172.
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recently as 1957, the USSR

favored a plan for an alliance ,of
the two German states in an independent, nonaligned confederation. 10 As
officia~ly

l,ong as tl:Le continued existence of the GDR as a separate

s~ate

. remained:

an unresolved,question, the SED's efforts to generate enthusiasm for
identification with theGDR faced considerable difficulties.

The

erection of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent closing off of all major
aven~es

for escape from the GDR undoubtedly did much to convinGe the

East German population

tha~

they, must resign themselves to a ,permanent

separate German state in the East.
Official East

Germ~n

st8.tements today leave ,no d01.,lbt as to the

permanent and separate character of the ,GDR.

The official view was

succinctly stated by Fritz Selbmann, a veteran Eas.t German communist,
before theGDR Cultural

~eague

Presidium Council in

Janua~y,

1973.

We believed and hoped . . . that fo~ years after 1945 the
possibility existed of creating a great popular movement in.
Germany which would enable us to preserve the unity o~ the
nation. In the meantime, Germany has now been definitely
split into two,states. ll
The affirmation of a permanent, separate German state is reinforced in
a variety of ways.

The most obvious--and deadly--is by the maintenance

of one of the ,world's most heavily guarded frontiers.

However, in

addition to this, and possibly of more lasting significance, are the
Abgrenzung policy, a fervent emphasis on history, and a theoretical
explanation of what makes a nation.

lOB. Ponomaryov,editor, History of,Sov~et Foreign Policy 1945-1970
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), pp. 364··365.
llNeue Deutsche.Literatur, No.6, 1973, pp. 7-8.
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The' East "German

th~oretical

explanation of the basis of a state

cQncedes that there ,are certain principles entering into the defin,ition
of the nation.

Suc~

considerations

a~

culture, language, psychology,

history, and,homogenous state territory are among these most frequently
cited.

However, while these

tradi~ional

elements are seen as of some

importance, they are criticised as being too emotional and idealistic
rathe~

than objective.

is" accqrding to

Alfr~d

The actual content and character of the ,nation
Kosing and Walter Sclunidt of the Institute for

Social Sciences of the ,SED

Centr~l

Committee, determined primarily by

the "prevailing economic foundations of the ,society, the class,
relationships, and the historical actions of the classes.
These, in ,their entirety, are said to

h~ve

the capability of integrating

the .GDR population into a higher form,of national community.

The people,

according to this formulation, will be drawn together to form a stronger
social unit and help prepare for a higher developmental phase of the,
communist society.
The East Germans do not attempt to deny the ,obvious ethnic
similarities between themselves and the ,West Germans.

They simply

assert.that the ethnic elements of any nation are constantly changing
and that the two Germanies are going in opposite directiol1s.

A new

socialist national ,consciousness is developing in the GDR which is
changing the ethnic and sociopsychological components, of East German"

l2Alfred Kosing and Walter Sclunidt, "Zur Herausbilding der
socialistischen Nation in der DDR" (liOn the Cultural 'Policy of the
Socialist Nation in the GDR"), Einheit, No.2, February, 1974, p. l8~.
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natiol1al life through new economic, social, political, and i<;leological
I3
conditions.
The society,which is emerging, they say, will_have very
little in.common with capitalist German society.

Therefore, there can.

be no future convergence of the GDR with the .FRG in spite of

continui~g

West German insistence on the unity of the entire German nation.
East and· West Germany have a,cornmon historical past, they no
a cornmon present or future.

Whil~

l~nger

have

The unified German.nation is 'declared to be

a relic of the historical past, rather than a hope for the future.
While the stress in the past used tO,be on the possible unity of.the two
stat~s

after a proletarian revolution in the FRG,

GD~

authorities today

emphasize that even this should not be taken for granted.

According to

Kosing and Schmidt,
The qu~stion of whether later,
theFRG, united with all workers,
transformation of society and the
nation can arise, will be decided
conditions for it have matured. 14
This

vie~ was.emp~sized

when the working class in
has achieved the
nation, a unified socialist
by history if the necessary

even more authoritatively by the

the .GDR Constitution in 1974.

~evisions

in

Whereas the Ulbricht,constitution, of 1968

affirmed the unity of the nation under a future communist leadership and
declared that the GDR was "a

sociali~t

state of the ,German nation," the

new Honecker constitution simply designates the GDR as a "socialist
15
state.of workers and.farmers."

l3 Ibid ., pp. 183-185.
14 Ibid ., p. 185.
l5Neues Detttschiand; September 28, 1974, p. 3.
as ND.)

(Hereafter noted
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The picture presented by the SED is one in which the GDR is being
drawn further and further away from the world of the capitalist FRG and

.

integrated ever more closely \'I1i th the states of the Soviet Bloc.

As

Fritz Selbmann declared, East Germany and West Germany are "integrated
into two completely opposing and antagonistic world systems." 16

In the

future, the GDR population will be experiencing an "increasing unity of
thought, will, and action" with its Eastern allies and, consequently,
will be well on its way to becoming part of an international community
of socialist states and thus losing much of the separate identity that
;t
... possesses t 0 daYe 17

When this process is completed, the GDR will have

converged with its socialist neighbors and any talk of convergence or
reunification with West Germany will be obviously pointless.

The

culmination of this process will bring the creation of the national
identity sought by the SED.

The further development of mature socialism

and its gradual transition to communism are said to increase the specific
importance of the international "without crowding out or even displacing
the national."

The East German population will simply see itself and

its state differently.

New historical values will have been adopted

which will "determine the thinking of men" and give the "socialist
national consciousness of the GDR its international character. II18

16Neue Deutsche Literatur, No.6, 1973, pp. 7-8.
l7Kosing and Schmidt, pp. 186-187.
18
.
Ibid., pp. 186-188.
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I~

summary, as Politburo member Hermann Axen explained in June,

1973, the

'charac~er

of a nation is determined above ,all by its social

or class content and the class content of the nation is determined by
the political power,of the working class. 19 The traditional concer~s
for language, culture, and a common.historical past are secondary and
pale in comparison to these ideologically

motivat~d

considerations.

Accordingly, the GDR and the FRG are being drawn apart an4 the prospects
for reunification are steadily diminishing.

A logical concomitant of

this assertion is the policy of Abgrenzung initiated by Walter Ulbricht
as a means of effecting the .final demarcation of the two German states.
However, while Ulbricht viewed this delimitation as

end~ring

only until

the coming of a socialist revolution in the FRG, the Honecker regime,
as indicated by the revisions in the GDR Constitution, may well regard
it as eternal.
The importance of the Abgrenzung or demarcation policy was clearly
reflected in. Walter Ulbricht's announcement in January, 1971, that the
"ever stronger State demarcation".between the GDR and the FRG would be
the theme of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the SED in April of that
year. 20 An East German statement in April praised the policy of
demarcation as an
. Unmistakable rebuff to all speculation by West
Germanmonopoly.rulers and their ideologies abou~ making
the socialist economy of the GDR dependent on the monopolycapitalist economy of the FRG and linking them even more

19Hermann Axen, The Development of the Socialist Nation in.the GDR
(Dresden: Verll:lg Zeit im BUd, 1973), pp. 16-17.
20 ND , January 14, 1971, p. 1.
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ISS
closely on the pretext of an alleged nonexistenc;e of.class
differences. in the scientific-technical revolution and
teaching about the "convergen~e" of the social system~.2l
After the conclusion of the Eighth SED Congress . in

th~

spring of 1971,

Neues Deutschland editorialized that the antagonisms between socialism
and imperialism were "unbridgeable." Therefore, it continued, objective.
developments were. certain to lead the .FRG and the GDR even ,further apart
so the demarcation between the two states "in all spheres of life should
become more and more far-reaching.,,22

According to a resolution of the

SED Congress, such a process was·. at that time taking place between the
·
. hb or. 23
GDR an d kts
western nekg
The precise

~eaning

of this process.is difficult to determine, but

it is possible to note.three distinct meanings that; have been imparted
to the term Abgrenzung in practice.

The first is related directly to

the national question discussed above and concerns a process of
separation of the GDR from the FRG by creating in, the GDR a society that
differs radically from that of West Germany.

This conception involves

the creation of a gulf between the two states that is not physical but
political and social.' In discussing this meaning of the Abgrenzung
policy in 1973 the SED journal for Party life, Neuer Weg, declared that
a "clear boundary between the socialist GDR and the capitalistic FRG"

2l BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 28, 1971, EE/3669/Al/3.
(Hereafter noted as SWB.)
22ND, June 22, 1971, p. 1.
23
Documents on the 8th Congress of the SED (Dresden:
im Bild, 1971), p. 9 •.

Verlag Zeit
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ha~

been created by

ideology.

E~st

Germany's

socioeconomic.stru~tur~,

policy, and

Opposite value criteria and ideologies, the journal argued,

had done. the most to cOl1tribute to the demarcation of the GDR from West
Germany.24

The overall effort of the .SED to create a.socia1ist national

culture in the GDR is predicated on the

ass~mption

of a need to separate.

East Germany from the FRG in a meaningful, permanent manner.

Progress

in this endeavor was noted by a resolution of the .Eight,h SED Congress in
1971.

25

The second manifestation of the policy of Abgrenzung is an outgrowth,
of the first.

This is the intense ideological confrontation between

socialism and capitalism.

A basic assumption of this policy is the

belief that the West is heightening the ideological struggle against
the .Eastand

t~t

and subtle forms.

the attack.on the East is assuming a variety

o~

new

This assumption is not seen as.contradicting the.

process of normalization of relations between states with differing
social systems.

The. argument is simply that such normalization of.

relations does not put an end to the contradictions which already
existed between socialism and capitalism.

These contradictions, we

are told, are now sharpening because the capitalists, in a mood of
desperation, are intensifying their ideological attacks in order to
reverse the process of normalization which is said to be,contributing
to the final destruction of many of the myths of the imperialists.
24
25

Neuer Weg, Vol. 28, No. 22, 1973, p. 23.
Documents of the 8th SED Congress, p. 21.

157 .
Thus, in order to make the process of normalization irreversible, the
SED leadership says that it now places "the greatest value on the
intensification of the political-ideological education of the ,members
of the socialist society."

Ideological work has become the "principal

content.of our political activity, as the most important lever with
which to raise our fighting strength.,,26 Western talk about the "free
flow of, ideas" across, the GDR frontier is. denounced by East German
authorities as evidence of the intensity of the'ideological assault
against the GDR.

A "Voice of the GDR" commentary in August, 197.2,

dismissed the demand for a free flow of ideas as nothing less than an
e ff ort to spy on East German

'1' t ary 1nsta
.
11'
at10ns. 27

m~ ~

The importance attached to the controversy over the concept of the
nation can be seen much more clearly in the context ofthis.intense
ideological confrontation.

Hermann Axen clarified the connection when

he denounced the idea of a."national community" formed by the FRG and
the GDRas a major element of the FRG's ideological war against East
Germany.

According to Axen, this dispute over the exact nature of,the

nation was "much more t.han an a.cademic dispute."

It is, he argued, a

dispute about."fundamental political and.ideological questions.,,28
Recent East German concern over the proper study of history,
especially by its youth, is also a reflection of the SED's preoccupation

26Horizont, Vol. 7, No.6, 1974, p. 2.
27 SWB, August 22, 1972, EE/4072/Al/l.
28Axen , pp. 23-24.
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with an ideological confrontation.

The creation of a "socialist

historical consciousness" has been described as an. "important
ideological task" and the only way in which an understanding of the way
in which the "German monopolist bourgeoisie" .betrayed the German working
people can be gained.

Without such an understanding, ideological ,defeat

is .seen as much more likely in the confrontatiQn with opposing
29
ideologies.
Honecker used the 450th anniversary of the German
Peasants' War as an occasion to stress the. importance of a class
approach to the study of history.
Peasants' War,

th~

In discussing the eyents of the

SED First Secretary stated that the ideological

foundations of the GDR actually dated back to the revolutionary demands
30
that were expressed during that war.
While the legitimacy of his
statement is subject to question, he is clearly attempting to demonstrate
continuity between the GDR and significant events in German history.
The East German educational system is geared to accomplish the sort of
instruction that will make the lessons of history clear to the GDR's
youth.

The primary emphasis is on teaching history from a c1ass.point

of view in order to teach students regarding the place of their society
'G erman h'1story. 31
1n

Under the integrated educational system of the

29Helmut Meier, "Sozialistisches Geschischtsbewusstsein in Unserer
Zeit" ("Socialist Historical Consciousness in Our Time"), Einheit,
No.6, June, 1973, p. 711.
30ND , November 10, 1973, p. 10.
31Erhard Scherner, Kultur and Kunste in der DDR (Culture and Art,
in the GDR) (Berlin, GDR: Staatssekretariat fur westdeutsche Fragen,
1970), pp. 36-37.
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GDR, students receive their first formal lessons in history in the fifth
grade with one hour a week devoted to such instruction.

In the sixth

year this is increased to two hours per week and in the seventh year an
additional hour of civics is added.

This three hours a week of

instruction in areas of either pure history of history-related subjects·
is one of the largest concentrations of the week.

Only poly technical

training, mathematics, and German receive more time while the study of
Russian receives equal time.

32

East German authorities do not attempt

to deny the political orientation of their educational system.

They

proudly observe that their consciously political education demonstrates
that they have drawn the proper lessons from history.33
The third manifestation of the policy of Abgrenzung is the securing
of the GDR frontier with West Germany and West Berlin.

In discussing

the concept of state sover:eignty, the GDRI S Professor Peter Alfons
Steiniger explained that the principles of inviolability and territorial
integrity were basic derivatives of that concept.

According to Professor

Steiniger, this meant that the frontiers were to be protected against
both military assault and other forms of international intervention as
well.

He cited the example of Nazi intervention against Austria in 1938

to illustrate how phrases such as "self-determination of the
German nation," frequently used by Bonn officials, could be misused. 34

32He1mut Klein and Wolfgang Reischock, Bildungfur heute und morgen
(Education for Today and Tomorrow), Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1973),
p. 18.
33 Yb
"d . , pp. 33-34.
... 1.
34Horizont, Vol. 6, No. 38, 1973, p. 4.
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Neues Deutschland added "freedom of movement" tq the list of those
concepts suoject to aouse in such a way as to

the sovereignty

~io1ate

of the GDR while avoiding the outright use of force. 35

While the

escapee proo1em faced bY,the East German authorities in recent years
is not nearly as great as in the past (some 6,450 escaped in 1973),36
it was evidently enough to

c~use

concern about the security of the ,GDR

borders with West Berlin and West Germany.
accounts, in early 1973 the GDR state,

According to

frontie~

W~stern

with the ,FRG consisted,

of a double oarbed wire fence with a length of 836 kilometers, a series
of spring-gun installations stretching 79 kilometers, mine fields
running for 750 ki1ometers.with an estimated 1.7 million mines, 540
37
observation towers, 936 bunkers, 517 dogs, and 109 light barriers.
Yet"

the~e

was evidently official

dissatisfactio~

with these

ins,tallations and the manner in which they were operated.

Late in

the summer of 1973 there ,was a major reorganization of the ,border troops,
which brought greater centralization in command over the border units.
The ,eleven

bo~der

brigades were placed under four operational commands

with each under direction of a major general and with a lieutenant
general in charge of the entire force.

Twq

separa~e

units, those

responsible for the oorders with Poland and Czechoslovakia, were not
35

ND, September 21, 1973, p. 1.
36
SWB, January 2, 1974, EE/4489/Al/l.
37 '
Die Welt, February 14, 1973, p. 5.
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included in the reorganization and remained independent. S8

Subsequently,

work began on improving the border positions of the frontier troops.

In

January, 1974, extensive work was begun to demolish buildings near the
frontier which restricted the guards' fields of fire.
in

Meck1~nburg

entire villages on

th~

In several cases

border were dismantled.

GDR

demolition troops were reported at work throughout an entire 140
kilometer section of the Mecklenburg frontier with the FRG removing any
structures blocking fields of fire. 39 At the same time new construction
work was begun on other parts of the GDR-FRG frontier and also on the
frontier with West Berlin.

Additional barriers were erected and new

electronic monitoring devices were installed.

New cement observation

points . were. added throughout the length of the zonal border in

Lo~er

Saxony and "forward command points"were built into many of the
observation towers.

Th~se

"forward command points" are designed for

placement at strategic points along the border in order to facilitate
the employment of "alert troops" in preventing any illegal berder
crossings. 40 This work was being continued in the border regions of
Lower Saxony during the summer of 1974.and the GDR border units were
concentrating on strengthening those sections of the border used. most
frequently as escape routes ,during warm weather.

Th~

frontier in Berlin

38Informationen (Bonn: Bundesminister fur innerdeutsche
Beziehungen), No. 18, September, 1973, p. 5.
39 Die Welt, January 28, 1974, p. 3.
40 Der Taggespiegel (West Berlin), February 24, 1974, p. 2.

, . ~.'

.
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was being subjected to the most stringent precautions in several years
to prevent escapes into West Berlin. 4l
The picture very clearly emerging from

the~e

developments is that

the East German authorities are emphatically denying the possibility of
any reunification with the West under forseeable circumstanGes.

They

are emphasizing a policy of demarcation from West Germany which involves
the continued and intensified restructuring of GDR society along lines
incompatible with West German society, an intense ideological
confrontation with the West, and a strengthening of the East German
borders with the FRG in order to guarantee the inviolability of· their
frontiers by either enemy forces or their . own citizens .. Although
Honecker announced that the process of demarcation from the West had
ended once and for all with the admission of the GDR to the United
Nations in Oc~ober, 1973,42 none of the specific policies or programs
discussed above have been abandoned.

Apparently their continuation is

justified by East German efforts to consolidate what has
in recent years.

bee~

gained

Certainly there is no sign of relaxation to date of

this basic policy of·divergent development.
III .. THE GDR'S SOCIALIST CULTURAL POLICY
Since the SED has announced its intention to create a ,separate and
fully developed state of its own, one must ask what type of society the

4l Die Welt, May 16, 1974, p. 5.
42 SWB, October 29, 1973, EE/4436/A1/1.
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SED is seeking to build.

The'issue here is less one of the

funda~entals

of the GDR's economy and political system than a·matter of.the
atmosphere of the nation.

This is

wha~

t~ne

or

SED,Politburo member Kurt Hager

has described as the GDR' s "socialist cultural policy.,,43 Of primary
importance in the development of the East German cultural policy is ,the
Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Therefore, it is to the place and function

of ideology that this inquiry is.first directed.
In January, 1972, in an article in Neues Deutschland Erich Honecker.
wrote of the process of develqpment of the GDR and observed that East
Germany was only beginning to master .the scientific-technical

revo1~tion.

The level of scientific economic management, Honecker explained, was of.
crucial importance to the East German economy.

However, math,

cybernetics, and operatiol1s research, he cautioned, "could not and must
not replace the political economy of· socialism as the theoretical basis
of economic.policy."

Ideological work was described as the "center" of

the SED's leadership activity.

The .conflict .between socialism and

imperialism was coming to a head precisely in the ideological ,field,
Honecker declared, so especially close.attel1tion must be paid to work
in that area. 44 This theme WaS continued in a "Voice of the GDR"
commentary in 1973 which affirmed
possible.

th~t

no ideological coexistence was

The. ideological struggle was described as part of the class

struggle and of growing, not.diminishing, importance.

The commentary

43Kurt ,Hager, Socialist Cultural Policy (Dresden:
im Bi1d, 1972), p. 8.
44
ND, January 16, 1972, pp. 1-2.

Verlag Zeit
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asserted that the correct formulation was,not that peaceful
is.also ideological coexistence but

tha~

coexisten~e

peaceful coexistence meant a

s~rper ideologicqlConfrontatio~.45 The SED's theoretical j9urnal,
Einneit, stressed the same theme when it.declared that .there had been
no change in the "essence of imperialism" and that there was no prospect
for "renunciation of force in the ideological

s~ctor."

Imperialism,

a<;:cording to Einheit, was continuing an ideological struggle against
socialism through such "secret and·devious means" as "cultural pressure"
and demands for "freedom of· ideas and opinions."

West Germany's Social

Democrats were cited as among the principal villains guilty of.this sort·
of .attack.

The article concluded by stating that the chances for peace

would improve as .the GDR succeeds in "anchoring socialist ideology in
the ,consciousness of the people." 46
The policy of the SED as resolved at the Eighth Party Congress was
marked by two fundamental goals.

The first was a continued rise of

material cmd cultural standards of the GDR and the second was. the
establishment of favorable external
socialism in the GDR.

condition~

In discussing these

for the building of

objectiv~s

of. the foreign

and domestic policies of the SED, Politburo member Kurt Hager
that their realization required cqncrete

h~storical

.mainta~ned

approaches and

actions based on complete scientific, ideological knowledge.

The tapks

of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, as outlined by Hager, were so.
45

SWB, January 16, 1973,

E~/4l95/Al/3.

46Heinz Geggel, "Keine ideologische Wafferruhe" ("No Ideological
Ceasefire"L Einheit, No.1, January, 1973, pp. 8-9.
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exten~ive

that no aspect.of

East'Ge~ansociety

by ideological considerations. Reliance

o~

coulc;l remain untouched

"unprincipled pragmatism"

was· specifically condemned as an unacceptable approach to social and
economic development.
was ideology.

The'only valid guide, Hager repeatedly stressed,

Mastery of , the scientific-technical

and·the

re'l(ol~tion

development of .the natural sciences were both described as philosophica11y dependent.

Only th:rough a proper understanding of philosophy, he

insisted, would the formation and all-round develqpment of socialist
··
be
persona 1~t~es

·bl e. 47

poss~

The carrying out of this work has

frequently been described as the "principal concern of party activity
and party leadership.,,48

The 1973 Party elections were seen by the

SED's leadership as an opportunity to increase the
ideologica~

work.

The

electio~s

inten~ity

of

wer,e to be used for "further improving

political and ideological indoctrination and making it more effective. '.,'
"Lenin's working style" was set as the norm to which a11 i,'arty members
should strive to conform in carrying out.the ideological tasks

t~at

necessary for meeting the goals of ' the Eighth Party Congress.

Only

after the

~horough

were

"socialist indoctrination of all workers"could the

84,000 party group organizers and the.73,OOO leaderships of the basic

organizations and department party organizations, feel that they had met
their obligations in the 1973 campaign. 49

47 ND , April.17, 1974, pp. 5-6.
48Horst Dohlus, "Die LeninscQ.en Normen in Leben unserer Partei"
("Leninist Norms in the Life of our Party"), Einheit, No. 10, October,
'
1973, p. 1178.
49 Ibid ., pp. 1179-1180.
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The development of a sense of East ,German statehood is dependent on
the work of the SED in the implementation of the ideological

tas~s

for the party, according to Hager and others in the SED hierarchy.

set
The

successful implementation of the SED's goals is seen as requiring an
especiallY

h~gh

standard for individual members.

Politburo member Erich

Mueckenberger dealt with this need in an article in NeuerWeg in
Septem~er,

1973.

According to Mueckenberger, the implementation of the,

Eighth SED Congress's resolution regarding the building of a developed
socialist society makes ,new and greater demands ,on the party.
Accordingly, the Central Control Commission of ,the SED, of which
Mueckenberger is

chairma~,

must increase its efforts to rid the party

of "unworthy elements." While insisting that the work of the Control
Commission had brought the SED more unity and resolution than ever
before, he warned that "residues of the old capitalist society continue
to affect ideas and action, even of party members."

In addition, there

are some. party members who are simply unable to "keep pace with the new
·
c h a 11 enges f ac~ng
us . . . . ,,50

Therefore, the party leaderships

thrqughout the country must be alert for identification of those members
whose behavior "offends against the unity, purity, and resolution of the
party, thereby crippling its fighting strength."

The "ruthless" exposure"

of these elements is necessary, Mueckerbenger explained, because the
enemy in the class war was continuing to work for the same goals as in
the past but with "greater

steal~h

and refinement."

50Neuer Weg, No. 18, 1973, pp. 818-819.
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enemy

"appea~s

to those whose

politi~a1

and ideological attitude is not

qui te firm, who. harbor doubts and hesi ta tiol).s . "

Therefore, only by

calling tl:? account "all those who damage the prestige of th.e party" will
the SED be able to tighten
figh~ing

it~

ranks even more strongly and increase its

strength in the effort to fully implement the GDR's cultural

and'politica1 goa1s. 51 This "purge" co~ld well represent an effort by
Honecker to

strengthe~

his position within the SED since it

c~mes:on

the

heels of a previous "purge" or exchange of party documents, as the SED
called it, in 1970. 52
Since the GDR is in the process of building what it

proc1~ims

as a·

developed socialist society, it is appropriate to examine the contours,
of this society in order.to see how it advances the goal of creating a
sense of national consciousness.

The SED's conception of a developed

socialist society centers around an irlsistence on total involvement of
its population in the affairs of the state.

Suc,h involvement, it

believes,. will aid its citizens in self-identification with the goals
of the regime and thus contribute to a greater national consciousness.
"Every further development of social democracy," according to deputy
chairman of the GDR State Council Friedrich Ebert, "must start with the
inevitably growing leadership role of the .working class and its party."S3

51 Ibid ., pp. 819-822.
52 ND , April 29, 1970 i p. 1.
53Friedrich Ebert,' "Stadt u;nq Demokratie unserer socialistischen
Gessellschaft" ("State Democracy in ou~ Socialist Society"), Einheit,
No.4, April, 1974, p. 397.
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The social composition of representatives in all popularly elected
bodies is supposed to correspond to the actual social composition of.
the GORIS population.

The unrestricted sovereignty of the working

people, which is the key to the development of a-sense of

natio~al

consciousness, is said by Ebert to be implemented by the participation
of citizens in both the management and the planning of all
s~ate

decis~ve

and social concerns and,also by the exercise of an increasingly

broad based popular control.

Three Dlillion GOR cit:tzens are said to

be participating responsibly in the exercise of power. in East Germany.
This

participa~ion

takes the form of membership in committees and study

groups of representative bodies, in commissions of the National Front,
in a variety of.activist groups, and numerous other committees.

Citizens

of,the GOR are described bY,Ebert as more ready to participate now. than
ever, before.

Not only po 1i tical, but also

e~onomic

affected by the masses of East·German citizenry.

decis:i,.on

makin~

is

Ebert asserts that

85 percent of all workers. and employees in state owned industries
participated in discussions regarding th.e economic plan which was
adopted for 1974.

The discussion of draft laws prior to their formal

adoption is described,as another. way in which social democracy is being
implemented and strengthened.

The drafts are formally submitted for

discussion by the East German population before becoming law.

The

recently' passed GOR Youth Law is estimated to have been discussed by
5.4 million citizens in more than 240,000 open meetings.
s\1ggestions regarding the

dr~ft

organizations' and individuals.

Some 4,800

of this law were,submittecl by
Ebert gives nq figures for the number
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of changes made following the submission of these suggestions, but the
,
, t hat t here were changes. 54
presumpt10n
1S
The strength of the popular representative bodies is to be a major
factor in the development of a sense of national consciousness in the
GDR's socialist democracy.

The strength of these organs, according to

Ebert, depends upon how well they "succeed in achieving constantly
closer relations with the working people and relying upon this in their
'
, 't'les. ,,55
en t 1re
management act1v1

If the population is to feel that it

is truly a part of the decision-making process, such closeness is a
necessity.

In a speech in December, 1973, to the staffs

conce~ned

with

constitutional and legal problems of East German local government, Ebert
admitted that the maintenance of such relations is not easy.

"The link

between citizens, state organs, and representatives is frequently rather
tenuous," he said.

A method of overcoming this problem was tried in

LeipZig where constituency activist groups were established in order to
collaborate with the citizens to determine emerging problems and submit
suggestions to the state organs for dealing with such problems.

The

constituency activist groups included representatives from local
government, the National Front, the Peoples' Police, local enterprises,
schools, and cultural faci1ities. 56 Another method of creating closer
ties with the population discussed by Ebert was the use Of voters'

54 Ibid ., pp. 397-398.

55 Ibid ., pp. 400-401.

56Neue Justiz, Vol. 28, No.1, January, 1974, pp. 1-6. In
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 857, March 19, 1973, p. 27.
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mandates or, ,in effect, referenda.

Yet, the mandates, Ebert cautioned,

must respond to the interests of a broad stra~a of people and be related
57
to e~onomic~lly feasible measures.
Newspapers were described as
a~other

people.

important

l~nk

Ebert ,faulted newspapers, however, for failing to have

established a "genuine
Th~

in the ,maintenance of close contact with the

partne~ship"

with the staffs of state organs.

reports of meetings, he said, failed to show

th~

way in

wh~ch

the

decisions made in meetings reflect the will of the ,workers and consisted
58
of northing more tha~ reports of the speeches.
While official discussions of the nature and meaning of the
cultural policies assume a particularly humanistic ,tone, rigid
ideological

contro~

is never ,relaxed and the party's position is

carefully preserved. The population must be encouraged to identify
with the goals of the regime and to feel

tha~

its will directs policy,

but the mechanisms for "popular control" must neVer be allowed to
overshadow the party.

Lest the SED's position be seriously threatened

and in order to avoid any misconceptions about the nature of the world,
west of the GDR frontier, a much less "positive" side to the explanation
of the GDR's developed socialist society is retained.

In discussing the

theory of state and law, Professor Wolfgang Weichelt, director of the
Institute for Theory of ,State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the
GD~, me~tioned
th~

opinions which see the role of ' the state as detached from

concrete processes and laws of socioeconomic, developm,ent.

57 Ibid. I p. 35.

58 Ibid ., p. 36.
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hold such positions, he concluded, will either think too highly of.the
state or will denigrate the importance of the state.

While I!J.eftist"

theories associated.with Trotsky are mO$t commonly thought of in this
connection, . Professor Weiche1t insisted that "leftist" and "rightist"
are actually now in union against socialism.

Distin~tio~s

between

the~e

two forms of revisionism have been ob1iterated.as the two join in a
struggle against socialism and communism "on the basis of.anticommunism,
anti-Soviet;ism, and nationalism."

If the continued development of

socialist democracy is to be.assured, he declared, all variants of
revisionism must be vigilantly opposed. 59
The concern over threats to the .GDR's program of nation building
extends far beyond the

theoretic~l

issues raised by Professor Weiche1t.

The East German authorities see themselves ,as the object of an intensive
psychological warfare campaign by the West wtih the .Federa1 Republic and
West

Be~lin

acting as principal agents in the ,campaign.

The presence of

a large number of Western television and radio transmitters in the fifty
kilometer strip along tho FRG-GDR frontier is cited as an example of the,
determination to direct hostile psychological influences against East
Ger.many.

The goal of Western, and especially West.German, imperialism

in.this.effort is seen as twofold:

first, to denigrate the leading role

of the SED in East Germany, and, second, to harm. the organs of state.
power in the GDR, particularly the National People's Army (NVA).
officials believe that the FRG seeks to separate the East German
59

Staat und,Recht, Vol. 23, No.4, 1974, pp. 571-579. In
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 923, June 28, 1974, p. 47.
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government and the SED·from the citizenry of,the GDR.

Colonel Doctor.

Dieter Langer of the NVA notes that while there are West
organs for conducting

psycho1ogica1.warf~re

periods of tension or in

wartim~,

Ge~anmi1itary

against the GDR during

the electronic lnass media of the FRG

and West Berlin are responsible for the

peacet~me

psycho1ogica1.missions.

This inc1,udes West Germany's Deutsch1andfunk and the West Berlin Radio
in the American Section (RoIAS) as well as others in. the FRG and Western.
Europe. 60 Radio Luxembourg has also been singled out as one of the
"most,ingenuous forms of Western psychological warfare." According to
a West German report, East German authorities feel that when a western
hit song gains afootho1d in·a Communist mind, it helps drive out.
something else.
its programming:

They charge that ,Radio Luxembourg has four goals in
first, to .restrain the initiative of workers in

socialist countries; second, weakening belief in the superiority of a.
socialist order; third, undermining the authority of the communist
parties; and fourth, combating socialist internationa1ism. 61
The SED's belief that western music posed a threat to their nation
building efforts was demonstrated by the 1973 "Order on Discotheque
Programs" issued by the Ministry of Culture,

The order noted that there

was a heavy responsibility on.the disc jockey for the management of
these programs so he must be required to have "an adequate, basic,
socioscientific knowledge.". In order to avoid any cultural harm, the

60Vo1ksarmee, No. 17, 1974, p. 6.
61Die Welt, March 19, 1973, p. 3.
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order. stipulated that only recordings made in East Germany or other CMEA
countries may be played in discotheque programs.

All recor4ings and

reproducing equipment owned by sqcial establishments as eating places
which conduct discotheque programs are requireq to be registered with
the

Cu1tur~1

Department of the local district council.

Violation of

any. of· these provisions may bring a penalty of a.fineof up to one
62
thousand marks.
Meanwhile, the NVA's Political
.
. Main Administration
,
issued a call to GDR soldiers. to examine their ,attitude toward "enemy
broadcasting."

Noting tha1; western "hot music" is intended,to lull

"our vigilance," it asked soldiers to prevent Western ideological
inroads with the GDR by refusing to.listen to Western radio stations. 63
In January, 1974, the GDR Peop1e's.Po1ice were called upon by the
Ministry of Interior to be alert for "hostile subversive activities"
against the GDR.

The process of detente will be aided and protection

of the GDR improved as public or4er is strengthened and· as ideological
work with members of the People's Police itself is increased, according
64
to the Ministry of Interior.
Later in 1974, according to a West
German report, the GDR authorities introduced an informant system in
order to better control contacts between East Germans and Westerners.
While many East German citizens have already been asked to pledge

62

tha~

Gesetzb1att.der DDR, Part I, No. 38, August 27, 1973, pp. 401-404.
In Translations on E.astern Europe, No. 792, October 10, 197.3, pp. 38-42.
63IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), February 21, 1973, p. 2.
64 Ibid ., January 9, 1974, p. 1.
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they will renounce any Western contacts, the new system required citizens
to report any contacts. with Westerners.

They must report whom they have

been in contact with, the type.of contact, and how the contact came
about as well as the contents of.the cQnversation or letter.

In some

cases, citizens ,are required to present any Western mail they receive
to officials before opening it. 65
The tone of'the East German cultural policy was further amplified
in directives relating to

m~li~ary

affairs.

In September, 1973, the GDR

Ministry of·Defense called upon cOmmanding officers
political

indoctrinatio~

the soldiers.

~o

intensify

in order to help repel western influences among

This intensified iQeological indoctrination campaign was

justified by the

Minis~ry's.claim

that the class enemy of the GDR is

increasing its ideological pressure ,and attempting to misinform.and lead
East Germans astray by slandering the policies of the .SED and its allied
.
66 At t h e same t1me,
.
.
part1es.
eff orts are b e1ng
rnad
e to'1mprove t h e

military posture ,of the GDR.

Early in 1973 a program was initiated.to

aq.apt.the cadres of the NVA to the "requirements of,armed con:flict with
an imperialist aggressor." According to.Lt. Gen. Otto Pech, this
improvement in the .cadres, as well as an increase in their.number, is
67
necessary to increase the combat readiness of the NVA.
In a similar
fasion, the NVA has placed higher demands on its soldiers physical

65 Die Welt, May 29, 1974, p. 3.
66 IWE Tagesdienst (West Be~lin), September 24, 1973, pp. 1-3 •.
67 Ibid ., Fe~ruary 21, 1973, p. 2.

175
capacities.

In order to improve. the combat readiness of the individual

soldier, the minimum requirements

o~

the so-called event

te~t,

which.

serves as the criterion for cqmbat fitness, were substantiallyraised. 68
Additiona~

evidence of the

GD~'s

militant
stance is presented by the
.

expanded East German civil defense system.

,

'

The objective of this

effort, which was begun in 1973 and justified by the Defense Ministry
as a contribution to the increC(lsed "defense readiness" of the GDR, is
to guarantee all

citizenssomepro~ective

accommodations,in

ca~e

of war.

The program calls for both state an,d private contributioJ?s in the
construction of shelter~.69 The militancy of the SED's outlook in its
nation-building efforts was most succinctly expressed in a recent issue
of Armeerundschau.

In justifying official

hostil~ty

toward the West,

it asserted, "Our love, of socialism reflects our hatred against its,
enemies.,,70
IV.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CULTURAL PROGRESS

While the general tone of. the SED's cultural policy can be seen
from the analysis above, the question of how this policy is
remains to be considered.

impl~mented

East Germany's leadership considers the.

implementation of a socialist cultural policy to

b~

an indivisible

component of the ideo1ogica1,work necessary for the deve1qpment of,

68Ibid~, November 23, 1973, p. 2.
69 Ibid ., November 2, 197,3, p. 1.
70Armeerundschau, No.1, January, 1974, p. 3.
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a national consciousness in the ,GDR.

Accordingly, it sees workrel,ating

to .the cultural policy as being too important. and

exten~ive

to be the

responsibility of cultural organizations, or artists,' and writers'
associations by themselves.

In terms of party responsibility, it is not

possible to limit efforts to one or two particular agencies.
Raupach, sociologist and deputy

depa~tment

chief in the ,SED

As Rudi
Centr~l

Committee has written,
Since s~cialist culture permeates all areas of our society,
and cultural-esthetic education and artistic creation are
closely linked with political, ideological, economic, and
scientific tasks, the encour~gement of the ,development of
socialist culture become imperative for the leadership
functio~s of every basic organization. 71
The basic organizations, in tUrn, may look to any of,a

var~ety

institutions or organizations for assistance with regard to
aspects of the ,cultural policy.

of

pa~ticular

Together, they are working toward what

the SED authorities term "cultural progress."

Such progress, accol'4ing

to Raupach,
. Is reflected particularly in a greater receptivity
for the problems of our socialist' society, in increasing
social and cultural activity, in the growing need for
invol ving art ami literature in one's daily life, in a
subsequent greater appreciation of art, and in a rising
desire for personal participation in art and culture. 72
There is, however, no implication that this is art and
for their own sake.

cult~re

simply

Rather, there is a very practical consideration

here, namely, that the "furthel; improvement of productivity needs people

71Rudi Raupach, "Initiat;or der Kultu~arbeit" ("rnitiator of
Cultural Work"), Einheit, Vol. 29, No.3, 1974, pp. 334-335.
72 Ibid ., p. 336.
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who have been shaped by socialist conditions to be creative, cultured,
and socia1ist.,,73
tion that

In addition to this, there is,the further considera-

cultura~ activit~es c~n

ideological struggle.

Thus, it

play an important part in the

be~omes

increasingly

the

importantth~t

party work for cultural progress both in and through as many channels
as possible.

East German.cu1tura1 efforts, therefore, will now be

considered as they relate to

a,cult~ra1

offensive in the ideological

struggle, to youth, to literature, art, and music, and to the churches.
In 1973 the GDR Ministry for Advanced and Technical School Education
expressed an interest in the ,expansion of cooperation with western
nations,in areas relating to its jurisdiction.

An improvement .in the

quality of , educational teaching standards played.a secondary role in
East German motivations, according to statements of the Ministry.
Central importance was placed on making a contribution to the foreign
policy program of the 24th Communist Party of the Soviet

U~ion

Congress

and the Eighth SED Congress as well as the ideological offensive of,
socialism.

While the improvement in the class-conscious indoctrination

of students sought by the Ministry might be ,viewed as a direct
contribution to education, greater stress was placed on strengthening
the international position of the GDR and of socia1ism. 74 This example
is illustrative of.the basic East German orientation toward anything
which might be considered even indirectly as a cultural exchange.

73 Ibid ., p. 335.
74IWE Tagesdienst" May 9, 1973, pp. 1-2.
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publication of the .GDR Institute ,of Politics and Economy (IPW), outlined
the official SED attitude toward cultural exchanges.

According to the

IPW'spublication"an increase in "spiritual-cultural and information
exchange" with Western countries is desirable but must be harmonized
with the ,fact that the ideological struggle between socialism and
capitalism is intensifying.

Such harmony is not difficult to obtain

because the presence of "socialist scientists, artists, and works of
art.in capitalist countries is tantamount to the presence of socialist
ideology.,,75
effects.

According to the IPW, this presence has two favorable

First, it reduces anticommunist prejudices and allows people

in capitalist countries to see socialism as a "humanist
as it truly exists."

so~ial

order,

Second, the socialist cultural initiative is a

means of ideological struggle in that it spreads the ,spirit of detente
over the whole world and promotes cultural international relations in
such a way that it benefits the strengthening of peace.
Such harmony is only possible if the cultural exchange is viewed
in accordance with certain criterion.

The desirable criterion, in the

SED's conception, is the freedom granted to Marxism-Leninism in a
country.

The greater that freedom the greater one ,may consider freedom

of thought in that country and, with it, the
exchanges.

,opportun~tie~

for cultural

According to the ,IPW report,

Consequently, the Marxist-Leninist also gauge the state
of development in spiritual freedom in the possibilities

7SIPW-Berichte, No. II, November, 1973, pp. 23-32.
on Eastern Europe, No. 840, January 17, 1974, p. 39.
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existing for propagati~g the ideology of the working
in.the capitalist countries. 76
If it is not possible for a cultural exchange to aid the
then a cultural exchange is not

cla~s

social~st

view,

po~sible.

In order to assure the achievement.of harmony between cultural
exchanges and the ideological struggle which is seen as an outgrowth
of present-day foreign policy conditions, the East
content qualifications for

eva~uating

Ge~mans

cl:lltural exchanges,

posit certain
If the

eX<,:hange involves the transmission of information or. ideas deemed
harmful to the cause of "peace" it must not take place.

All exchanges

must have the effect of strengthening those causes considered worthy by
the socialist

nations~

The IPW's report

concl~des.that

Such.an objective for the exchange of spiritual~cultural
values implies, of course, that no freedom of dissemination
will be granted tO,spiritual product~ whose content is hostile
to peace, is nationalistic, racist, contemptuous of humans,
and is counterrevolutionary.77
Responding to those.who might object to .this restriction, . the IPW
article, asserts that the thing which is actually cj.eplorable is not the
struggle against such views, but rather the existence of those views.
People who insist on the "freedom of opinion" are depicted as simply
seeking to stop the victorious advance of ,the ideas .of socialism and
to put t4e ideology of.imperialism on the offensive once again.
Marxist-Leninists to accede to such

76Ibid~, p. 40.
77 Ibid ., p. 42.

demands~

For

we are told, would be to
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yield to an appeal for ideological coexistence" something which is
clearly out of the question.

Such "subversive activity" will never be
legalized, according to the ,IPW's analysis. 78
While cultural exchanges, under these circumstances, are seen as

very desirable by

E~st

German

autho~ities,

the

GD~

has not hesitated to

place preconditions on even such obviously one-sided exchanges.
"

th~

GDR will agree to

~ny

Before

exchange of ,cultural information the Western

states involved must accept certain principles as ,well as East Gel.'I1lan
interpretations of those principles.
Those principles mainly are the sovereign equality of,the
states and respect for the rights inherent in the ',sovereignty;
the refraining from the ,threat or ,use of force; inviolability
of the borders; territorial integrity of the states;, peaceful
arbitration of controversies; and noninterf~rence in internal
affairs. 79
The. possibility has also been raised that, the ,GDR might insist that

We~t

Germany, before entering into a cultural agreement with the GDR, hand
over to

t~e EastGe~mans

certain works of art and other

valuab~e

items

presently held by the FRG Prussian Cultural Property Foundation on. the
grounds that the GDR is, as Erich Honecker has said, "the state
embodiment of the best tr~ditions of German history.II 80 With regard
to the West Germans,
right to sole

t~e

SED has been, in effect, insisting on the GDR's

represe~tation

of both German states in cultural

matte~s.

The unwillingness of the ,Bonn government to yield to this demand has
meant that virtually all

78 Ib 1'd ~, pp. 46 - 47 .

cultur~l

contacts between the .FRG and the GDR

79 Ibid ., p. 44.

80Frankfurter Allgemeine, January 17, 1974, p. 20.
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have been

thw~rted.

West Germany's refusal to yield to the GDR's demands

in the cultural negotiations between the two states has

undQubt~dly

led

the SED to cqncll,lde that broad. cultural exchanges at this time would not
aid the GDR's ideological struggle.
The importance of the .GDR's youth in terms of the cultural policy
of East

Ge~ny

is such that references to the proper education and

upbringing of the nation's youth repeatedlY appear in party writings
and officials' speeches.

Considerable energy is alsQ devoted to the

study of youth by East German sociologists.

Th~ir

concern for issues

relating to the ,SED's cultural policy is reflected in the major research
questions:

first, problems of the development and consolidation of the

socialist consciousness of youth,

incl~ding

the processes of the

formation of ,socialist attitudes; second, problems of ' the

d~velopment

and management of socialist youth teams, especially in youth organizations;

thi~d,

problems ,of

deve~oping

,.-

intellectual, cultural, sports,

and,tourists interests in youth with particular consideration given to
cultural and tourist facilities and the influence of ,the mass media;
and fourth, problems of the ,efficiency of the integrated youth
organization within the system of planning and management of work with
young people. 8l

The attent;ion ?evoted to the ,recently passed Youth Act

is yet another indication of the tremendous importance placed on the
proper political and sociological development of the nation's youth in

81Gunther Bohring, "Youth Research in the GDR, " 'Sociological ,
Research in the GDR, e~ited by the Scientific Council for Sociological
Research (Berlin, GDR:' Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschafter, 1970),
p. 106.
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Th~

order to advance the ,social development of the GDR.
efforts to guarantee that the ,youth adopt proper
at the earliest.age possible.

official

attitude~

are, started

Children of preschool age are expected,

according to the Ministry of, Public Education, to receive from their
parents the information that will enable them to
friend and enemy.

Parents are urged to tell

GDR soldiers that the troops guard
children can play in peace.
influence,

p~rents

the~r

between

children if ,they see

borders against enemies so the

In order to protect children from Western

are admonished not to allow children to listen to

' .
" or te l
Wes t ern ra d ~o
ev~s~on

considered to be

the~r

d~stinguish

m~king

programs~

82

I n so d o~ng,
.
t h e,parents are

a contributiqn to the early formation of proper

socialist attitudes in young people.
The Tenth World Festival of Youth and Students,

whi~h

was held in

East Berlin in 1973, gave the GDR a chance to display its youth to the
world.

On this occasion Erich Honecker boasted that, thanks·to their

socialist training, every third young worker is an innovator who
demonstrates his initiative in ,the economic affairs of his country.
Free German Youth

(FD~)

The

organization, he said, shows that the great

majority of the ,East German

yo~th

possess political maturity.

This is

possible because in the GDR "girls and boys start early to participate
in social life."

This early start aids in developing socialist

personalities and in training youth to recognize its "social
obliga tions," Honecker explained. 83 The GDR' s' youth was active during

82 IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), February 2, 1974, p. 1.
83
Neuer Wag, No. 14, July, 1973, pp. 628-630.
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th~

Festival not only in arranging parades and demonstx:ations, but also

in enforcing public order and security.

FDJ groups were given extensive

training prior to the Festival by the People's Police to enable them to
influence "endangered youths" who were not ,properly educated ,in a
outlook and to ens~e the maintenance of order at all Festival
84
meeting places. . The FDJ evidently fulfilled its security responsibi1isocialis~

ties well ,at

th~

Festival because, several

month~.

later GDR authorities

began a program to give the FDJ public order groups increased assignments
to protect youth from "harmful influences. ,,85
The emphasis on youth in the,GDR has lead to a concern that the
educational system fulfill ideological and cultural responsibilities
specified by the SED.

The 1974 Youth Act specified some of the ,goals

in its declaration in Article '47whic;h states"
It shall be the concern and 1;he task of young people to
adopt a cultured way of life, to use their leisure time in
a meaningful way, to engage in cultural and artistic,
activities and to take a creative ,part, in the development
of culture and.art. 86
Further specifics were given in the Act on the
System of the GDR which

inc1~ded

an

,Integra~ed

en~eration

objectives,and responsibilities at each level.

Educational

of educational

In discussing social

science lessons at the ,secondary state, the Act illustrates ,the extent

84 IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), AprilS, 1973, pp. 1.2.
85 Ibid ., April 22, 1974, pp. 1-2.
86Youth in the Socialist State:
Panorama DDR, 1974), p. 43.

Youth Act of the GDR (Berlin, GDR:
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of the responsibilities of the ,public schools in the GDR.

It states

i~

Article lQ that,
pupils shall ,be led to recognize the historic role and
duty of the German Democratic Republic. They shall
come to the conclusion that the future belongs to socialism
in the whole:ofGermany.87
Th~

natio~a1

To insure that yOl;lng people spend their leisure time

in,"a'purpos~fu1

way" the Act introduces the concept of a "who1e-day",schoQ1 education.
This concept, which is to be applied to an increasing number of pupils,
involv:es a ,close connection betwee:n formal
extracurricular education.

.inst~uct~on

and

Students are called upon to perform

"socially useful work'.' and to develop "pleasure in work."

Holidays

are to be used by students to "strengthen thei.r .physique and health
in the .community of happy and self-radiant young people.". Organized
games and excursions are to be utilized in fulfilling this objective.
Socialist enterprises and scientific institutions are required under
the .Act to entrust young people

invol~ed

in the ."who1e-day" educational

system.withuseful and interesting work.

Organizations such as the FDJ

and its younger partner, the Ernst Thae1mann Pioneers, are to.be
responsible for assuming leadership of many of the activit~es associated
with this educational innovation. 88 This approach is supported by GDR
educational journals which stress the importance of showing the "unity"
between school and life.

According to a recent article in Deutsche

87Act on the Integrated Socialist Educational System of the .GDR
(Berlin, GDR: Staatsver1ag der DJ?R, 1972), p. 31.
88 Ibid ., pp. 32-33.
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Lehrerzeitung, schools are supposed to implement the instructions of the
SED calling for an increased congruity between the teachings

~n

educational institutions and the demands of life in the GDR.
Accordingly, schools are working to stress politically relevant themes
and to demonstrate the inadequacies and misconceptions of imperialist
1'deo 1ogy.

89

An additional and especially significant aspect of the educational
process in the GDR is the premilitary training which is justified by the
assertion that the only revolution worth anything is the one that knows
how to defend itself.

.

Honecker has described defense preparedness as a

basic requirement for the guarantee of the socialist gains of his nation
and, at the same time, for the consistent continuation of the
international detente pOlicy made possible only by the strength of
'1'1sm. 90
SOC1a

For defense preparedness to be complete, the SED feels

that the youth must understand their military class mission.

Therefore,

the FDJ, along with the Society for Sports and Technology (GST) , has
been called upon to prepare the nation's youth for military service in
political, physical, and premilitary terms.

A basic part of the FDJ's

responsibility involves meeting future requirements of the East German
military.

Only by the inculcation of proper attitudes toward military

service, the SED believes, can the young people of the GDR be adequately

89Deutsche Lehrerzeituns, No. 17, April, 1974, p. 4. In
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 913, June 10, 1974, pp. 10-13.
90ND, November 1, 1973, p. 1.
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prepared.
an

Ea~t

Th~

FDJ's success in this respect has regently been

not~d

in

GeJ;1llan youth publication.

Being a soldier for socialism and being a mercenary for
monopoly capitalism are two things th~t have nothing in
common with eacb other. The youth of the .GDR is fully aware
of this fact. 91 .
Having developed an appreciation for the honor of serving in the GDR
military, the FDJ and tQe other youth organizations then proceed.to
impart a knowledge of military techniques to.young students.

Th~

GST

organizes students into. companies where military topics such as the use
of hand grenades, creeping and crawling, and map reading are taught.
Students participate in a variety of sports which have a close
relationship to

mil~tary

communications. sports.
become a

co~ponent

free time.,,92

activities, including sport

shoot~ng a~d

According to Volksarmee, "defense sport has

part·of a

mea~ingful

and interesting way of.using

In add:ition to teaching young people the .basic military

skills, the GST prides itself on the dis,cipline

imp~ted

to

thos~

who

t

participate in its activities;. discipline which will enable. them to
. t ·1t s eneffiles
. .ln t he f uture. 93
. 1·l~m agalns
de f en d SOCla

In the .spring

of 1974, according to Western reports, the GDR was undertaking yet a
further increase .in premilitary training and.military education.

"Xoung

soldier" working groups were being organized in school.to impart military

9lJunge Generation, No.2, February, 1974, pp. 5~-63. In
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 878, Aprll S, 1974, p. 10.
92
yolksarmee" No.7, Febrl,lary, 1974, p. II.
93Armeerundschau, No.9, September, 1972, pp. 79-80.
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and political knowledge to students outside of the obligatory premi1itary
training programs already in the ,school
even set up in-the basements of ,many

curricu1~.

EastGer~n

Target ranges were

schools so students

could practice marksmanship without haying to go to one of" the
normally used for such activities. 94

~arnps

In evaluating th~ efforts to'incu1cate proper socialist attitudes
and.a love of the ,"socialist fatherland" in the young people of the GDR,
the SED ',s theoretical journa1.observed that there is a necessary
connection

betwe~n

the internal strengthening of ,each socialist country

and the increase in its world political effectiveness.

Thanks to the

government's educational programs, the journal concluded, the GDR has
been strengthened internally since the overwhelming

majo~ity

of its

youthis associating itself increasingly firmly with sqcialism in ,the
GDR and is developing patriotic and internationalistic ways of
and acting.

thi~king

Therefore, the authors assert, not only is the international

effectiveness of the GDR now greater, but

th~

development of

EastGe~many

as a socialist nation completely independent from the FRG has been
enhanced. 95
While literature has been mentioned in another context, it is ,
important to cqnsider this topic separately as a

veh~c1e,for

social

94 IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), April 10, 1974, p. 2.
95Horst Adam and He1mut,Zapf, "SoziaUstischer Patriotismus und,
Pro1etarischer Internationalismus in der ideologischen E~ziehung d~r
Jugend" ("Socialist Patriotism and Proletarian Internationalism in the
Ideological Upbringing of Youth"), Einheit., No.6, June, 1~73,
pp. 678-680.
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development.

Lenin wrote in a draft resolution on proletarian culture

that literary and artistic works "should be imbued with the spirit of
the class struggle being waged by the proletariat.,,96 This statement,
which came during a controversy in the Soviet Union in 1920, was neither
the first nor the last in a long line of pronouncements regarding the
proper role of literature, art, and music in a socialist society.
Krushchev published an entire volume entitled The Great Mission of
Literature and Art in 1964 in an attempt to provide a comprehensive
guide to the evaluation of cultural contributions in the USSR.

East

Germany is no different from the Soviet Union in its concern that
writers and artists have a "socialist" outlook in their contributions.
The popular East German magazine Sonntag spelled

OUt

the cultural-

political needs of the GDR by listing
. . The convincing artistic presentation of figures of
workers and of the struggle and life of the working class as
the history-forming power of social progress, of its battles
and victories, its historic greatness, defeats, and
experiences; the artistic presentation of true socialism,
. the crystallization of new standards of morality, •
and tB; consciousness formation toward a "social entity."
In order to promote the arts and the development of a favorable climate
for new accomplishments, Sonntag called for a public discussion of the
nature of social responsibility and the functions of the arts in a
developed socialist society.

This was seen as necessary if the ,arts

96V • I. Lenin, Selected Works, Volume Three (Moscow:
Publishers, 1967), p. 476.
97 Sonntag, January 6, 1974, p. S.
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were to aid in shaping the working class into a core. for further
progress in,the arts.

What was not said, but was clearly implied,

however, was that art was conceived df as, something to be enjoyed by
the masses

ra~her

Youth Law to the

than by a se1ect.few.

cultu~a1

The references in the 1974

enrichment of youth further support the

position that East ·German art is primarily for the masses.
these cultural-political needs, Werner

Neube~t,

In surveying

eqitor-in-chief of Neue

I

Deutsche Literatur, enthusiastically asserts that "for the first time in
our historical experience in our GDR, literature is in the position to
realistically participate in a real task.,,98
tha~ lit~rature

Neubert, too, is concerned

be responsive to its social responsibility and maintain

a high level of class content.
Yet, not all East German ,writers fulfill their social obligations,
judging from a variety of comments appearing in the ,GDR press.
shortcomings were

discuss~d

Such

in the official SED newspaper, Neues

Deutschland, in an article in 1973.

The problem with many literary

works, we are told, is that the worker is unable to establish a
connection between himself. and the figures in the story.

The

chara~ters

simply do not raise the questions over which the .worker himself muses.
They do not .dress in the same fashion as he dresses.
as he speaks.

The reader is irritated,

No do, they speak

according to Neues Deutschland,

because figures are placed before him which are petty bourgeois,
irrelevant or antisocial, or merely reflections of the author rather

98Neue Deutsche Literatur, No. 11, November, 1973, pp. 3-4.
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than figures from the ,life of the average East German citizen.

Such a

situation is described as "an impoverishment of literature against which
;)

we must defend ourselves.

,,99

In order to mount this defense,

writers are called upon to resist "nondialectical" tendencies and to
write in sucha way as to bestow confidence on his contemporaries.
Literature is.also

subj~ct

to the ,SED's ideological,alert.

The

official view is that there is a ,close connection between literature and
art and political-ideological questions.

Therefore, literature,is

expected to share in responsibility for effecting a clear-cut
delimitation from imperialism.
to the Abgrenzung policy.

Hence, literature is placed in service

The SED believes ,that writers have an

obligation to support the Abgrenzung policy through
contributions.

the~r

literary

Failure to do this is generally considered the result

of inadequate knowledge of the basic problems of Marxism-Leninism.
Writers are to be subjected tO,the restrictions of ideology in,that
they are not

al~owed

to

d~viate

beyond ideologically-inspired guidelines.

Political the,mes are not an option,

b~t

a necessity in literature.

The

rule governing literary and artistic freedom is summarized in the
Marxist observation that even in the details of art "there iS,no
ideological

freedom~

Artistic problems are ideological problems, since

art is a form of ideology. ,,100

In assisting the writers, in fulfilling

their ideological obligations, literary critics are called upon to make
99 ND, June 10/11, 1973, p. 4.
100Ibid., July 6, 1973, p. 4.
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a more thorough analysis. 101 The lack of a literary history of the GDR
is viewe9 as a,serious shortcoming by the SED because it has given West
German~

a~d

an opportunity to offer the only broadly based criticisms

histories of East German literary efforts.
the ,East German

cu~tural

literary criticisms

According

toWester~

bureaucrats are ,concerned lest

b~ infecte~

the~r

reports,

own

by what is seen as a continuation of the

ideological ,struggle in thli', field of literary history.

East German

critics are being encouraged to conduct their own analyses in complete
independence ,of ,any West German contributions. 102
Few events illustrate the ,concern of the ,SED to stress the cultural
heritage of the GDR more than the commemoration of Beethoven's 200th,
birthday.

In addressing the ,Council of State on the occasion of the

beginning of, the cer-emonies in East Germany honoring Beethoven, Willi
Stoph set the ,tone when he declared that Beethoven's music
Radiates power impulses for the people who were
striving to throw off the shackles of feudalist-absolutist
oppression. In Beethoven's powerful music they found their
own ideas, sentiments ,and concepts of a better, a more human
world confirmed in a new and unique way.l03
Stoph claimed tha1; Beethoven hact finally found his
the GDR.

It is in

Ea~t Ge~any,

ideas have come to life.

according

~o

"tru~

homestead" in

him, where Beethoven's

The power of Beethoven's music was dramatically

101Ibid., January 31, 1973, p. 4.
102Der Tagesspiegel (West Berlin), December 20, 1973, p. 4.
103Beethoven Commemoration of the GDR (Dresden:
Bild, 1970), p. 8.
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illustrated, we ,are told, during World War, Two when it was "played ,in the
USSR during the ,days of Hitler's attacks on Russia.

In the same

s~nse,

Beethoven's "music is said to have inspired the ,building of, an
antifascist, democratic order in the GDR.

Today, the ideologies of

imperialism and anticommunism are being combated, not

on~y

in the

traditional ways, but also by making use of artistic means, such as
Beethoven's music.
bi~th

Stoph concluded that tl).e celebrations of, Be etho,v en 's

in the GDR have made it clear that his music is firmly rooted in

the hearts of East Germans, that it ,has found a firm place in the
intellectual and cultural life of , the country, and that, in reality,
Beethoven's music is more a part of the GDR's
of West GermanY's.104

cultur~l he~itage

than

In th,e same fashion, other cultural figures such

as Heinrich ,Heine are cited as having influenced the development of the
GDR.

His thoughts, in turn, are said to be embodied in the, East German
political and social systems. 105 Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, and Herder
are

desc~ibed

as ":representatives of the ,progressive bqurgeoisie who

worked for the liberation of man from the fetters of feudalism" in their
tim~.

beliefs and aspirations ,have been realized, we are told, in

Th~ir

the development of the "present-day reality of ,the German Democratic
'
Repub1 I.C.

•

•

• ,,106

Th e SED pre f ers to stress tha t I.'t draws on a 1ong

104 Ibid ., pp. 13-15.
lOSLutz Dietze and Vladimir Gorodnov, editors, Through the Eyes of
Friends (Dresden;, Verlag Zeit im BUd, 19~4), p. 33.
'
l06Herbert Arnt, Horst Dorrer e~ a1, Introd,ucing the GDR (Dresden:
Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1973), pp. 18-19.
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history of such progressive individuals as well as the one hundred year
history of the German 1abor.movement,in the development of its
traditions.

What transpired since 1945 is presented simply as the

cU.lmination of a. process which was

start~d

long ago.

Organized religion is another subject of considerable impartancein
East

Ge~many's

cultural policy.

Its importance stems from the fact that

not only does organized religion exert such influence as to make it an
important potential ally in the development of any society, but it also
represents a potential threat to the communist regime.

For the most

part, the SED's policy over the years has been to neutralize by any
means possible the influence which the ,churches might utilize to oppose
official policies.
negative terms.

Yet the approach has not been phrased completely in

It is possible to discern official efforts to.make the

church an ally of the
sounded a

relat~vely

.regi~e,

especially in recent years.

Albert Norden

positive note at the 13th Congress of.the GDR

Christian Democratic Union in Erfurt when he referred to the
contributions which the churches could make to the cause.of peace and
his listeners that some farsighted.Christians had grasped. the
dangers of imperialism even before the ,1917.revolution in Russia. 107

re~inded

However, the, despairing observation about the "social impotence" of GDR
Christians by Bishop Fraenkel of Goerlitz probably best

surnrn~rizes

the

actual position of East German churches today. lOS Other East German

I07Albert Norden, Active Partners for Mankind's Noblest Cause
(Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1972), pp. 5-6.

lO~Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 6, 1974, p. 2.
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church leaders have confirmed Bishop Fraenkel's view by the account they
give of the minority situation of Christians in the GDR.

Dr. Albrecht

Schoenherr of the Berlin Ecumenical Institute estimates that the
percentage of Christians in East Germany runs as low as 10 percent now
in many areas.

Even more indicative of the position of the churches in

his view is the fact that religious instruction and other church
functions are rapidly dwindling everywhere. I09 Such ceremonies as
church marriages and christenings are on the decline in East Germany,
as admitted even by East German publications. 110
Though Ulbrichtis policy toward the churches softened when he
undertook to transform the ,GDR into a permanent state, his successors
have formulated no specific policy

o~

approach toward the church.

Unlike Ulbricht, they have failed to maintain any significant contnct
with the churches.

The

n~st

conspicuous form of pressure against the

churches has consisted of discrimination against those associated
closely with it.

Young citizens who participate in the church are

denied admission to the secondary schools leading to higher education
and to universities.
teachers.

Christians are also denied the right to become

The occupational outlook in other professions for Christians

varies from district to district.

However, it is only in the educational

' d
.
'
eh'
sec t or t hat one f 1n
s '1ronc1a d ru 1es aga1nst
emp loy1ng
r1S t'1ans. III

l09Mitteilungsbiatt des Bundes der Evangelischen Kirchen in der
DDR, February 1, 1974, pp. 2-5. In Translations on Eastern Europe,
No. 884, April 17, 1974, pp. 56-57.
110Democratic German Report, Vol. XXI, No. 14, July 26, 1972. p. 119.
IllFrankfurter Allgemeine, October 27, 1973, p. 24.
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As for the ,church organizations themselves, they run into problems only
when they stray into subjects that are political in nature.
reflected in much of the

1iteratur~,

ed~cat~onal

Again, as

matters ,seem to be,

particularly sensitive and,the GDR press has responded,very.sharply to
statements by church officials ,deploring the "hate education" being
given to East German youths.

As Neue Zeit,

~he Christia~ Democra~ic

Union's official paper, observed,
Whoever ',today deplores a, "hate eQucat;ion" of youth, in our
schools, and thereby considers ,it necessary to criticize the
quite deliberate partisan feel and action toward,imperia~ism
and anticommunism inherent in our,youth, disqualifies himself
as a theologian. He opposes party engagement in the ,struggle
against exploitation ',' • and racism. ll2
The dispute over churcb boundaries and the partial

reso~ution

of

this, issue by the Vatican has been one of the ,most notab1,e episodes
invo1 ving the East, German Catholics and GDR officials.

Until 1973,

the jurisdiction of the bishops of Fulda, Wuerzurg, Paderhqrn,
Hi1desheim, and Osnabrueck extended into the GDR by vi~tue of the fact
that the GDR-FRG frontier cut through their,church districts.

As a

result, East ,German Catholics were under the church authority of bishops
who lived in the FRG.

In 1973 the ,Vatican appointed separate bishops

for the East German regions, but refused to designate the separation as
permanent.

Rather, it insisted that the final resolution would have tq
"

.

'

'I'

wait until later, after the ,possibilities of reunification of the
dioces~s

can be thoroughly examined.

by charging that ,the

Vatic~n

East German officials

respond~d

had yielded to "tbe notorious opponents.

112Neue Zeit, February 16, 1974, p. 9.
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of detente in the .FRG and in West Berlin.,,1l3 Meanwhile, the official
approach to the GDR Catholic Church consists largely of

appe~ls

to the

leadership of the Church to "use its means and possibilities to support
the peace efforts of the government of the. GDR.,,114 The SED is
concerned, of course, about establishing relations. with the
and,

ra~her

Va~ican

than destroy these.prospects, it prefers to attempt,to

co~x

Catholics into using their Church as a vehicle in the SED's construction
of a developed socialist ,society.
GDR Protestants have been subjected.to a policy which had as its
goal the delimitation of the Eastern Evangelical Church from its Western
counterpart.

The Evangelical Church of Germany (EKO) in the FRG is

accused of being integrated into the power structure of the Federal
Republic and of

b~ing

used as a tool of capitalism.

the GDR church leader Dean Dietrich Scheidung

Several years ago

a "resolute
separa~ion from the EKD" for the Protestant churc~es of the GDR. 115
dema~ded

By 1972, the separation was yirtually complete as the SED's

Abgre~zung

policy was applied to the Protestant church. llq Otherwise, while some
of the

restrictio~s

on church meetings, such as registration with the

People's Police for any meeting other thal) those on Sunday, have be.en
113Begegnung, September, 1973, pp. 4-6.
Europe, No. 814, November 21, 1973, p. 21.
114Neue Zeit, March 2, 197~, p. 3.

11SIbid~, February 28, 1969, pp. 1-2.
l16sWB , March 28, 1972, EE/395l/B/4.
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relaxed; the GDR officials have concentrated on limiting church
influence on young people.

Discrimination

aga~nstChristia~

youths,

while, varying in intensity from district to district, is being
continued. 11 7
East German Jews have,been the subject of less official concern.
Their small number--approximately 800 persons in the GDR belong to the
Jewish religiouscommunity--probab1y accounts for this.
a special state welfare as a

resu~t

of being

They receive
of

recognize~ victim~

fascism and they are allowed to publish their own newspaper. 1l8 Xet,
the SED apparently intends to keep its small Jewish population

isolat~d

from West German Jewry, as evidenced by its ban on the ,FRG Jewish
weekly, Allgemeine Judische Wochenzeitung.

Contacts with

foreign

oth~r

"h groups are l"k"
t encourage.
d 119
~ eW1se no,
J ew~s
Th~

official East German attitude toward organized religion was

probably best summarized by the statement that "the socialist state does
not

ne~d

the encouragement of the

churc~es

,,120 However, the SED

..

would clearly prefer to have any support that it might
this would further strengthen

~he

re~eive

since

internal situation in the ,GDR.

Church

assistance in achieving cultural goals and develqping a sense of national
identity could be most valuable.

Meanwhile, the official policy is

117Frankfurter A1l$emeine, June 5, 1974, p. 1.
118

Begegnung, Febr~ry, 1974, pp. 7-9.
Europe, No. 887, April 23, 1974, pp. 24-25.
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119Die Welt, August 14, 1973, p. 2.
120Begegnung; No.4: April, 1974, pp. 1-2.
Eastern Europe, No. 921, June 26, 1974, p. 16.
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directed toward isolating East German religious communities from those
in the West.and preventing the ,churches from developing independent
power bases from which they might challenge the regime.
tim~

At the same

it tries to enhance the prestige of the GDR by claiming the leader

of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther, as part of the ,historical
heritage of .East Germany.

On the occasion of the 450th anniversary of

the Reformation, the GDR Christian Democratic Union, speaking on.beha1f
of the regime, boasted of the "friendly cooperation" between Christians
and Marxists in the GDR and of the Marxist strains present. in the
teachings of Martin Luther. 12l
While the survey above indicates that the SED has enjoyed
considerable success in working toward the deve1opment.of a

natio~al

culture and a sense of national identity, contemporary literature,
indicates that a number of problems remain.
problems is clearly disturbing to the

The persistence of these

East·Ge~n

leadership. The

major problem areas are the inability to eliminate criminal behavior,
shortcomings in the training of youth, and the lack of thorough
ideological work.

Lack of success in

the~r

elimination obviously

hinders the nation building efforts of the SED.
The problem of criminality was discussed by GDR Prosecutor General,
Dr. Josef Streit, in a recent article in Neue Justiz.

While giving no

figures on the crime rate--such figures are never released now--Streit

12lSecretariat of the Christian Democratic Union, Gedenkstatten des
ganzen Volkes (Remembrance Places of All People) (Dresden: Verlag Zeit
im Bild, 1970), pp. 3-4.
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expressed displeasure with the development of crime prevention in the
GDR and indicated that crime had actually
~ncreasing

certain

incre~sed.

In the process of

the ,material prosperity of.East.Germany, Streit

cont~adiction

a~it~ed,

a

had arisen in. that the desire .of the individual

to satisfy his material needs "does not always coincide with a high
moral sense or with a high degree of awareness and of
toward the ,collective and society."

respons~bility

In order to correct this situation,

Streit called for greater efforts to explain the "political content of
the law."

In a more direct sense, the public prosecutor's office was

called upon to increase its supervision of society.

In short, he

explained, both educational and coercive measures must be increased if
socialist legality is to be safeguarded. 122 The failure to consolidate
socialist legality has also been reflected in a campaign by the People's
Police in 1974 to intensify its measures for the protection of the.GDR
economy.

This campaign was inspired by the frequency of destruction

andarson in industry, the building trade, agriculture, commerce and
transportation.

In addition, there had been a considerable increase
123
in thefts of socialist property.
The announcement of a campaign

against alcoholism in late 1974 was yet another indication of an
124
increase in East German social prob1ems.

122Neue Justiz, May 2, 1974, pp. 285-286. In Translations. on
Eastern Europe, No. 920, June 25, 1974, pp. 38-40.
123 IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), January 25, 1974, p. 2.
124 ND , Novemqer 14, 1974, p. 4.
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Shortcomings in the training of,GDR youth are evident in ,both,
educational and
o~ficials

attit~dina1

concerns.

Wester~

of the People's police are concerned

reports indicate that,
tha~

some young people

have "no firm socialist class viewpoint, no clear socialist ideology
and • . . demonstrate kinds of behavior which

con~radict

our socialist

mox:ality and ethics." Rowdy behavior and the ,imitation of W~stern
life-styles are· considered evidence of this problem. 125 Political
indifference among the ,Young Pioneers is yet another reflection of
shortcomings in this area.

The fact that few children come to meetings.

with political topics and many refuse to be ,active workers in the
, 26

organization is viewed as a serious,problem.-

There are also reports

that East German young people are not receiving a proper education in,
"socialist history."

The

factua~

knowledge of ,many young people is said

to be limited to a few particularly impressive events.

Therefore, they

do not understand the total historical picture and, as a result, this
"makes it hard for them to think thr()ugh historical processes
independently. ,,127
The lack of thorough ideological work affects several aspects of
East German society.

Party journals frequently note the need for

greater and more effective ideological undertakings in economic policy.

l25 1WE Ta2esdienst (West Berlin), April 22, 1974, pp. 1-2.
l26 1bid ., April 8, 1974, p. 1.
l27Rolf Doehring, "Unsere Jugend und die Anspruche an die
geschichts-ideologische Arbeit" ("Our Youth and the Claims on Historical
Ideological Work"), Einheit, No. 10, October, 1973, p. 1211.
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The'managerial cadre have

b~en

criticized because of the "too general

and ve,rbal economic propagandall and their, lack ,of qualification in
leading political-ideological discussions.

Furthermore, they have been,

scolded for failing to maintain a unity between ideological

educatio~

and training and th~ acquisition of-economic and specialized professional
knowledge. 128 The SED has also ,cited the ,military services for their
deficiencies in ideological work.

Cr~ticism

has been voiced in military

party circles of,the political behavior of SED members in

th~

are supposed to ensure that ideological tasks are fulfilled.

NVA who
The policy

of Abgrenzung has been accompanied by an intensification of the stress,
.\
placed on the political training of NVA officers. 129 Further failures
have been noted in the NVA relati,ng to discipline and order.

!fa more

"militant" atmosphere prevailed, according to,Volksarmee, these
deficiences could be overcome. 130
V.

NATION BUILDING AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GDR

Having reviewed East Germany's nation-building efforts, what may
one conclude that it means for the conduct of the GDR's foreign policy?
What is the impact generally and
West Berlin problem?

mor~

specifically in relation , to the

While all statements,make the importance of

l28Klaus Gaebler and Heinz Puder, "Wel tanscha).lung und Oekonomie"
("World View and Economy"), Einheit, No.6, June, 1973, pp. 701·704.
l29Dale Roy Herspring, East German Civil-Military Relations,
(New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 165-166.
130Volksarmee , No. 12, Marc~, 1973, p. 1.

.
"
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ideology very clear, it is not easy to determine ideological dictates
which apply directly to the ,West Berlin question, or, for
to most other foreign policy matters facing the ,GDR.

tha~

matter,

Yet, it is

possible to draw some conclusions from the above analysis of efforts
to mold and direct East German society.
The linkage group which makes the relationship between foreign and
domestic policies felt is, in this case, obviously the SEQ.

Th~

is charged

wi~h

andat

same time is one of .several parties that comprise an

th~

supervision of the domestic situation in East

party

Ge~ny

international system under the leadership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.

The SED receives input, one may reasonably assume, from

both the internal and the external environments.

Th~ exter~al

environment, of course, is dominated by the Soviet Union since the USSR
is clearly the dominant member of the bloc of communist party states.
The SED must consider the demands of both systems, the national system,
of the GDR and the international system of· the Soviet Bloc.
The SED has made its recognition of the relationship between its
foreign and domestic policies explicit in its pronouncements that the
international effectiveness of the GDR improves as the development of
East Germany as a socialist nation completely independent from the FRG
is enhanced. 13I

The SED's nation building efforts are thus viewed as

a complement to the GDR's foreign policy undertakings.

At the same

time, however, it always points out that what advances the international

131

Adam and Zapf, pp. 678-680.
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standing of the GDR also enhances the internal develQpment of East
Germany.

Therefore,

th~

relationship between foreign and domestic

policy flows in bQth directions.

Each aids

is one explicitly subordinated to the
Th~

th~

other.

At no point

.othe~.

primary link between the foreign and domestic ,policies, in

terms of creating needs and demands

tha~

have mutual consequences for

both, is the GDR's principal ally, the Soviet ,Union.
the Soviet

Un~on

The alliance with

requires the development of the East German society

along lines compatible with the USSR's internal characteristics.

It

also requires with equal force that the GDR conduct a foreign policy
supportive of the Soviet foreign policy.

Recent discussions about a

nuified, coordinated foreign policy for the Soviet Bloc illustrate this
particular need.
An additional . link of
policy of the SED.

partic~lar

importance is the Abgrenzung

It has both foreign and d9mestic aspects.

Its

foreign PQlicy aspects are seen in the SED's campa:i.gn of asserting
the unique character of the GDR in re+ation to the FRG.

Th.e physical

expression of this demarcation from West Germany.is the reinforcements
of the .GDR-FRG frontier and the work of the GDR-FRG frontier commission.
This aspect has also required the SED to strive to enlist the aid of its
allies in sUEPorting the East German demands on the Federal Republic,
especially those. relative to West Berlin.

The domestic aspect of the

Abgrenzung policy has been reflected in numerous ways, such as the
effort to enlist literature in the service of Abgrenzung.

The SE,D

has repeatedly issued calls for thecul tural and ideological demarcation
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of the GDR from West Germany.

An aim of, this policy has been to make it.

very clear that reunification with the. Federal Republic is completely
out.

Demarcation has been proceeding in every possible area which could

affect a union between the GDR and the ,FRG.

Such

~ctions

as the rupture

of the church organizations emphasize the effort to create a society in
the GDR totally different from that existing in the FRG.
proceeds, of course, the isolation of West
environment is solidified.

Be~lin

As this policy

from its physical

The absence of any hope for reunification

means that the West Berlin problem will persist until some other
solution is found

a~d

no other one offers such a comfortable prospect

for West Berlin.
While there is no evidence of a demand for a hostile military
confrontation with West Germany or West Berlin--there is a total absence
of

statem~nts

of the necessity of·armed conflict--an ideological struggle

has been declared by the SED to be in progress as a.direct consequence
of the foreign policy situation existing between socialism and
capitalism.

Events in the FRG and West Berlin will be viewed and

evaluated in ideological terms.

Weaknesses and problems will be focused

upon as evidence of the decline of capitalism and the emergence of
socialism as the dominant world system.
Yet, military improvements in the GDR, new civil defense programs,
and the emphasis on the military class mission of youth demonstrate the
desire to be ready for military confrontation.

The

eff~ct

of

the~e

policies is to make any future East German military threats more
credible.

Such an increase in the credibility of those threats might
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add to their likelihood.

If that happened, the positiot;l of West Berlin

might worsen considerably since.it could easily become the subject of
more frequent East German demands.
Talk of psychological war against the GDR alleged to be emana.ting
from West Germany and West Berlin shows the willingness of the East
Germans to initiate a crisis if proper circumstances exist.

Principal

among those circumstances, of course, would be the consent of .the USSR.
The prospect for a psychological .victory for East

Ge~ny

the prospects for a crisis in view of. the persistent
success and thereby the superiority of their system.

ne~d

would increase
to demonstrate

This l'iould

certainly help fulfill an important ideological mission for the SED
which has stressed the importance of ideological work in domestic
affairs.

Again one sees the ease with which West Berlin's problems

could.be exploited.
By placing its concept of the nation under the rubric of proletarian
internationalism, the GDR is binding itself ever more closely to the
Soviet Union and its allies.

While widening the ,gulf between East and

West Germany this also limits the freedom and independence of the SED
in foreign affairs.

The effort to .develop asocial in the GDR

whi~h

is compatible with t!l:at of the East European communist party states is
likely to continue to be reflected in a foreign policy mirroring those
of its allies.

Ideology, of course, does not remove the need for

Western, especially West

Ge~an,

other members of the Soviet Bloc.

technology in both the .GDR and the
The GDR shares this need and, as

Peter C. Ludz has observed, does not object to a special relationship
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existing between itself and the FRG in terms of economic cooperation. 132
Accordingly, East

Ge~n

freedom of action is limited ,and the prospects

for pressure directed against West Berlin are decreased

a~

a result of

this factor.
In spite of all that has been done, the GDR still has not completely
realized its objectives in social development.

Stress is repeatedly on

the ,fact that the SED is presently building a developed socialist
society.

The assertion that such a society has already been constructed

is not made.

Therefore, one can conclude that the ideal of complete

identity with the ,GDR among the population, the total sense of socialist
patriotism, has yet to be achieved.

Therefore, in the absence of ,a

total devotion to the GDR as an entity, tension is still ne,eded to
compensate for an incomplete national consciousness.

West Berlin, whose

extended position means that it is always vulnel'able, provides the most
convenient opportunity for creating tension that might provide, if only
temporarily or occasionally, a degree of unity among an East
population believing itself threatened.

Ge~man

Continued official reminders

that a psychological war is being waged against the GDR from the
territory of West Berlin is only one step from an

assertio~

that

imperialism is planning a military adventure against the GDR on West
Berlin's territory.

Accordingly, social needs perceived by the SED

may well be reflected in confrontations with the West over the issue
of West Berlin.

In this respect, the ,West Berlin problem will continue

l32Frankfurter Allgemeine, October 3, 1974, p. 10.
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to be a vivid illustration of the

re~ationship

domestic needs and its foreign policy.

between the SED's

CHAPTER V
THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE GDR'S WEST BERLIN POLICY:
THE GDR AS A JUNIOR ALLY OR A SATELLITE?
In an effort. to more closely evaluate the ,extent of independence
enjoyed by the German Democratic Republic in the formation of its foreign
policy, this chapter will examine the public attitude of the Soviet
Union, as expressed in major party and state publications, toward the
West Berlin problem.

Obviously, it is

impossibl~

to determine exactly

what the USSR's role is in such matters because of the relatively closed
nature of both the Soviet and the East German policymaking process.
One cannot and should not rule out the possibility of considerable
behind-the~scenes

pressure by the USSR and maneuvering by the GDR.

Nor

can one determine precisely the manner in which the participants relate
to each other.

While certain assumptions are possible under normal

circumstances, it is only during times of major public ruptures in the
Communist alliance system that we learn more than what is indicated in
speeches, communiques, and newspapers.

Such public disputes are rare

and the East German-Soviet relationship has been
them.

punctua~ed

by none of

Therefore, we must rely on public communications in order to make

an evaluation of what the .USSR has sought with regard to the.East German
policy on West Berlin.
Up to this point, the West Berlin issue has been examined in terms
of its handling during the last years of the Ulbricht regime and the
208
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first of the Honecker period., East German nation-building policy has
been reviewed in order to evaluate the possible impact of domestic
affairs on the. SED's foreign policy.

This chapter will endeavor to

consider Soviet desires relative to the West Berlin issue, as well as
related concerns, and, hopefully, in this manner permit a more.direct
analysis of the evolution of the GDR's status from satellite to junior
ally of the Soviet Union.
I.

SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS DURING ULBRICHT'S LAST YEARS

The conception of East Germany as something more than a totally
subservient satellite of the USSR has been gaining since the mid-1960's.
In 1966, I1se Spittmann wrote of the changed relationship between the
GDR and the USSR and commented that the "SED is no longer a vassal but
. a J01nt
"
a par t ner ~n
venture. ,,1

This belief continued to grow up until

the time of Ulbricht's removal as First Secretary in 1971.

In evaluating

Ulbricht's achievements, Melvin Croan declared shortly after his removal
that developments clearly and uncontroverted1y demonstrated the degree
to which the former First Secretary had "outgrown his erstwhile status
of Soviet viceroy in Germany.,,2
The process which led to this situation is a long and involved one
which cannot be separated from events of the Soviet Union's foreign and
domestic policies.

Ulbricht benefited from developments affecting

1I1se Spittmann, "Soviet Union and DDR," Survey, No. 61, Fall, 1966,
p. 165.

2Me1 vin Croan, "After Ulbricht:
No. 79, Spring, 1971, p. 78.

The End of an Era?", Ibid.,
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primarily and most directly the USSR, but ultimately was sacrified in
order ,to help meet the requirements of Soviet policy.

One of the first

events aiding the creation of a more independent GDR, if only in terms
of subsequent East German rhetoric, was the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964
which, according to lIse Spittmann,
its own successes.

e~ab1ed

the GDR to take credit for

While, in her analysis, the East

Ge~man

reaction to

the fall of Khrushchev was ambiguous, it did demonstrate an awareness of
the absence of a unified leadership in the Kremlin. 3 Accordingly, the
fall of Khrushchev is said to mark a turning point in the ,relationship
between the GDR and the USSR.
German-Soviet

deten~e

Khrushchev's ,efforts tq effect a West

with the exclusion of the GDR undoubtedly

contributed to the East German desire to adopt an attitude of greater
independence.

Likewise, the statements by Khrushchev's son-in-law,

Adzhubey, while visiting in the West that Ulbricht was suffering from
cancer and would not live long would not haye endeared the Khrushchey
regime to Ulbricht. 4 After Khrushchev's removal, Ulbricht publicly
criticised the Soviet Union for its shortcomings in agricultural policy
5
For
and chided the USSR for not correcting these mistakes ear1ier.
the remainder of the decade, Ulbricht persisted in his boasts of the
independent accomplishments of the SED.

Even on the occasion of the

3Spittmann, p. 171.
4Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York:
p. 389.
5

ND.)

Neues Deutschland, November 5, 1964, p. 1.

Viking Press, 1967),
(Hereafter noted as
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International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969, as
Ulbricht was calling for greater unity wi,thin the ,Bloc, he also reminded
his listeners.that socialism has been.built in the GDR due.to the
creative applications of Marxism-Leninism to "the concrei:e conditions
of our.country" by the SED itself.
CPSU was

The value

o~

the .alliance with the

only briefly and secondarily in Ulbricht's report on
develqpments in theGDR. 6
men~ioned

An additional important development which facilitated the evolution
of the GDR from satellite toa junior ally was the initiation of the new
economic system, planning for which had begun in June, 1963. 7 With the
GDR-USSR Treaty of Friendship of 1964 the SED had the needed reassurance
that the USSR, while supporting the SED's economic reforms, was also as
committed as ever to the defense of East

Ge~many.

8

The prestige that

East Germany enjoyed in economic affairs clearly added to the influence
of the GDR with the Soviet Union as well as other members of
alliance system.

~he

Soviet

The importance of the GDR economy to the Soviet Union

could be seen by the sharp increase in Soviet imports from East Germany
after 1965.

By 1971 this trade had increased by 47 percent ov~r the
1965 figures. 9 The sophisticated nature of East German products and

Pe~ce

6International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (Prague:
and Socialism Publishers; 1969), pp. 224-226.

7Otto Reinhold, editor, Seht, welche Kraft I (See, What Strength)
(Berlin, GDR:. Dietz Verlag, 1971), p. 170.
8 Ibid ., p. 172.
9Statistical Pocket Book of theGDR, 1973 (Berlin, GDR:.
Staatsverlag, 1973), p. 91.
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the reputation that they enjoyed in the .Westadded further to the status
of the GDR within the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance.

As the need for commodities of this sort increased in the

USSR and elsewhere. in Eastern Europe,

Ulbri~ht

had reason to take

considerable pride in the accomplishments of the SED.

The growing

popularity of the annual Leipzig Trade Fair gave further testimony each
year to the wisdom of the SED's economic programs.

At the same time,

Ulbricht undoubtedly felt that his political stature must also benefit
from his economic

achievem~nts.

With the modification of the West German Ostpolitik by the Erhard
government, the spectre of East European
grew in the .late 1960's.

d~fections

It is reasonable to assume that the .stock of

Ulbricht, who was continuing to stress his
during this time.
Fede~~l

from Soviet tutelage

l~yalty

to the Kremlin, rose

The entry by Rumania into formal relations with the

Republic in 1967 demonstrated the potency of the West German

Ostpolitik as practiced by Erhard's successor, Kiesinger, and presented
the FRG as a potential threat to the hegemony of the USSR in Eastern
Europe.

While the FRG has been pursuing a more conciliatory policy

toward East Europe for several years, it had achieved no significant
successes until 1967.

Simultaneous disruptions of the ,alliance by

pro-Chinese Albania further underscored the need for some new basis
for unity in the Soviet alliance.

In response to this need, the Soviet

Union abandoned proposals for an all-European security conference and
began a strident anti-German campaign in order to, as Melvin Croan.has
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observed, "arrest fissiparous tendencies in Eastern Europe." 10 The
congruity between the Soviet and East German attitudes on this point
was remarkable.

Both Brezhnev and Ulbricht, speaking at the

International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969
heaped scorn upon those "right wing Social Democratic leaders" who
were attempting to disrupt the unity of the international communist
movement. 11

The Kremlin's concern for preservation of its authority

in Eastern Europe prompted it to attack West Germany and Red China,
while the East Germans' fears of isolation as well as its everpresent
need for tension inspired the SED to also pursue an intensified
anti-West German campaign.

Regardless of divergences in their

motivations, both the USSR and the GDR shared a common purpose at
the time of the Czechoslovakian developments in 1968.
The year of the Czechoslovakian intervention is especially
important in tracing the evolution of the GDR's status.

While estimates

of Ulbricht's influence in persuading the USSR to launch the invasion
vary, few would deny that it was the GDR which spearheaded the press
campaign against Dubcek's "revisionism."

The SED press and East German

officials were the first to raise alarm at Czech experiments, pointing
not only to the extreme dangers of revisionism but also to the ,
subversive influence of West Germany.

Early in the spring, the SED's

Kurt Hager referred in ominous tones to the FRG's interest in Czech
10

Croan, p. 79.

llInternational Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties,
pp. 164 and 222.
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developments and to Bonn's efforts to "soften up the socialist countries
from within.,,12

Neues Deutschland editorialized the SED's warnings that

all of the socialist states would suffer as a resuit of the
Czec;hoslovakian experiments. l3 The intolerance and aggressiveness of
the East German press surpa.ssed that of the Soviet Union and its other
allies long before the August invasion.

In the aftermath of the

invasion, numerous observers expressed the ,belief that the action meant
that

Ulbr~cht's

influence in the Kremlin had been a major factor and

that a "fusion" had taken place in which the Soviet and
"imperialism" were united for the first time. l4

East,Ge~an,

Whether the invasion was, in fact, undertaken due to Ulbricht's
influence or not, it did mark a victory for the SED's First Secretary.
The fact,that the USSR responded according to his publicly stated wishes
certainly gave him the appearance of enjoying the special confidence of
the Soviet leaders in Bloc questions.

It also underscored most

dramatically the importance of the conception of the West German menace
in East Europe, a ,conception which Ulbricht had preached for years.
Ulbricht began to speak more frequently of the special role being played
by the GDR in the Soviet alliance and even cited the East German
experience as a model which could be followed by other states wishing

12BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 29, 1968, EE/2733/Cl/7.
(Hereafter noted as SWB.)
13ND , May 12, 1968, p. 1.

14Francois Fejto, "Moscow and Its Allies," Problems of Connnunism,
Vol. XVII, No.6, 1968, p. 37.
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to achieve economic efficiency and political stability. 15 Ulbricht
emphasized his "special relationship" with tqe USSR in a number of ways.
Most significant was his willingness to make independent proposals
regarding matters of European security, such as agreements on the
reunification of force .16 Ulbricht's long lectures on "the secret
of our success" in the GDR provided another indication of how he saw
himself in the Bloc.

He would repeatedly speak at length on how a

nation could develop itself. in working for victory over capitalism.
how it could achieve a developed socialist society, and the techniques
to be used in improving labor productivity.

At the same time, it has

proceeded to give advice to nations of the Third World, particularly
the Arab nations.

To them and to the rest of the world, it has also

offered the benefits of the technology developed by the GDR.

Ulbricht

pointed to East Germany's unique "socialist architecture" as evidence
of the many technological advances made in the GDR. 17 In sum, even if
Ulbricht did not enjoy a special relationship with the Soviet Union, he
certainly behaved as though he felt himself to be very much a special
individual.
Soviet actions in 1969 should have convinced Ulbricht that he did
not, in fact, enjoy a special relationship with the .Kremlin.

Event;s

very quickly indicated that Ulbricht lacked the stature that enabled
15

ND, October 25, 1968, p. 1.

16Ibid ., January I, 1968, p. 3.
l7 Ibid ., June II, 1969, pp. 1-2.
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him to veto Sqviet policy when he desired to do so.

The negative tone

assumed by the USSR toward West Germany prior to the Czech invasion was
quickly replaced by a.renewal of efforts to achieve a relaxation of
tensions between the ,two states in 1969.

In the summer of that year the.

Soviet government .called for steps to ease the West Berlin situation
while minimizing the crisis which had arisen in February and March over
the use of West Berlin for a session of the FRG Bundestag.

The immediate

result was agreement on an exchange of views by representatives of the
Four Powers in Berlin which commenced in March, 1970. 18 After the,
Bundestag elections in September, 1969, the Soviet Union formally
recognized that changes had taken place in West Germany's political
situation by tendering a proposal on talks on the renunciation of force
with Bonn.

The talks ,began before the end of 1969 and were concluded

on August 12, 1970 with the signing of the Soviet-West German treaty
on the renunciation of force. 19
However, Ulbricht refused to yield to the USSR's obvious calls for
a reversal of the rigid policy toward the FRG still being followed. by the
GDR.

While Soviet accounts simply spoke of the ,necessity of goodwill on

the part of the West Berlin authorities for improving the West Berlin
situation, Ulbricht maintained a series of demands as a prerequisite
for alleviation of the situation.

While the USSR called for "the,

establishment of equal international relations"

betwe~n

the GDR and

l8B. Ponamaryov, Historr of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1970
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 540.
19 Ibid ., p. 541.
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the FRG as a prerequisite for an improvement in the larger "German
problem.,,20 Ulbricht maintained a ,much harsher approach.

He continued

to demand full diplomatic recognition as the price for improving
relations and added an

additio~al

demand in January, 1970, when he

insisted that Bonn would have to withdraw from NATO if it seriously
wanted an improvement. 2l The fact that the Stoph-Brandt talks in March
and May were set against the background of a consistently hostile East
German tone toward the FRG indicated that Ulbricht, in spite of Soviet
wishes to the contrary, was still essentially opposed to detente.
In this manner, Ulbricht was succeeding in isolating the ,GDR from
its own allies, the very thing he had feared that the FRG would
accomplish.

Evidence of this was seen at the Warsaw Pact Political

Consultative Committee meeting in Moscow in December, 1969.

The

communique of that meeting called for bilateral negotiations with West
Germany without pledging to work for diplomatic recognition of the GDR
by the Bonn government, an obvious departure from Ulb~icht's formula. 22
Ulbricht's defiance was exemplified by charges that NATO and the FRG
were "as aggressive as ever" and that the policies of the West had not
changed at all. 23 This approach served to underscore the extent of his

20 Ibid ., pp. 539-542.
21 ND , January 20, 1970, p. 3.
22Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 20, No. 44, December 28,
1969, p. 21. (Hereafter noted as CDSP.)
23 ND , December 12, 1969, p. 1.
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self-imposed alienation from the USSR and his other allies.
supposed

It might be

the realization of this was dawning on Ulbricht when he

tha~

consented to the Stoph-Brandt meetings early in 1970.

The fact that he

agreed to the meetings in spite of his openly critical attitude of
detente indicates that the degree of Soviet pressure must have been
considerable.
capitul~tion

Yet, Ulbricht's independence was such that complete
was impossible.

The remainder of Ulbricht's tenure saw a pattern of alternating
defiance of the Kremlin on the one hand and acquiesence to Soviet wishes
on the other.

It might be argued that he .would resist until he felt

that the Kremlin was losing patience and then would make some effort
to show that he was willing to cooperate with the Soviet policy.

His

speech to the Central Committee following the Stoph-Brandt meetings
illustrates this.

At this time Ulbricht dropped the demand for

diplomatic recognition by the FRG, a significant departure from previous
statements. 24 He continued his more moderate tone the following month
at the 13th Workers' Conference of the .Baltic Sea Countries in Rostock
when he asserted that: "a certain measure of recognition of realities."
was apparent in the new Brandt government.

Just six months earlier he

had been arguing that there had been no change at all in the nature of
imperialism and had included West Germany as one of the ,major
imperialists.

While his praise at Rostock was also coupled with a

denunciation of "right-wing" and "neo-fascist" tendencies in the FRG,

24 Ibid ., June 16, 1970, pp. 1-2.
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his only demands were that Bonn ratify a treaty with the, USSR on
renunciation of force and that the .GDR be regarded by the FRG "as a
subject in

internatio~al

law." He stopped short of a demand for

diplomatic recognition by simply stressing the GDR's demand for "what
the Federal Republic itself practices and demands in its own relations
with other countries.,,25
While the conclusion of the Moscow-Bonn treaty in August, 1970 was
greeted by the GDR as a favorable development, there are indications
that it failed to achieve what the SED hoped for.

The fact that the

treaty did not elicit guara1)tees. from the ,FRG on those issues of central
concern to the SED meant

tha~

bargaining position at all.

it had not altered the East German
The .USSR made no demands for a settlement

of unresolved issues of the German question, so the SED was forced to
read into the treaty those points which it had sought.

While the

negotiations on the treaty brought a pledge from West Germany to agree
to an upgrading of the GDR's international status through its admission
to the United Nations and other international organizations, it was
clear

tha~

the FRG meant this only as a reward for a favorable East

German response to West German initiatives for alleviating the.
inter-German situation, including the Berlin situation.

In short, the

West Germans were offering as a reward what Ulbricht regarded as a
. h t. 26
r1g

2S Ibid ., July 17, 1970, p. 1.

26E. H. Albert, "Bonn's Moscow Treaty and Its Implications,"
International Affairs (London), April, 1971, pp. 319-323.
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The SED made up for
its own more favorable

the~e

t~rms.

shortcomings by analyzing the ,treaty in
The statement by the GDR Council of

Ministers issued two days after the ,conclusion of the treaty gave the
SED an opportunity to air its own interpretation of the treaty.

"The

heart of the treaty," according to the statement, "h the recognition
of the terr:itorial status quo in Europe . • • • "

The border

betwe~n

the

GDR and the FRG was mentioned as one of the most important aspects of
the results of the ,Second World War affected by the treaty.

The

statement continued this theme by declaring,
Th~ treaty between the USSR and the FRG stipulates in a
form binding in international law the inviolability of the
state border between the FRG and ,the GDR and the ,unlimited
respect for the territorial integrity also of the ,GDR. With
that, the normalization of relations between 'the GDR and the
FRG on a basis of equality has become a task the solution of
which is now in the ,realm of possibility.27

The statement, went on to assert that, for these reasons, it was now
"necessary to establish normal diplomatic relations"
and the FRG.

betwe~n

the GDR

It also argued that now there was no longer any reason

for any third state to continue to avoid establishing diplomatic
relations with the GDR or for the GDR to be denied admission to any
international organization.
The failure of the Soviet press to repeat the complete text of the.
East

Ge~~an

statement, thus failing to air what amounted to a renewal

of old demands by Ulbricht, indicated that the GDR was once again
isolating itself from its allies and pursuing a policy counter to the

27 ND , August 15, 1970, p. 1.
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wishes of the USSR.

The commuliique of the Warsaw Pact summit meeting

later in August gave further credence to,the assertion that the GDR was
once more out of step.

It spoke of the overall concerns for achievement

of detente in Europe and the convening of a security conference, but
made no mention at all of the East German demands issued in the statemept
on ,the treaty.28 The continuation of the Four. Power talks on Berlin
raised the further possibility of another Soviet "betrayal" of East
German interests.

By this time, there was a strong possibility that the

USSR might agree to a statement affirming the continuation of at least
some sort of ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

Repeated

warning appeared in the GDR press about the creation by Bonn politicians
of a "West Berlin myth" which would deny that all of Berlin was part of
East Germany. 29 These warnings illustrated the SED's fears but
apparently had no effect on the Soviet negotiators who were in the
process of doing exactly what Ulbricht

wa~

attempting to prevent.

Robert Bleimann has posited the ,existence of two factions in the
SED Politburo at this time, divided according to their orientations
toward Soviet pressure on the GDR.

The central issue in this dispute

was, according to Bleimann, how to upgrade the international position
of the GDR.

Honecker, Verner, and.Stoph are said to have favored the

Soviet position that recognition of ,the GDR would be achieved only by
supporting the process of normalization sought by the .USSR.
28CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 36, October 6, 1970, p. 10.
29Berliner Zeitung, March 25, 1970, p. 3.
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in turn, would protect the sovereign rights of the GDR.

This faction
also favored the forging of closer ties with the Soviet Union. 30 Walter
Ulbrich~

is described as the leader of the other faction which took a

more skeptical view of the USSR's guarantee.

Bleimann explains that,

Ulbricht resented the revision in the ,Warsaw Pact's demands in which
the GDR's needs.had been given a lower priority.3l

Ulbricht expressed

this resentment in the fall of 1970 by publicly criticizing the USSR
for alleged shortcomings in the area of "joint consultation" betwe~n
the East European states 32 and by failing to appear at the 10th Congress
of the Hungarian Communist Party which was, as is the usual practice,
33
attended b~ all major communist leaders.
Bleimann hypothe~izes tha~
the 10th Hungarian Congress was to have been an informal ,meeting of the.
heads of the East European communist states to examine the detente
policy of the Soviet Bloc.

Ulbricht's ,absence is thus interpreted as
an expression of his disapproval of detente. 34
Brezhnev's speech to the Hungarian Congress demonstrates the
Soviet Union's efforts to refuse to allow Ulbricht to exercise a veto
over detente.

Responding to Ulbricht's fears of a Soviet "sellout" of

East German interests, Brezhnev argued that the Moscow-Bonn treaty and

30Robert Bleimann, "Ostpolitik and the GDR," Survey, Vol. 18,
No.3, Summer, 1972, p. 4Z.
3l lbid ., p. 44.
32

ND, November 15, 1970, p. 3.

33 Ibid ., November 22, 1970, p. 1.
34 Bl eimann, p. 45.
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the Polish-FRG treaty were "based on a-clear recognition of.the actual
state of ,affairs in Europe . . • . "

Accordingly, he insisted, the

treaties create "good preconditions" for improving detente while at the
same time safeguarding "the legitimate interests of the German Democratic
Republic . . • • ,,35

The same theme was stressed in a Pravda editorial

earlier which had attacked the Red Chinese for charging that the
Moscow-Bonn treaty was a betrayal of the interests of the GDR.

Pravda

charged the Red Chinese with seeking to aid the ,"neo-fascists" in the
FRG. 36 These statements clearly show that the USSR was aware of
Ulbricht's reluctance to support Soviet policy and was making efforts
to overcome that opposition.

Brezhnev continued to apply pressure in

his speech at the Armenian Jubilee on November 30, 1970.

In his speech

he linked a settlement of the West Berlin problem with an improvement
in detente for all of Europe.

Brezhnev declared that the USSR believed

normalization of the West Berlin situation was possible and that all
such a normalization required was, not the acceptance of Ulbricht's
demands, but simply that the
. . . Interested patties display goodwill and work out
decisions that will meet the wishes of the West Berlin
population and will take into account the legitimate interests
and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic. 37

35CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 47, December 22, 1970, p. 6.
36 Ibid . , Vol. 22, No. 38, October 20, 1970, p. 8.
37 Ibid., Vol. 22, No. 48, December 29, 1970, p. 4.
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The meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in
Berlin in the ,first week of December served as an additional warning
to ,the GDR that Ulbricht's intransigence would not be allowed to disrupt
Soviet policy.

The communique of the meeting, while expressing support

for the "peace-loving policy" of the GDR and stating that "without the
participation of the ,GDR it is impossible to build the edifice of
lasting peace in this area," went on to
views on all major issues.

r~affirm

the Soviet Union's

Ignoring Ulbricht's demands for the

fulfillment of additional prerequisites by the ,FRG prior to the further
advancement of detente in Europe, the ,communique asserted that
"sufficient preconditions had been created" and that the ,process of
"
norma 1 lzatlon
cou ld now con t'lnue. 38

In his speech at the 14th session of ,the Central Committee of the,
.

,

SED the following week, Ulbricht issued a further challenge to the USSR,
clearly demonstrating his unwillingness to yield ,to Soviet pressures.
First, he emphasized that the WTO,Po1iticai Consultative Committee
meeting had declared its "solidarity" with the policy of the GDR and,
in so

doi~g,

placed considerably more stress on that endorsement than

the three sentences in the communique would seem to have justified.
The diplomatic

recognitio~

of the GDR by the FRG was described as a

"vital requirement of the times," as Ulbricht quoted very selectively
from the communique.

He continued by denigrating the concessions,made

by Bonn, declaring that "nobody • • • pays anybody anything • • . if a

38 Ibid ., Vol. 22, No. 49, January S, 1971, pp. 2-3.
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state aQandons in whole or in part positions that have always b.een
unrealistic or illegitimate."

In discussing the West Berlin problem,

Ulbricht spoke, of a settlement

tak~ng

the population of
had.

We~t

into

c~nsideration

the "needs of

Berlin" rather than the "wishes" as Brezhnev

He then proceeded to specify the'needs of West Berlin's population

as he saw them, stressing the ,need ,for an end to "illegal state
intervention" by Bonn in West Berlin's affairs.

He concluded with his

most significant challenge, an offer to enter into talks with the FRG
to settle those very questions being discussed at that time by the
Soviet Union and the major Western powers in Berlin.
that once the GDR and

t~e

Ulbricht implied

FRG succeeded in working out maj,or problems,

such as transit from the FRG to West Berlin, the need for the USSR and
the other powers in Berlin to negotiate a settlement would be eliminated.
In effect, Ulbricht was replacing the competence of the USSR for the,
Berlin question with that of the GDR. 39 Meanwhile, Paul Verner's report
to the Central Committee stressed the leading role of.the USSR in
resolving the major issues between the GDR, the FRG, and West Berlin,
clearly illustrating the rift in the Politburo spoken of by Robert
Bleimann.

Verner made no reference to those points made by Ulbricht

in his speech nor did he discuss any major independent
the GDR on international questions. 40
A pattern of pressure and counterpressure

betwe~n

Ulbricht emerges from an analysis of events since 1968.
39 ND, December 10, 1970, pp. 1-2.
40 Ibid ., p. 3.

initia~ive

by

the USSR and
The influence
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of Walter Ulbricht seemed to reach a zenith with the Czech invasion of
1968.

It might be supposed that,as a result the ,SED's First

Se~retary

developed an overconfident attitude regarding his importance to the
Soviet Union and the Bloc.

In the three years ,that followed the Czech

invasion, Ulbricht attempted to exercise a veto over major Soviet policy
decisions affecting Germany and, consequently, demonstrated that he ,
could be a rather awkward ally for the USSR.

Apparently, the man who

had headed what was once the USSR's most subservient satellite was
endeavoring to assume an independent position within
in certain policy areas.

~he

Bloc, at least

In attempting to analyze this development, one

West German observer of GDR affairs, Peter Jochen Winters, speculated
that, in fact, Ulbricht was and "remained a German nationalist to the
end of ,his days."

According to Winters, Ulbricht, as a German

nationalist, "did his best to keep his distance from the Soviet Union
and tried to preserve for the GDR at least a modicum of independence.,,4l
Whether the Winters analysis is accurate or not, the GDR had evolved
from sa te11 i te, to junior ally, and then, in the ,Ulbricht formulation, ,
to equal partn'er of the USSR.

While these developments followed a,

period in which the Soviet Union was apparently loosening its rigid
control over the East European nations,42 the GDR had clearly tried
to achieve more than the USSR could tolerate.

This was also more than

Ulbricht could survive when he lost the flexibility that had previously

41Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 30, 1974, p. 10.
42Zbigniew Brzezinski, The ,Soviet Bloc (Cambridge:
University Press, 1967), pp. 433-434.
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enabled him to almost unerringly anticipate shifts in Kremlin policy and
immediately accommodate the GDR's positions to those of the USSR.

By

contrast, Honecker demonstrated that he possessed the flexibility that
made him valuable to the Kremlin.

While Honecker's early statements led

many to assume that he was among those resisting detente--for example,
his apparent opposition to

East-W~st

German rapprochement in early

197043 --by the time the USSR's determination became obvious, Honecker
had become a part of the faction in the SED Politburo supporting the
Soviet position.

By the fall of 1970, Honecker had become especially

vocal in his support for an East German policy of even closer ties with
the Soviet Union. 44 In addition, Honecker had also been on record
previously for his

enthusi~stic

support of the Soviet positions on Red

China and had been noted for his frequent attacks on the ,Chinese
leadership, attacks which were much more numerous than those of the
more reluctant U1bricht. 45 Seen in the light of the USSR's concern
for maintaining the GDR as a cooperative, responsive ally, Honecker's
selection to replace Ulbricht appears to be a highly logical decision
on the part of the Soviet Union.

43

ND, February 22, 1970, p. 3.

44 Ibid ., October 24, 1970, p. 4.
45Heinz Lippmann, Honecker and the New Politics of Euro e
(New York: Macmi11~an Company, 1972 , pp. 207-208.
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II.

SOVIET INFLUENCE SINCE 1971

Soviet influence on East German foreign policy since.the promotion
of Erich Honecker has apparently been much stronger.
has been characterized by a return to

t~e

The Honecker period

previous East

of quick responsiveness to Soviet suggestions.

Ge~man

attitude
tim~

This has been.a

in

which the reliability of the SED as a partner of the Communist Party of
the Soviet

Un~on

has increased considerably.

The Soviet Union's expectatj,ons were spelled out \'1i th some
specificity on a variety of occasions.

The main Soviet theme was

sounded in an article in World Marxist Review which has been quoted
extensively by· various East German publications.

The author, CPSU

Central Committee Secretary Konstantin Katushev, stressed the necessity
of unity for socialist victories in international affairs today.

He

begins by citing evidence of a change in the international situation
"in favor of detente and the peaceful coexistence of states with
different social systems."

This change, he insists, did not come about

because of any alterations of the nature of imperialism, but because of
the "coordinated foreign policy of the socialist countries . . . . "
Unity under the leadership of the CPSU is described as an absolute
necessity for the victories being enjoyed for socialism.

The Soviet

Union, Katushev writes, has a "special responsibility" by virtue ·of its
position as the biggest and most powerful of the socialist countries.
Accordingly, all actions must be .taken in unison with theUSSR.

46

46Konstantin Katushev, '~oward Closer Unity of the Socialist
World," World Marxist Review, Vol. 16, No.8, August, 1973, pp. 4-5.
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Brezhnev made.a similar point in his speech at the 8th SED Congress in
June, 1971, just one month after Ulbricht's removal.

According to

Brezhnev, the greater the unity of the socialist states,
The more stable will the foundations of universal
peace and security be and the more firmly will the peoples
advance towards freedom and independence. . . . We consider
it our duty to do everything we can to strengthen this
alliance. 47
The Soviet First Secretary also noted that CPSU foreign policy programs
were enjoying the active support of the Central Committee of the SED and
declared that his was simply

furthe~

striking proof of the unity of the

foreign policy aims of the Warsaw Treaty s,\:ates.

Report~

of Brezhnev's

speech to the Congress indicate that each of the statements stressing
some aspect of Eastern unity was met with either "stormy,

prolo~ged

applause" or at least "prolonged applause." These personal reactions
themselves, assuming the accuracy of the newspaper accounts, testify to
the East Germans' sensitivity to the Soviet leader's message.

His

emphatic assurances that the negotiations on West Berlin were being
conducted with "due considera.tion for the lawful interests and sovereign,
rights of the GDR" also indicate the CBSU's awareness of East German
fears that the Soviet Union might not fully protect the ,GDR's concerns
in the talks. 48 By linking this reassurance with calls for greater
unity, Brezhnev clearly intended to express the USSR's view that no
independent actions on the part of the ,SED were necessary to advance
theGDR's interests on the Berlin question.

47 ND , June 16, 1971, pp. 1-2.
48 Ibid ., pp. 2-3.
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The Soviet

conceptio~

of the increased necessity for unity on

foreign policy questions was coupled with an ideological justification.
A Soviet authority wrote in 1971 ,that the "nature of the epoch" was
determining changes in international relations in such a fashion that
th~

need for coordination was now greater

tha~

ever.

Increased

coordination was described as dictated by ideological necessity, not
49
the whims of the CPSU.
Furthermore, the Soviet authority continued,
the imperialists were the principal opponents of a.coordinated foreign
policy for the socialist states and were seeking to create the impression
that such a policy involved a violation of the sovereignty of the East
European states or an abuse of.their legitimate rights.

Th~

best

interests of the WTO states,. he insisted, required a rejection of. these
views.

He concluded with an observation reflecting once again the

USSR's awareness of previous East German unwillingness to smoothly and
completely coordinate all aspects of their foreign policy witll. that, of
the USSR.

While the overwhelming majority of the countries were

coordinating their policies, not all countries of the socialist
community were willing to do so.
Experience shows, however, that the country which
underestimates the importance of coordinating its foreign
policy actually weakens the effectiveness of its own policy
and finds itself in a position of international isolation. so

49Sh . Sanakoyev, "Socialist Foreign Policy: Coordination and
Effectiveness," International Affairs (Moscow), No.6, 1971, p. 8.
sOIbid., pp. 13-14.
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Though only China was specifically named in this connection. there can
be little doubt that the warning. coming almost at the very time
Ulbricht was being removed, was intended for the GDR as well as other
East European states.
The SED has demonstrated its responsiveness to Soviet concerns in
a number of ways since 1971.

One has been the renewed emphasis on the

importance of foreign policy in the overall development of socialist
societies.

Official East German publications have placed considerable

stress on the necessity for the creation of the proper conditions for
the internal development of their society.

Such external conditions

can be achieved, in the SED's view. only through the pursuit of a
coordinated socialist foreign policy.

One East German author recently

explained that such a policy
. . • Has to an increasing extent become a basic condition
for the full utilization of the advantages of the socialist
society in the socialist countries. The importance of foreign
policy in the uniform social strategy and tactics of the
communist parties of the socialist countries is growing. 51
This has been coupled with ever increasing praise for the Soviet
Union from the highest SED officials.

Most notable have been the

frequent verbal bouquets offered by SED chief Erich Honecker who has
regularly praised the USSR for its "consistent, farsighted. and flexible
policy" which has aided peace. international security. and world
. I'15m. 5 2 ' The v1ew
.
Honec ke~ avances
d
. t hat peace on t heuropean
E
soc1a
lS

51Werner Hanish and Hartwig Busse. "Peaceful Coexistence:
Principle of GDR Foreign Policy." German Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII.
No. I, 1974, p. 14.
52

ND. June 7, 1972, p. 1.
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contine~t

has been preserved, more than anything else, by the power and

strength of the

Sovie~

Union.

The occasion of the 50th anniversary of

the founding of the USSR in 1972 gave the GDR an especially good
opportunity to make the .SED's devotion to the USSR visible to its own
citizens and all who passed through the GDR.

Bright red banners and

billboards proclaiming this event and the GDR's enthusiastic support
of the USSR could be seen on almost every street in East Berlin as well
as in the smaller towns and along the .railways.

This was in sharp

contrast to the much less conspicuous and less frequently seen
proclamations in neighboring Poland.

Praise for the USSR itself has

been equaled only by the innumerable instances of official praise for
the GDR's alliance with the Soviet Union, such as that of Gerald Gotting,
president of the Volkskammer, in a recent article stressing the "true
and dutable friendship" of the USSR and East Germany.53 Oskar Fischer,
Acting GDR Foreign Minister, has also spoken of the considerable value
of this alliance and the "daily consultation with our Soviet friends"
on all foreign policy matters. 54 East German soldiers are even called
upon to pledge their allegiance to the alliance with .the Soviet Army in
their soldiers' oath. 55

53Gerald Gotting, "Growing International Reputation of the GDR,"
German Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII, No.1, 1974, pp. 4-5.
54RBI-Journal (Berlin, GDR), No.3, 1974, p. 5.
55Handbuch Militarisches Grundwissen (Handbook of Basic Military
Knowledge) (Berlin, GDR: Militarverlag der DDR, 1972), p. 25.
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The greater responsiveness of the SED to Soviet pressures has also
been demonstrated by the calls for increased Bloc cooperation which have
become an almost daily element of official rhetoric.

East German

accounts emphasize that there are now new bases for the
the states ,of the socialist community.

cooperatio~

of

The field of foreign-political

coordination is said to be particularly affected by this development.
The official view is that historical experience shows that the ,increased
coordination of the foreign policies of the socialist states is an
"inevitable process" which has resulted from the internationalist
character of socialism and the existence of several independent and
sovereign states which are linked by a bond of common interests. 56
Erich Honecker has praised the system of meetings between the heads
of the communist parties of East Europe as one important means of
consolidating the unity of the community of socialist states. 57 Since
his elevation as First Secretary, Honecker has been among the most
enthusiastic of the

E~st

European leaders working for increased

consultation and coordination among the Bloc states.

An additional

element of Honecker's theme has been an intensified stress on the
belief that tne USSR must be recognized as the authoritative vqice
in East Europe on all major issues.

While Ulbricht also recognized

the USSR's authoritative position, he seemed to be seeking to make
exceptions to Soviet authority on certain issues, especially those

56Anton Latzo, "Foreign-Political Coordination in the Interests of
Socialism and Peace," German Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII, No.2, 1974,
pp. 170-171.
57 ND , December 10, 1973, p. 1.
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relating to detente and the ,West Berlin question.

Honecker makes no

effort to except certain areas from Soviet authority and has been
optimistic about the results of the GDR's renewed efforts at policy
coordination.

SED spokesmen have boasted ,that cooperation with both

the Soviet Union and the other socialist states has been strengthened
.
58
and deep,ene d l.n recent years.
The handling of the crisis over the opening of a branch of the FRG
Epvironmental office in West Berlin in 1974 demonstrates the change in
the relationship between the USSR and the GDR.

Observers of East German

affairs felt that the GDR's conduct during the last serious crisis over
West Berlin, that arising as a result of ,the FRG's decision to elect a
new president in West Berlin in 1969, illustrated the lack of cooperation
between the ,SED and the Soviet Union.

At that time, according to an

analysis by Melvin Croan, the SED precipitated a crisis on its

ownwhi1~

the USSR attempted to play the dispute down and acted as a mediator
rather than a participant aiding the GDR in its confrontation with the
West. 59 The 1974 crisis illustrated the unity of the GDR and the Soviet
Union.

East German objections to the branch office are couched in terms
60
of a violation of ~heQuadripartite Agreement on West Berlin while the
Soviet Union has made public its support of the SED's position and its
intention to support the implementation of appropriate measures to

58 Got tl.ng,
.
p. 3 .
59
Croan, pp. 80-81.
60Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Berlin, GDR:
Affairs), Vol. 14, August 2, 1974, p. 167.
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counter the West Germanmoves. 6l

In contrast to.their conduct during

the 1969 crisis, in this incident the East Germans.have been especially
careful to place their demands within the context of a Soviet-approved
policy, the full implementation of the Berlin agreement as interpreted
by the Soviet Union.
GDR and voiced similar

The fact that Moscow has given full support to the
objectio~

to the establishment of the .branch of

the FRG Environment Office in West Berlin clearly indicates that the
CPSU does not see the

~risis

as an East German attempt to impede detente.

The Soviet press placed the blame in this controversy squarely on the
FRG Ministry of Interior and branded the decision as "devoid of any
practical business sense" and "in complete contradiction to the letter
and spirit of the quadripartite agreement on West,Berlin.,,62 The
conformity of the Soviet and the East German responses demonstrates the
coordination of foreign policy spoken of so frequently by both nations.
This might also be considered evidence of what the SED refers to as the
"new element in the worldwide struggle
imperialism."

betwe~n

socialism and

This new element is described by the East Germans as a

result of the socialist states having reached a "new, higher stage of
their common foreign policy.,,63
Spokesmen for the SED and the GDR government never tire of
pointing out the benefits of a common foreign policy for the WTO

6lNew York Times, July 21, 1974, p. 3.
62CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 27, July 31, 1974, pp. 21-22.
63paul Markowski, "Common Foreign Policy of the Socialist Community
of States," German Foreign Paliey, Vol. XU, No.5, 1973, p. 501.
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states.

Since Honecker's elevation as First Secretary the SED has

repeatedly emphasized the advantages that the GDR enjoys as a result
of the USSR-East German alliance.

Speaking of this in 1974, an East

German commentary advanced the view that East Germany's "position within
international politics has fundamentally changed within the last year."
This change, it insists, came about thanks largely to the efforts of the
Soviet Union. 64 The SED sees this change as one which helps create the
internal and external conditions for shaping the "evolved socialist
society in the GDR."

Hanisch and Busse, writing in German Foreign

Policy, expressed the East German view ofa link between foreign and
domestic policies.
. . . Socialist foreign policy has to an increasing extent
become a basic condition for the full utilization of the
advantages of the socialist society in the ,socialist countries.
The importance of foreign policy in the uniform social
strategy and tactics of the .communist parties of the socialist
countries is growing. 65
Furthermore, East German authorities explain, the basic condition for
full international equality of the GDR is its alliance with the Soviet
Union.

Without this alliance, East Germany would still suffer from the

discrimination said to have been practiced by the West in its relations.
with the GDR, discrimination which caused many difficulties and forced
the .GDR to make additional expenditures for defense.

As a result,

during this time the GDR was at a disadvantage in protecting its

64ND, April 27, 1974, p. 9.
65Hanisch and Busse, p. 14.
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interests vis-a-vis the capitalist countries as well as within the

· d N'
Unlte
atlons. 66 The

USS~'s

assistance is considered the .decisive

factor in helping East Germany advance beyond its previous status.
In December, 1973, Honecker went so far as to attribute not only the
above improvements but "every success of socialism in the GDR" to its
alliance with the USSR. 67 On the occasion of the.twenty-fifth
anniversary of the GDR, Kurt Hager declared that "without the ,Soviet
Union's all-round comradely aid, the very existence and evolution of
our republic would have been impossib1e.,,68 While Ulbricht never
questioned the value of the .GDR-Soviet alliance and heaped considerable
prais~

upon that alliance, he never lavished the .excessive praise on

the .al1iance seen during the Honecker years.
The East German stance on the treaties negotiated by the USSR,
especially the one on West Berlin, further illustrates the SED's
increased responsiveness.

In September, 1971, Pravda spelled out its

view of the meaning of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.
First, it declared the agreement to be "an effective foundation" for
the normalization and improvement ,of the West Ber.lin situation.

Second,

it stressed that the agreement excludes West Berlin from the ,territory
of the FRG.

And, third, it pointed out that the agreement meant that

66Wexner Hanisch, "The GDR and Its International Relations," Geman
Foreign Policy, Vol. XII, No.6, 1973, pp. 632~633.
67ND , December 10, 1973, p. 1.
68
Kurt Hager, "Werte und Errungenschaften unseres Lebens" ("Values
and Achievements of our Life"), Einheit, No. 9/10, September/October,
1974, p. 1072.
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there would be a curtailment of West Ge~man "poli tical acti vi ties" in
West Ber1in. 69 At almost the same time as it was making its yiew of
the West .Berlin agreement public, Pravda was also able to report on the'
"complete \lJ1.ity of opinion" between the USSR and the GDR on "questions
of West Berlin.,,70 The SED has further demonstrated its responsive
attitude by giving credit for the agreement, without reservation, solely
71
to the Soviet Union.
Also, while Honecker attributes certain
constructive contributions in the process of

deten~e

to the GDR, he is

careful to phrase his claims in terms of.the SED's close adherence to
the foreign policy program outlined by the .24th Congress of the CPSU. 72
East German accounts are also careful to point out that the negotiations
which it has been carrying out with the FRG on such matters as a postal
and communications agreement, a health agreement, and on mutual legal
aid are being conducted pursuant to .the Berlin Agreement concluded by
the Soviet Union with the Western powers. 73 In other words, the GDR
sees itself acting to put the finishing touches on what is described as
the settlement of the German question, but, only in connection with
provisions already determined by the Soviet Union.

There is no talk

of independent East German proposals as was very much the case during

69CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 36, October 5, 1971, p. 22.
70 Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No. 35, September 28, 1971, p. 21.
71

ND, June 7, 1972, p. 1.

72 Ibid ., p. 2.
73Hanisch, p. 645.
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the Ulbricht. regime when the GDR offered initiatives for the preparation
of an all-European security conference. 74 Honecker has worked carefully
within the framework of Soviet initiative and, as a result, has won the
praise of the Soviet Union for the GDR's "businesslike approach and
The fact that the SED, as Honecker himself has stated,

goodwill.,,7S

views the actions of the USSR as having closed the German question, 76
certainly no small achievement, is additional
Germany's responsive attitude.

~estimony

of East

Finally, the appreciation of the SED,

which declared that the agreement on West Berlin showed how "our.
republic's vital interests are ensured precisely in

th~

course of

cooperation between the GDR and the USSR," was noted with approval
in Pravda following the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreenlent.
The

S~D

77

has exhibited its increased loyalty to the Soviet Union by

acting as a major spokesman against Chinese revisionism, once more
echoing the Kremlin's current view on the activities of the Red Chinese.
Not only have the allegedly disruptive actions of Peking in the
int~rnational

arena been condemned, but Honecker has also warned against

Chinese interference in German affairs.

In December, 1973, he spoke of

ominous indications of a potential union between certain elements in the
FRG government and the Red Chinese who are said to share a common desire

74Dieter Vogl, "The Warsaw Treaty States and the European Security
Conference," German Foreign Policy, Vol. X, No.1, 1971, p. 27.
7S CDSP , Vol. XXIII, No. 50, January 11, 1972, p. 22.
76ND, December 10, 1973, p. 1.
77CDSP , Vol. XXIII, No. 40, November 2, 1971, p. 23.
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to distupt the process of detente in Central Europe. 78
critic~l

The sharply

attitude assumed by the SED in recent years toward the Red

Chinese contrasts with the more restrained tone of the last Ulbricht
years, a tone which did not always fully reflect the
feeling with regard to Peking.

inten~ity

of Soviet

Ulbricht's speech at the 1969

International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties illustrated .the
GDR's restraint.

While Brezhnev spoke at some length on the Chinese

problem,79 Ulbricht devoted most of his speech to an attack on the West
German Social Democrats.
the Red Chinese.

Only three paragraphs of his speech dealt with

While Ulbricht noted that the "aggressive armed raids"

on the Soviet-Chinese border had "angered" the GDR and that the Chinese
leadership had "officially completed its departure from MarxismLeninism," he also spoke of the Chinese Communists as people "with whom
we feel closely bound up" and invited them to "resume cooperation" with
. t - Lenlnlst
. .
.
80
t he other MarX1S
partles.
Finally, the .SED has altered its attitude toward the West German
Social Democrats during the time since Honecker's elevation and, in so
doing, has further accommodated its position to that of the Kremlin.
The establishment of an SPD government in the FRG was greeted in the.
GDR as an event of little significance initially.

Neues Deutschland

suggested that the Hmuch vaunted 'accommodation' shown by the. Federal

78 ND , December 10, 1973, p. 1.
79Internationa1 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties,
pp. 156-160.
80 Ibid ., pp. 229-230.
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Republic" in the first months after Brandt's election as Chancellor was,
in reality, nothing more than a "flood of more or less beautiful words.
The SED also suggested that. the ,SPD, instead of wanting to
recognize "realities," desired a "restoration of the state of affairs
that existed before August 13, 1961.,,82 As First Secretary, Honecker
has done much to reverse the negative tone set by Ulbricht with regard
to the SPD.

The change became apparent with Honecker's statement in

November, 1971, following a visit to East Berlin by Brezhnev.
Brezhnev's departure, Honecker noted the

"constructiv~

Upon

approach" of

the Brandt government in dealing with the settlement of "unresolved
questions" and stated the GDR's intention of giving a favorable response
to the Brandt approach. 83 The reversal was further shown by an
interview Honecker gave to the director of the East Ger,man news agency
and the editor of Neues Deutschland in 1972.

In response to a question

as to what he might expect from a West German government under the
leadership of the conservative Christian Democratic Party, Honecker made
his preference for an SPD government explicit.

He explained that the

CDU had demonstrated its negative attitude toward the GDR for the twenty
years it had controlled the government in the past and that it would be
likely to resume such a po licy should the CDU I S Barzel become Chancellor.
A defeat of the SPD and a victory for the CDU would, in Honecker's

81 ND, March 7, 1970, p. 1.
82 Ibid ., March 17, 1970, pp. 1-2.
83Ibid ., November 7, 1971, p. 1.
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opinion, bring an end to the process of detente, a process to which the.
GDR was fully committed by this time. 84 The reversal of the traditional
East German view of the Social Democrats as being worse than the more
conservative parties must be seen as an event of considerable
significance and an additional expression of the GDR's willingness to
cooperate more fully with the USSR than during Ulbricht's last years.
While there is no reason to believe that Ulbricht was completely
unresponsive to Soviet wishes during his last years, it is apparent that
he had become less responsive than desired on certain specific issues
and that he attempted to exercise a veto over Soviet policy in some
respects.

By contrast, Honecker has returned the GDR to a pattern

of more complete and full compliance with Soviet dictates.

In short,

while Ulbricht was responsive, Honecker has been more responsive.

This

is not to suggest that the GDR has reverted to the servile status that
it had during the years it was the .Soviet Zone of Germany.

A return to

such situation does not seem desirable even for the Soviet Union.
However, recent developments do suggest a greater awareness on the part
of the Honecker leadership that East Germany cannot become an independent
force within the Bloc.

Honecker's policies indicate an awareness of the

futility of attempting to oppose the Soviet Union on major policies,
especially one such as detente which seems to form a central element of
Soviet strategy in world affairs today.

The current leadership realizes

that the GDR can be an effective power in Europe only as it acts more

84 Ibid ., April 26, 1972, p. 1.
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closely than ever within the WTO and in concert with the Soviet Union.
Honecker, unlike his predecessor, displays no pretensions of being an
equal

partne~

III.

with the .Soviet Union.
DOMESTIC INFLUENCE OF THE USSR ON EAST GERMANY

The Soviet Union has consistently issued calls for its allies to
follow as closely as possible the example set by the Soviet Union not
only in foreign policy but also in domestic affairs.

While this emphasis

on the necessity for unity does not represent a return to the Stalinist
policy of

institutio~al

and ideological uniformity of the.postwar

0 d
0 01 ar concerns.
years, 85 1t
oesO
1nvol ve S1m1

Essentially the same ends

are sought but different means are employed for their attainment today.
The USSR utilizes what it refers to as "collective analysis" of the
experiences of all socialist countries rather than just that of the
Soviet Union.

Ideally, the communist parties of the Bloc states are

supposed to arrive at common policies during frequent meetings at which
coordination is discussed.

The implication is that these policies are

supposed to be formulated after joint consultation, not simply on the
basis of Soviet dictates as would have been the case during Stalin's
time.

One Soviet author recently addressed himself to this issue and

explained that
Coordination of the political activity of countries of the
socialist community is determined by practical necessity and
ensues from the community of their international and national

85Brzezinski, pp. 67-83.

244

interests . . . • It serves as .another example of the
86
untena,bility of concepts of different "models of socialism."
Soviet sources call for the elaboration of a common line among all
socialist countries in economic, political, and ideological affairs.
Multilateral and bilateral talks as well as the meetings of the WTO
Political Consultative Committee are described as the.principal means
of achieving the .desired common line.
East German domestic policies during the period since 1968 do not
reveal any serious divergence from the policies supported by the .Soviet
Union.

Both Ulbricht and Honecker have demonstrated attitudes

remarkably similar to those of the .Kremlin's leadership relating to the.
domestic development of the GDR.

Most accounts see this congruity of

outlooks on domestic affairs, especially cultural questions, as
characteristic throughout East Germany's history.87

The most notable

variation in East German dumestic policy from that of the USSR is the
SED's economic policy.

Even in the period prior to the Czech

disturbances the East German leadership, according to typical Western
analyses, was seeking a certain amount of economic freedom through its
reforms, commonly referred to as the New Economic System (NES).88
However, even in this departure from what might be considered orthodoxy,
the SED's efforts were facilitated by the Soviet Union itself, hardly
an indication that East Berlin was exhibiting independence from Moscow.

86 V. Dolgin, "Unity of Goals and Action," International Affairs
(Moscow), No.7, July, 1974, p. 5.
87Spl.ttman,
.
p. 170 .
89
Croan, p. 83.

88 Ibid ., pp. 174-176.

89
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Yet, even this has been abandoned within recent years and a process of
economic recentralization has begun in the GDR, which makes its economic
system indistinguishable from those of the Soviet Union and most other
90
East European communist states.
This development does not seem related
to the shift of power from Ulbricht to Honecker, but rather to increasing
dissatisfaction with the ,results of the system since 1970 and 1971.
Honecker, unlike Ulbricht, has demonstrated a sensitivity to the
USSR's calls for unity in the internal development of the Bloc states
and an awareness of the necessity for linki,ng domestic policies with
foreign policy in order to facilitate the development of an "evolved
socialist society" in the GDR. 91 Furthermore, according to Honecker,
just as the improvement of the GDR's international position, which has
corne about due to the efforts of the USSR, has strengthened the internal
development of the GDR, the continued domestic development of East
Germany along the lines favored by the ,Soviet Union has a favorable
impact on the world power ratio. 92 In other words, favorable domestic
developments aid favorable international development which, in turn,
aid the former, thus suggesting that the relationship between foreign
and domestic policy is reciprocal.

And, according to the ,SED's First

Secretary, it is ,only through coordination with the USSR in both areas
that the GDR can achieve success.

SED Politburo member Kurt Hager has

90Michael Keren, "The New Economic System in the GDR: An
Obituary," Soviet Studies, Vol. XXIV, No.4, April, 1973, p. 5~4.
91 ND , May 29, 1973, p. 1.
92 Ibid ., April 27, 1974, p. 9.
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explained that coordination with the Soviet Union is particularly
important in the area of philosophical question.

He has described

cooperation on these issues as being of.primary importance in building
the type of

personality essential for the successful
construction of a socialist society in the GDR. 93 In May, 1974,
socialis~

Professor Doctor Heinrich Vogel of Rostock University echoed Hager's
views and observed that the cooperation of the philosophers of the USSR
and the GDR "has become closer in recent years." According to Vogel,
numerous East German philosophical works were being reprinted in the
94
Soviet Union as part of an intensive philosophical exchange effort.
Discussions of the basis of East German "socialist democracy"
reveal the .extent of Soviet influence in the ,development of the state
organization of the GDR.

The Soviet

ex~"ple

is constantly cited and

efforts are continually made to emulate the USSR's model.

The deputy

chairman of the GDR State Council, Friedrich Ebert, explained the
importance of the experiences of the USSR in an analysis of East German
local government.

Bourgeois democracy proclaims the equality of all

citizens, Ebert stressed, while in reality creating domination by
capitalist "exploiters."

By contrast, he claims, the Soviet state

organization destroys this swindle by implementing genuine democracy,
the real equality of all working people.

Accordingly, it is to the

Soviet example of state organization that the GDR as well as other

93Ibid ., April 17, 1974, pp. 5-6.
940stsee Zeitung, May 28, 1974, p. 4.
Europe, No. 942, August 9, 1974, pp. 1-2.
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socialist states look as a model for their own governments.

95

In order

to expand what the SED refers to as "democratic collaboration" by the
citizens in the management of the .state organization, the GDR has begun
to experiment with the so-called "voters' mandate" or referendum.

This

is also viewed as an effort to build on the basis of Soviet innovations
in popular control of government.

East

Ge~an

accounts cite an

evaluation of Soviet experiences with the mandates as a major·
contribution to their understanding of the proper use of such a
.
96
East German experimentation with the voters' mandates is
mec h anlsm.
by no means the only example of the SED's effort to mold its governmental
organization in the image of that of the USSR.

Both Ulbricht and

Honecker displayed a readiness to look to the.Soviet

examp1~

for numerous

features which might be applicable to the GDR.
The SED's cultural policy represents one of the most remarkable and
extensive areas of East German emulation of the Soviet model.

Ulbricht

frequently referred to the impossibility of creating a socialist
national culture in the GDR without the

frat~rna1

help, guidance, and

cooperation given by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in "a11
aspects of life. ,,97 While Ulbricht began to deviate from the USSR in
certain foreign policy questions, he never strayed far from the

95Friedrich Ebert, "Staat und Demokratie ,unserer soz~alistischen
Gessellschaft" ("State and Democracy in Our Socialist Society"),
Einheit, Vol. 29, No.4, 1974, p. 396.
96Neue Justiz, Vol. 28, No.1, 1974, pp. 1-6. In Translations
on Eastern Europe, No. 857, February 27, 1974, p. 35.
97SWB, October 8, 1969, EE/3197/C2/l.
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orthodoxy of the CPSU's cultural policy.

Honecker has continued the

cultural policy' inherited from his predecessor.

The Soviet Union

remains the primary influence affecting the East German.cultural policy.
The SED stresses its concern for the harmonious development of its
cultural policy and its determination to guarantee the more systematic
inclusion of cultural problems in party life.

In order to do this,

according to a recent article in Einheit, the experiences of the Soviet
Union will continue to be used as a guide for determining the cultural
98
standards of the people.
Efforts to improve social control over the
population are also based on Soviet experiences.

GDR sources state

that they are looking to basic enterprises, collective farms, offices,
and organizations as the means of implementing more complete social
control.

choice is described as one which was based on a study
of the experiences of Sovie~ popular control organs. 99 The
T~is

intensification of the effort to strenthen ties. between the GDR and the
USSR was further illustrated by the 1974 order requiring training in the
100
Russian language for all university students.
Such a requirement
would obviously facilitate the creation of closer bonds between the tNt)
states by easing communication between Russians and the

bet~er

educated

and presumably leading members of East German society.

98 Rudi Raupach, "Initiator der Kulturabeit" ("Initiator of
Cultural Work"), Einheit, Vol. 29, No.3, 1974, p. 334.
99Staat und Recht, Vol. 23, No.4, 1974, pp. 571-579. In
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 923, June 28, 1974, p. 50.
100Gesetzblatt der DDR, Part I, No. 14, March 27, 1974. In
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 908, May 29, 1974, p. 15.
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The measures discussed above, as well as many others implemented
th~

during

last six years by the GDR, illustrate the official effort to

draw East German society more closely within the orbit of Soviet society.
This policy must be viewed as a logical concomitant of the SED's
Abgrenzung policy.

The

GD~

is being demarcated from the FRG and at the.

same time integrated ever more firmly with the Soviet Union and its
allies.

The development of a social and cultural policy compatible with

that of its allies is seen by the SED as being just as important as
compatible foreign policies.
IV.

IN SUMMARY:

JU~IOR

ALLY OR SATELLITE?

This chapter has considered the relationship between the GDR and
the USSR regar4ing foreign policy

questio~s

impinging on the West Berlin

issue as well as matters relating to the domestic development of the
GDR.

The latte!' has b.een included in view of the connection between

foreign and domestic policies spoken of by both the USSR and the GDR.
In conclusion, i t is reasonable to conclude that Ulbricht, during his
last years as First Secretary, began to depart from the USSR's desired
course on a number of foreign policy questions.

This by no means

implies that there was anything like a rebellion by tilt:

mall

who had

been considered for so many years Moscow's most faithful puppet.
Rather, it was an effort by Ulbricht to

e~ert

more influence on the

Kremlin's policy in certain areas of foreign policy.
not extend to domestic policy questions.

This effort did

Ulbricht's independence was

resisted by the Soviet Union and apparently played a major role in
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helping the ,Soviet leadership decide upon the need for Ulbricht's
removal.

Gerhard Wettig has speculated that the Soviet need for

practical cooperation at this time demanded a "pragmatic renunciation
of confrontation."

Ulbricht's reluctance to renounce confrontation

obviously ran counter to Soviet needs.

According to Wettig, at the same

time as the USSR was working to achieve cooperation with the West in
order to benefit from Western economic and technological advancements,
it also saw a need that the Eastern camp's relationship with the West
be Udetermined by the awareness of an insurmountable antithesis and
unrelenting militancy if 'socialism' is not to give itself up. ,,101
Honecker was able to retain East German sensitivity to Soviet desires
for an ideological confrontation that not involving any military
aspects.

The new First Secretary has returned the GDR to its former

position as an especially cooperative, reliable ally.

East German

social policy throughout this period has remained close to the Soviet
guidelines. This is important because it demonstrates that the GDR's
efforts to resist Soviet pressure during the last Ulbricht years did
not represent an attempt to dramatically alter East German society.
Any efforts by the SED to initiate serious changes in the pattern of
East Germany's social and cultural development, what one might consider
a new version of de-Stalinization, coupled with a recalcitrance in
foreign policy questions, would have undoubtedly been viewed with

101Gerhard Wettig, "Sowjet Politik zu Westeuropa" ("Soviet Policy
Towards Western Europe"), Osteuropa, No.7, 1974, pp. 851-852.
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considerable alarm by the USSR.

De-Stalinization and desatellitization

are two separate processes and the Soviet Union has always preferred
that they be kept apart.

A union of the two might be considered cause
for intervention, as was the case in Hungary in 1956. 102 The SED under

Ulbricht made its reluctance to create such a union very clear by its
continued orthodoxy on domestic questions.

In so doing, it further

emphasized its basic satisfaction with its status within the Bloc.
While one cannot determine the degree or tone of the pressure that
the USSR might have exerted on the SED behind the scenes, it is obvious
that the disagreements between itself and the GDRls leadership were
handled with relative delicacy.

The fact that it was possible to handle

its disagreements in this manner makes one inclined to view the GDR not
as an abject satellite but rather as a junior ally.
all, frequently have serious disagreements.

Even allies, after

What would seem to

characterize the ally relationship is the more circumspect manner of
resolution of disputes contrasted with the heavy-handed methods typical
of earlier periods of Soviet-East European and East German relations.
In this instance the Soviet Union was no longer compelled to rely upon
the introduction of Red Army tanks in order to restore a more desirable
situation for itself as had been necessary in 1953 in East Germany.
However, before concluding that the relationship between the Soviet
Union and the GDR is the same as that between the United States and
the FRG, two factors should be taken into consideration.

102Brzezinski, p. 434.

First, the
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differences of opinion in the last Ulbricht years were not nearly as
great as those in the 1968 Czech-Soviet disputes.
stakes weren't so immense;
about to leave the Bloc.

the~e

Accordingly, the

was no suggestion that the GDR was

Therefore, it was easier for the USSR to

adopt a more casual method of conflict resolution, one not involving
force.

Second, it should also be remembered that the Ulbricht-Kremlin

disputes did lead to the removal of the GDR's leader.

That in itself

points cut the nontraditional relationship between the GDR and the USSR.
The GDR may no longer be a satellite, but it is still not a completely
independent state.

CHAPTER VI
THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE WEST BERLIN PROBLEM
In order to gain a fuller appreciation of the significance of the
GDR's West Berlin problem and its relationship to East Germany's
membership in the Soviet Bloc, it is necessary to develop an overview
of this issue in terms of its possible long-range impact.

This overview

will be developed, first, through a reexamination of the significance of
the Soviet influence which has been demonstrated in the previous chapter.
Second, the West Berlin issue will be approached with a consideration of
its actual meaning for the GDR's political system.

Next, an effort will

be made to evaluate the nature of the "threat" posed by West Berlin to
the SED regime and, on the basis of this, an attempt will be made to
determine the root motives of the East German policy on West Berlin.
A final concern will be an evaluation of the significance of the
so-called era of detente for the West Berlin dispute.
I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE

The Soviet Union's influence on the GDR must now be evaluated in
light of two considerations:

first, it is important because it affects

East Berlin's relations with the socialist community of states; and,
second, it is significant due to its impact on the GDR' s foreign policy.
In neither of these aspects is the GDR's siutation unique.

It is the

subject of what is essentially the same policy for each of the member
253
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states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

While there are significant

variations between the respective applications to each of these states,
these variations are a function of local conditions and issues, not of
a separate policy goal.

In short, the USSR is primarily concerned about

the implementation of a policy which will strengthen East European unity
and embellish and perpetuate Soviet leadership over the alliance.
The Soviet Union's belief in the necessity for East European
neighbors who were "friendly" to the USSR was demonstrated in the last
years of World War Two.

Immediately after the Teheran Conference in

1943 Stalin initiated a particularly bold political line with regard to

the political situation of the states bordering it on the West. l

While

the USSR was first concerned about the situations in Poland and
Czechoslovakia, its interest extended to what is now the rest of the
socialist community of states in East Europe as well as Greece and
Turkey.

Stalin was determined to have a protective cordon between

Russia and its western" neighbors who, in Stalin's mind, were evidently
seen as potential invaders.

The Soviet response to the invitation to

participate in the European Recovery Program illustrates Stalin's
conception of the dangers facing the USSR.

He had no intention of

allowing Soviet participation and when Poland and Czechoslovakia
expressed interest in the
their positions.

progra~>

Stalin pressured them into reversing

Stalin saw Polish and Czech participation in the

European Recovery Program as the first step in the direction of a

lAdam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York:
pp. 354-356.

Praeger, 1968),
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defection to the West and this, he felt, would present a challenge to
the very survival of Communist power in the .Soviet Union. 2 The
maintenance of a string of sate11itel states between itself and the West
was clearly viewed as an absolute necessity for the military and
political security of the USSR.

The securing of such a protective

shield had been a major Soviet goal during the war and after the war
its preservation assumed the highest priority in Soviet foreign policy.
The military importance of the East European satellites rested,
however, on a traditional conception of war.

In the context of a

nonnuclear war, such as the Second World War, Stalin's exercise in
geographical strategy was a highly rational one.

However,

th~

advances

in military technology of the past quarter of a century have made this
strategy obsolete.

Today, the USSR's protective cordon could easily be

bypassed by modern miss1es and high-flying aircraft.

The East European

buffer states can no longer protect the territory of the Soviet Union
frOID a direct and sudden military assault.

What would have served as

a valuable and effective shield against a Nazi attack in 1941 is no
longer of any real military significance.
In spite of the dramatically diminished military value of Eastern
Europe, Moscow has not downgraded the importance of the region.

Not

only does East Europe augment the traditional military forces of the
Soviet Union, making the Warsaw Pact force one of the most powerful
military organizations in the world, but it also enhances the political

2 Ibid ., p. 436.
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position of the USSR.

First, it serves as a demonstration of the

applicability of the basic Soviet-style system to countries other than
the USSR.

The success of the "peoples' democracies" in East Europe is

considered a fulfillment of a major stage in the development of world
'1'l.sm. 3
SOCl.a

It is now possible to speak of more than socialism in one

country since the system has spread th.r:oughout <!.n entire region
encompassing eight separate states if Yugoslavia and Albania are counted.
Second, it makes it possible for the Kremlin to act as spokesman for a
group of states rather than simply one state.
political impact of the USSR is magnified.

In this fashion the

In an international

organization such as the United Nations it has a bloc of votes on which
it can count in almost any situation.

In short, while East Europe may

be of less value militarily than it once was, its political significance
continues to justify the importance that Moscow attaches to its alliance
with its small neighbors.

Finally, the el::onomic importance of East

Europe should not be overlooked.

East Europe provides the USSR with

valuable markets for its products and, in turn, also produces a
considerable amount of commodities vital to the Soviet economy,

The

economic significance of the Soviet-East European alliance has been
such that many

autho~ities

feel that progress in the development of

economic ties between the USSR and Eastern Europe actually exceeded
4
progress in the formation of effective political bonds.

3

Shalva Sanakoyev, The World Socialist System (Moscow:
Publishers, 1972), pp. 59-65.
4Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge:
University Press, 1967), pp. 287-288.
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A pro-Soviet East Europe derives additional importance from its
value to the Soviet Union as a laboratory for experimentation with
numerous Marxist theoretical concepts.

Nish Jamgotch, Jr., has written

a brief book in \'lhich he examines the efforts of the Soviet Union to
develop so-calleci "international relations of a new type" between itself
and East Europe.

The current relationship between the USSR and East

Germany will facilitate a careful analysis of the success that the
Soviet Union has enjoyed in its endeavors relative to this ideal type
of international relationship.

While in the past it was common to

dismiss the relationships between the Kremlin and its East European
client states as being of a purely "satellite" character or, in other
words, characterized by total subservience on the part of .the minor
states, the tendency to consider the Soviet alliance system as more
S
of a genuine political coalition has increased in recent years.
Accordingly, the issue to which Jamgotch addresses himself has become
more significant.

The East German case, as a review of previous

chapters would indicate, may serve as a demonstration of the sort of
alliance that the USSR is hoping to create in Eastern Europe.

An

examination of the Soviet Union's apparent designs will also provide
a better understanding of the GDR's place in the Soviet coalition.
According to Jamgotch, the most basic condition postulated by the
Soviet Union for the development of international relations of a new

SLouis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics
of Regions (Englewood Cliffs, New .Tersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970),
pp. 366-367.
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type is proletarian internationalism, which is defined as a set of
principles collectively guiding the world socialist movement. 6 The
East German case illustrates acceptance of this precept as a guide to
its policy.

Both Ulbricht and Honecker repeatedly

cite~prole~arian

internationalism as the foremost authoritative concept in the
formulation of the SED'S policies.

Honecker enunciated the GORis

consistent attitude relative to proletarian internationalism. in May,
1974 in his speech on East German-Soviet friendship.
of the advanced stage of

GDR~Soviet

He spoke then

relations, stressing that "every

step we are taking today" is determined by the GDR's membership in
the Sovial alliance system.

Only through complete unity, he emphasized,

could the socialist state community achieve security and peace.

7

A second essential attribute of the development of the new type of
S
international relations is the concept of socialist internationalism.
This involves a complete and equal sharing in the benefits derived by
members of the socialist community of states.

!n short, it is a

socialist affirmation of all for one and one for all.

Also, just as

the entire community advances as a result of the successes achieved
by individual states, each state also suffers from mistakes made by
other members.

This concept provided the theoretical underpinning for

Ulbricht's warning in 1968 that the Czechoslovakian experiments would
result in harm to all of the members of the Soviet alliance, not simply

6Nish Jamgotch, Jr., Soviet-East European Dialogue: International
Relations of a New Type? (Stanford University: The Hoover Institution,
1968), p. 94.
7

Neues Deutschland, May 13, 1974, pp. 1-2.

8

Jamgotch, p, 95.

(Hereafter cited as ND.)
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in harm to the Czechs alone.

Socialist internatioJ'!,alism is described in

Soviet accounts as a "motive force" in the world socialist system today.
It is seen as the best contribution
For the economic and political development of each
country with the common effort to strengthen fraternal
cooperation and mutual assistance of socialist states. 9
East German authorities have emphasized the logic of a situation in
which all the "revolutionary forces" share equally in the successes and
setbacks of socialism.

This, they assert, leads to an "interlacing of

interests" and to "joint responsibility" in the development of the
socialist community.lO The forecasts relative to socialist
internationalism predict increased cooperation in economic, military,
and cultural endeavors.

The GDR, as noted previously, has been one

of the most enthusiastic members of the Bloc in its proclamations of
the need for increased cooperative efforts in these areas.

East German

enthusiasm can most likely be attributed to, first, the need to develop
a sense of identity in the GDR with the Bloc, something which would
limit the attraction of the FRG to East

Ge~man

citizens if accomplished.

Cultural and economic cooperative ventures are especially important in
this respect.

Second, the GDR t s position as the "front line" of

socialism obviously makes the SED conscious of military matters so it
is reasonable to expect the leadership to stress the military aspects

9

Sankayev, pp. 131-132.

lOHarald Neubert, "Interrelationship of National and International
Aspects in the Socialist Community of States," German Foreign Policy,
Vol. XIII, No.2, 1974, p. 137.
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of the alliance with the Bloc.

A close military relationship with the

Bloc, in effect, puts the power of the USSR on the line in defense of
the GDR.

Finally, as Peter C. Ludz has noted, the GDR enjoys certain

economic benefits as a result of economic cooperation with the Bloc.
East GeI:ll\any has profited more than its neighbors in the "international
socialist division of labor" which was begun in 1967.

As a result, the

GDR has achieved an economic monopoly in East Europe in certain key
industrial products, especially in the chemical industry.ll
Jamgotch explains that the Soviet conception of the new type of
international relations is distinguished by the continued existence of
sta';;e sovereignty, limited independence, and Soviet restraint upon
excessive intrusions in East European affairs. 12 The East German case,
once again, is illustrative of the fulfillment of this objective.

The

GDR state organization obviously possesses sovereignty over its territory
in most respects today.
stat~

Furthermore, the SED stresses the element of

sovereignty as a necessary component for the new type of,

.

.

~nternat~ona

1 re 1
·
13
at~ons.

If qualifications are to be expressed

regarding the complete sovereignty of the GDR, their application must
be to certain foreign policy restrictions which are clearly derived
from the insistence by both the GDR and the USSR for a common socialist
foreign policy.

In this respect, the SED has echoed the Soviet view

llpeter C. Ludz, The GDR From the Sixties to the Seventies
(Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1970), pp. 66-68.
12
Jamgotch, pp. 98-99.
13

Neubert, pp. 136-137.
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that national considerations should not be .allowed to interfere with the
attainment of communitywide objectives for the Bloc.

Spokesmen for the

SED have declared that a socialist country should not concentrate
exclusively on tasks which serve primarily its own national state
interests.

First consideration must be given to those tasks which

benefit the entire community.

However, the East German leadership feels

that there are no "antagonistic contradictions between the national and
international interests of the socialist countries." The two are said
to form a "unity" of common interests. 14 Thus, limited independence is
seen as a possibility because of the community of interests within the
Bloc.

Soviet hesitancy about blatant and excessive intervention in the

GDR's internal affairs has been illustrated by the relatively restrained
way in which it exerted its influence in the ouster of Ulbricht.

His

removal was not followed by public denunciations in either the GDR or
the USSR.

Nor was Ulbricht charged with legal offenses and subjected

to prosecution, as was commonly the case during Stalin's time in East
Europe.

By contrast, Ulbricht \\las allowed to retain an important office

in the GDR.
Honecker summarized the SED's view of the successful achievement of
international relations of a new type in 1971 when he said,
The GDR grows stronger and thrives as part of the whole of
the socialist community of states. The construction of
evolved socialism in our country is thus directed towards the
welfare of our own people and the increasing unity, strength
and attractiveness of our socialist fraternal alliance. lS

14 Neubert, p. l3S.

lSND, October 9, 1971, p. 1.
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The development of this new type of international relations, in the view
of the SED, is consistent with both Soviet and East German needs.

On

the one hand, the socialist community, including the GDR, is becoming
increasingly solidified.

On the other hand, the "class-determined
differentiation" of the GDR and the FRG is being intensified. 16
Therefore, the need of the GDR for a thorough delimitation from the
Federal Republic converges smoothly with the Soviet Union's oft stated
desire for greater Bloc unity during the era of superpower detente.
This coincidence of East German needs and Soviet policy eases the
coordination of their foreign policies today.

One need not operate on

the assumption of Soviet directorship over questions relating to the
GDR's foreign policy to see how Soviet and East German needs complement
each other.

The common foreign policy for which the GDR and the ,USSR

are working makes it necessary to view the West Berlin problem, not as
an isolated issue, but as a policy object for coordinated resolution by
the two allies.

The importance that the USSR places on the West

Be~lin

issue was emphasized by the fact that the Soviet Union saw a need to
work for the conclusion of the

Quadripartit~

Agreement on West Berlin.

The Soviet Union was certainly motivated in its negotiations on the
Quadripartite Agreement by the desire to eliminate a situation in which
West Berlin was, as Brezhnev said, "a detonator of tension and crisis.,,17

16Nuebert, p. 140.
17L• I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course (Moscow:
Publishers, 1972), p. 480.
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Such a desire is thoroughly consistent with the Soviet policy of detente.
The elimination of West Berlin as a potential source of tension would
greatly strengthen the USSR's detente policy.
Agreement has an additional effect.

However, the Quadripartite

As a result of it, the GDR will not

be in a position to act independently on West Berlin by asserting that
the matter is one of little concern to the USSR and its alliance.
Rather, the East Germans must act in at least approximate unity with
the Kremlin and must coordinate efforts under the umbrella of a Soviet
policy taking into consideration more than the issue of West Berlin
alone.

The haste with which the GDR has acted to negotiate agreements

with the West Berlin Senate and the Federal Republic which were
specified by the Quadripartite Agreement as necessary for the full
implementation of the treaty demonstrates the SED's understanding of
its role.
II.

THE WEST BERLIN ISSUE:

BASIC OR PERIPHERAL?

East German treatment of the West Berlin issue, it is reasonable
to assume, will vary according to the perceived nature of this problem.
If it is viewed as a peripheral or occasional problem, then the
prospects for compromise and accommodation will be much greater.

If

the West Berlin problem is, in fact, simply one of several relatively
equal concerns faced by the GDR, a more casual, balanced view of the.
matter will be possible.

However, if this issue is one which is, in

the perceptions of the SED's leadership, basic to the GDR as a state,
there will be little likelihood that the SED's concept of the proper
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approach to this problem will be one involving a willingness to
compromise on essential points of dispute.

In other words, the stakes

will be too high to permit the GDR to sustain a serious setback on the
West Berlin issue if it is seen as a problem of vital concern to the
survival of East Germany as a state.
One especially important way in which the West Berlin issue has
been manifested has been in the public reaction to the construction of
the Berlin Wall is 1961 and its continued rigid maintenance since that
time.

The consciousness of this situation among the East German

population has undoubtedly varied since August, 1961.

Though there

are no East German accounts dealing with the specifics of the public
reaction to the Wall, with the exception of the numi:;rous propaganda
reports that the country's population rejoiced at the construction of
this "antifascist protective wall," Western journalists who have been
permitted to visit the GDR frequently report the persistent dismay with
which the East Germans view the Wall which separates them from friends
lS
and relatives in West Berlin.
Apparently many, if not most East
Germans refused to

belie~e

that the Wall was designed not to keep them

in but rather to keep Westerners from entering.

This disbelief was

verified by the number of East Germans who attempted to escape across
the GDR-FRG frontier, either in Berlin or elsewhere, following the
construction of the Wall.

In the first six years after the securing

of the border, 26,000 East German citizens managed to cross illegally

l8John Dornberg, The Other Germany (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday &Company, 1968), pp. 109-110.
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into the West. 19

number of successful escapes leveled off to about
20
5,000 per year after the first few years but rose to 6,450 in 1973.
~he

While this exodus is in no way comparable to the losses prior to
August, 1961, it is testimony to the suspicion that the official
justification of the Wall has met with considerably less than universal
acceptance.
The SED's concern over the public's reaction to the complete
partition of West Berlin from the -rest of the city was reflected in
changes in the career patterns of the Central Committee which occurred
after 1961, according to Peter C. Ludz.

His extensive study shows that

the structure of the Central Committee in 1963 had changed in two
directions as compared with the Central Committee elected in 1958.
First, the "professionalization" of political functionaries in the party
apparatus increased and, second, functionaries with leading technical
and administrative occupations were found in greater numbers in 1963.
In addition, individuals from educational professions were more
prominent in the new Central Committee.

Ludz interprets this relative

"opening" of the SED toward different elements of GDR society as an
effort by the party to achieve at least a partial rapprochement between
21
itself and the East German population after the erection of the Wal1.

19 Ibid ., p. 111.
20Summary of World Broadcasts, January 2, 1974, EE/4489/A1/1.
(Hereafter noted as SWB.)
21peter C. Ludz, The Changing Party Elite in East Germany
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 239-240.
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The Ludz interpretation of the shifts in the composition of the SED
Central

Committe~

suffers from the same shortcoming as many journalistic

works dealing with perceptions of the Wall, namely, the lack of
empirical justification for the proposition that the construction of
the Wall fundamentally changed the perception of the regime among
certain strata of the population in East Germany.

While it is not

unreasonable to infer the unpopularity of the regime before the Wall,
it hardly follows that the erection of the Wall necessarily made the
SED even more unpopular among particular segments of the population.
However, one might justifiably view the SED's "opening" as an effort
to broaden the base of a regime that was already unpopular, a good move
wi th or without the Wall.
An additional important consideration for the SED in dealing with
the West Berlin problem is the impact of developments on the party
cadres.

While this may not be the greatest problem faced by the SED's

workers today, it is one of the closest and most visible.

A demonstrated

success in resolving the West Berlin matter would undoubtedly ease the
labors of the SED agitation-propaganda cadres in presenting the party's
case to East German citizens.

In the same fashion, an apparent defeat

would spell an increase in the difficulties they face.

The advantages.

that the SED would enjoy as a result of "proving" the validity of its
policies in any important area are just as obvious as the disadvantages
from which it would suffer should its policies be repudiated by
developments.

Ludz has asserted that the political system of the GDR

has remained unstable and has posited three reasons to substantiate his
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argument of political instability.

First, he writes, "s.ubstantial

segments of the population continue to withhold unqualified, active
support from the party and its politics."
hostile to the regime, according to Ludz.

Many groups are still openly
Second~

there has not been a

development of a "national consciousness" in the GDR.

The result is

that the normal citizen remains insecure regarding his conceptions of
the correct sort of political behavior.

Finally, Ludz believes that

the GDR's close identification with the USSR in foreign policy matters
has resulted in a feeling that the GDR is not a sovereign state.

He

concludes that as a result of the continuing political instability of
the regime, the SED's foreign policy considerations are of particular
.
Importance
to

.
t h e d omestlc

.
.
sltuatlon

0f

East Germany. 22

Accord'lng 1 y,

the results that the party achieves with regard to one of its most
prominent issues, the West Berlin problem, will be of great importance
in determining the ability of the SED to strengthen its regime.

This

involves not only the work of the cadres in encouraging efforts to reach
economic goals, but also in striving for the development of a national
consciousness for the GDR,

The morale of the cadres, who certainly

follow political developments much more closely than the average
citizen, will be directly affected by the success or failure of the
party leadership in achieving its objectives long before the general
population .. Their morale, m turn, will have an impact on their ability
to mobilize public support for the SED policies in other areas.

22Ludz , The GDR From the Sixties to the Seventies, p. 54, p. 79.
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Probably the most important consideration for the SED in approaching
the West Berlin problem is the issue of East German sovereignty.

East

German insecurity over the question of its sovereignty is reflected in
the preoccupation of its leaders and its publications with emphasizing
the sovereignty and permanence of the East German state.
twentieth anniversary of the GDR's founding in 1969,

On the

W~lter

Ulbricht

went to great lengths to stress the reality of East Germany's statehood.
Asking the question "What constitutes a modern state?," Ulbricht
answered himself by stating that a modern state must be a socialist
state and that the GDR "is the modern German socialist state to whom
the future belongs." 23 Recent East German accounts are careful to
point out that, contrary to Western charges, the GDR's sovereignty is
24
not in any way infringed by its close alliance with the USSR.
The
FRG, however, according to numerous East German accounts, is the state
which has curtailed its national sovereignty, having done so by its
alliance with the capitalist states.
The continued existence of a city of two million "on the territory
of the GDR," as Ulbricht never tired of repeating, is obviously seen as
an infringement of East German sovereignty.

Considering sovereignty as

the exercise of control over ones own territory, it cannot be denied
that the GDR does not enjoy complete sovereignty in that it lacks
control over West Berlin.

For a regime suffering from political

23ND , October 7, 1969, p. 3.
24
Neubert, pp. 139-140.
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instability, as Ludz asserts, such a deficiency must seem considerable.
The existence of West Berlin, even as an independent political entity
such as the SED prefers to consider it, must serve as a reminder of the
incompleteness of the GDR.

The SED's anxiety was undoubtedly intensified

during the years when the Federal Republic pursued a policy calling for
reunification of the two German states.

Faced with a conception of West

Berlin as only slightly less than a Land of the FRG and as a potential
base for an effort to achieve reunification in some undetermined manner,
the East German leadership probably was forced to condition itself to
regard West Berlin as an aggressive enemy outpost. As Bonn began a
retreat from a policy which involved such hostility toward the East
German regime, the need for the SED to regard West Berlin as one of the
most serious threats to the existence of the GDR diminished.

Yet, the

old attitude seems to have survived the gradual transition in West
German policy.

Even the most recent East German accounts and statements

continue to reflect an attitude of animosity toward West Berlin.

Though

there have been fluctuations in the intensity of·this approach, the
official East German view has been consistent even during those periods
of relative progress in resolving the West Berlin problem.
has varied but the essentials have remained the same.

The tone

The demands for

a reduction of the political presence of the FRG and for the cessation
of a variety of allegedly anti-GDR activities in West Berlin have
clearly indicated the desire of the SED to work toward a situation in
which the Western city will "blend in" with its surroundings.and be more
amenable to an eventual merger with the GDR.

In short, th.ere is no
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indication that the SED feels secure enough to be able to indefinitely
tolerate the existence of a separate city within its own territory.
In view of these considerations it is necessary to conclude that
the West Berlin issue is, from the East German point of view, not a
peripheral or secondary issue.

It is nota matter on which the SED

can afford to accept a serious, long-term setback, such as, for example,
one which would involve an increase in West Germany's official presence·
in West Berlin.

The statement by theGDR government protesting the

FRG's Environmental Office in West Berlin is a reflection of this. 25
Rather, the West Berlin issue involves concerns which are viewed as
basic to the GDR as an independent state and which will, therefore,
require the SED to refuse in the long run to abandon its view that all
of Berlin is actually part of the GDR. 26

This demand, dropped for

several years in m:'der to accommodate East Germany's .policy to that of
the Soviet Union, will ultimately have to be reasserted.
III.

THE WEST BERLIN THREAT:

POLITICAL OR MILITARY?

Having concluded that the West Berlin issue is one which poses
questions basic to the existence of the German Democratic Republic, it
is now necessary to determine the nature of the threat, if any, which
West Berlin presents to the SED.

In other words, what is the

25Poreign Affairs Bulletin (Berlin, GDR), Vol. 14, No. 22,
August 2, 1974, p. 167.
26Albert Norden, Thus Wars Are Made (Dresden:. Verlag Zeit im
Bild, 1970), p. 244.
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significance of this challenge to the.GDR?

Should West Berlin be viewed

as a military or as a political threat to East Germany?

The answer to

this question should facilitate an understanding of the possible
motivations that underlie the SED's policy on West Berlin.
The question of the significance of West Berlin as a military
threat to the GDR is the easiest one to consider.

On the many

occasions when the major powers have confronted each other in Berlin,
West Berlin has served as a base from which the Western powers,
particularly the United States, could threaten retaliatory action
against the Russians and their East German allies.

However, even during

the most severe of the many crises, such as the one in 1961, the Western
response to Communist pressure has been uneven.

On some occasions the

United States would give the appearance of a willingness to engage in
military action if necessary while on others the American determination
27
to stand firm in the face of possible war \'las in doubt.
The record of
the 1961 crisis was especially illustrative of Western restraint, in
spite of frequent statements of the intention to fight if necessary.28
Therefore, even during those times of

greates~

tension, when West Berlin

seems to pose the most serious military threat, the restraint or
timidity of the American and Western leaderships served to lessen the
possibility of war.

The lack of a military clash in Berlin during any

27James L. Payne, The American Threat (Chicago: Markham Publishing
Company, 1970), pp. 52-56.
28 Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 133-139.
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of the many confrontations of the past years points to the conclusion
that the West Berlin problem need not necessarily erupt into war.
Experience has shown that war is avoidable.

However, it is still

possible to argue that West Berlin poses a military threat to the GDR
and its allies through its function as a trip-wire.

That is, armed

aggression in Germany beginning in Berlin would clearly involve the
Western powers at an early moment.

This, however, is probably more

significant for the Soviet Bloc as a whole rather than for East Germany
alone.
The absence of war in the past does not, of course, resolve this
question.

There is still

th~

consideration of West Berlin as an advance

outpost of the Western military forces.

It is not unreasonable to argue

that the presence of NATO forces one hundred and ten miles inside the
territory of the Warsaw Pact constitutes a serious threat for more than
a possible trip-wire function.

However, this argument rests primarily

upon the assumption that a nonnuclear war is a possibility in Europe.
The validity of this assumption would require considerable restraint
upon the part of both the. WTO and NATO in the event of an outbreak of
armed hostilities involving Germany.

The conventional wisdom on this

matter, of course, is that. such a conflict could be fought by nonnuclear
means until one side perceives that the course of events is running
against it.

When this happens, if the stakes in the contact are too

great to permit a defeat, the temptation to utilize nuclear weapons
would be irrestible.

After all, if the defeat would entail the

disintegration of one's empire, or the termination of a highly valued
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"way of life," then it is not inconceivable that a rational
decision-maker might decide that a nuclear war is the lesser of the two
evils, as Herman Kahn has argued in his discussion of nuclear war by
"calculation. ,,29

This is not to argue that the .loss of East Germany

would necessarily lead to USSR to prefer war, but should a situation
arise in which war was chosen, the value of West Berlin as a military
outpost would be diminished as long-range missiles and bombers took
the place of conventional forces.

Therefore, considering the present

alliance systems in Europe, both of which have impressive nuclear
potential, the likelihood of a nonnuclear war in which West Berlin
plays a strategic role is very small.

While the disintegration of

the alliances might bring some change to this situation, speculation
on that requires such a radical alteration of the conception of the
political power distribution of Europe as to be virtually meaningless.
West Berlin's military value is, at best, only of marginal importance
to the Western powers today.
Concluding then that West Berlin does not constitute a serious
military threat to the GDR under present circumstances, it remains to
consider the city as a political thre,at to the SED's regime.

In this

context, the motivations for the concern expressed by the SED on the
West Berlin question become more apparent.

First, West Berlin continues

to serve as an important outpost of Western broadcasting efforts.

The

East German press and the SED's spokesmen have frequently expressed the

29Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York:
Books, 1962), pp. 53-61.
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regime's concern over the concentration of Western broadcasting media in
West Berlin as well as .along the .GDR-FRG frontier. 30

Western journalists

visiting the GDR have noted the degree of anxiety of the SED over the
fact that many East Germans seem to watch and listen to Western radio
and television.

This is expressed in a variety of efforts aimed at

discouraging citizens who wish to tune in West German and West Berlin
progr~s.

These efforts range all the way from instructing school

children in the evils of Western media to lectures by local party
activists. 3l In addition to the influence of the Western media which
are based in West Berlin, the SED has for many years had reason to fear
that the values of the society it was constructing might not be
sufficiently appreciated because of the appeal exerted by West Berlin
on GDR citizens who saw their own part of Berlin as shabby by comparison
with the more modern Western sectors.

However, the tremendous amount of

construction which has been completed in East Berlin with the last few
years has probably served to lessen the psychological impact of West
Berlin's prosperity.

This, coupled with the increase of economic

problems in the West generally, has probably decreased the significance
of West Berlin as a propaganda tool against the GDR.
The economic impact of West Berlin on the GDR in the past years
has probably bothered the SED more than the appeal that the city might
have for

30
31

di5~ffecteuEast

German citizens in general.

Volksarmee, No. 17, 1974, p. 6.
Dornberg, pp. 233-235.
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275

affected the East German economy in two important ways in the last two
or three years.

The first was to act as a funnel thrqugh which hundreds

of thousands of Western-purchased GDR marks flowed into the East German
economy.

Not only did the GDR's currency suffer as a result, but,

according to the GDR press, East German citizens were forced to compete
at a disadvantage with Western tourists for the purchase of certain
valuable commodities frequently in short supply.

In the fall of 1973,

the SED took steps to eliminate much of the need for "illegal" East
marks by doubling the required amount of currency that had to be
exchanged by visitors corning into the GDR while at the same time
continuing an intensified effort to apprehend currency smugglers. 32
While the economic damage that East Germany suffered as a result of
illegal currency exchanges was of little consequence compared with the
activities prior to the construction of the Wall in 1961, it was
evidently serious enough that the SED was willing to risk damage to
the process of detente with West Germany in order to attempt to bring
it to a halt.

While the minimum required exchange amount was lowered

in 1974, it remained well above the previous minimum.
A second way in which West Berlin presented an economic threat to
the GDR was by its use as a base for organizations specializing in
aiding escapes from East Germany.

The economic significance of this

activity is derived not from the numbers involved but from the types
of individuals who were being aided in leaving the GDR illegally.

32 ND, November 6, 1973, p. 3.

More
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and more highly trained specialists were being smuggled out of East

Germany to the FRG.and West Berlin where they enjoyed the prospect of
much higher salaries in their professions.

The East German press

continually cited West Berlin as a haven for "gangs of criminal
smugglers" which were composed of many West Berliners and U.S. military
personnel stationed in West Berlin. 33 Through its use by such
organizations, the SED has frequently charged, West Berlin is being
manipulated as a tool against the

politic~l

stability of the GDR.

Finally, West Berlin must be considered a political threat to the
SED's regime in that it stands as a symbol calling into question the
permanence of the GDR.

In the context of West German politics today,

West Berlin is not being used.to the fullest extent in this fashion.
However, the termination of the Brandt government could well mark the
end of a period in which the FRG sought to back away from challenges
to the permanence of East Germany as a separate state.

The manner in

which the Brandt government came to an end could well hasten.a process
of either revers·al or restraint of the Ostpolitik begun during Brandt's
years.

The disclosure that Gunter Guillaume, a close advisor to the

Chancellor, was in fact a longtime agent of the East German security
service tended to confirm suspicions that the Social Democrats under
Brandt's leadership had entertained illusions with regard to the
intentions of the Soviet Bloc states.

The subsequent sensational

treatment in much of the press of the Guillaume case, coupled with

33Ibid ., November 1, 1973, p. 2.

277

suggestions that the GOR was directing an espionage campaign embracing
other leading West German political figures 34 increased the prospects
for additional pressure on the Bonn government to alter its policy
toward not only East Germany but also the Bloc itself.

The decision

to go ahead with plans for establishment of a branch of the Federal
Environment Office in West Berlin shows how the city can be used to
facilitate a reversal of policy which the SED considered a political
attack on the GDR.
Following his elevation to the office of Chancellor. ,the West German
newspaper

I~ndelsblatt,

an economic journal which had followed Schmidtts

career closely because of his background in economic affairs, predicted
that Schmidt would approach the FRG's Ostpolitik with a more pragmatic
view than his predecessor who had held a somewhat emotional view on the
question of relations with the East.

Much was made in the Handelsblatt

analysis of the fact that Schmidt had been much more vocal in his
reaction to the Czech invasion of 1968 than Brandt and other leaders
of the Social Democratic Party.

Schmidt, the journal stressed, had seen

the invasion of,Czechoslovakia as justification for the FRG to shelve
plans for a Moscow-Bonn rapprochement. 35

By the summer of 1974, West

German newspapers were noting Schmidt's tendency to concentrate on
domestic policy at the expense of Ostpolitik.

While there were no

governmental statements indicating a formal change in the FRG's policy,

34Berliner Morgenpost, May 23/24, 1974, p. l.
35Handelsblatt, May 10, 1974, p. 5.
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West German commentators were noting that the policy of detente under
Schmidt was differing greatly from that policy under the Brandt
government.

As the Frankfurter Rundschau editorialized with favor in

July,
It could be a good thing that the small steps taken so far
become even smaller. Rappro,chement from now on will not be
marked by the prospect of revolutionary change so much as by
pressure to maintain the equilibrium. 36
A more puzzling question has been raised by the changed position
of the FRG in Sino-Soviet relations since the end of the Brandt regime.
In the first days after ,Schmidt's assumption of the office of Chancellor,
one West German newspaper noted that Schmidt had long enjoyed the favor
of Red China because he considers a strong Atlantic alliance and close
ties with the United States still to be in the ,best interests of
37
Europe.
Presumably, Brandt was regarded.by the Chinese as overly
critical of the Atlantic Alliance and too friendly to the Soviet Bloc.
When a delegation of Federal Republic parliamentarians announced their
plans to visit Red China in September or October of 1974, plans were
well under way for a visit by Schmidt himself in the spring of 1975.

38

Considerable controversy erupted in September when another West German
delegation under the leadership of Christian Democrat leader Helmut Kohl
toured Red China and was toasted by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Red
China with a reference to West Germany as the "one and only German

36

Frankfurter Rundschau, July 20, 1974, p. 4.

37Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 17, 1974, p. 5.
38Die Welt, August 20, 1974, p. 1.

279
nations." At another point, Premier Chou En-lai was quoted as having
said that he had never heard of a city called Kaliningrad but only of
Koenigsberg, an old German city incorporated into the USSR after
World War Two.

Pravda regarded this as an

attac~

by the Chinese on

both the USSR and the ,GDR and an effort by them to intervene in European
'
39 The fact that Schmidt's visit to Moscow occurred on schedule
a ff a~rs.
in October, 1974 helped dispel Soviet fears of an early union between
the Chinese and the West Germans.

Yet, the possibility remains that the

West Germans might become a factor in the competition between the USSR
and Red China.
The possibility of collusion between Peking and Bonn and the more
cautious Ostpolitik of the Schmidt government raise the possibility that
West Berlin might be used to mark an alteration of West German policy.
This is not because there is a direct

re~ationship

between the West

Berlin problem and Sino-Soviet-West German affairs but because it is
simply one of the most convenient opportunities for confrontation.
It is in a sense a barometer of the relations between the powers
involved in the disputes over the German question.

The absence of

a concerted effort on the part of the Bonn government to exploit the
West Berlin situation in some fashion does not remove the continuing
threat to the stability of the SED regime in East Berlin.

Brandt's

departure makes the possibilities of a renewal of West Berlin's status

39Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVI, No. 36,
October 2, 1974, pp. 16-17. (Hereafter noted as CDSP.)
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as what Honecker described as a "thorn in the flesh of the GDR" much
greater than in recent years.
IV.

MOTIVATIONS OF THE GDR'S WEST BERLIN POLICY

The most simple way to phrase the question which is the object of
this discussion is:

Was the SED's policy on West Berlin arrived at

independently or was it formulated as a result of Soviet dictation?
As previous chapters have

indicat~d,

the influence of the Soviet Union

on East Germany is indeed, to say the least, profound.

It is reflected

not only in the many twists and turns of the SED's foreign policy
statements but also in the elements which compose the society the SED
is working to create.

Clearly, the Soviet model is viewed as an

extremely valuable and authoritative guide for the officials of the
East German regime.

In 1972 Honecker praised the GOR's alliance with

the USSR as the "foundation for our successes" and described East
Germany's friendship with the Soviet Union as "sacred for us, for the.
working class of the GDR and for our people.,,40

He recently declared

that the SED and the CPSU were in agreement on all political,
ideological, and theoretical questions and that "every step" taken by
4l
the GDR was based on the alliance with the Soviet Union.
Undoubtedly,
no factor is of greater importance to the SED than its relationship with
its Soviet ally.

Citations of the value of the GDR-Soviet alliance are

40ND, January 7, 1972, p. 2.
4I Ibid ., May 13, 1974, pp. 1-2.
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outnumbered only by references to the Marxist-Leninist ideology
itself.
Yet, the phrasing of this question obscures as much as it might
reveal because it creates an impression that it is possible to speak
of a dichotomy in East German decision-making on West Berlin in which
some policies would be classified as independent while others would be
classified as dictated.

No such simple classifications are possible.

An examination of the West Berlin issue as it affects the GDR reveals
that there is an apparent equality of interests between East Berlin and
Moscow on this matter.

The fact that West Berlin continues to represent

a serious political threat to East Germany leads to the conclusion that
the SED turned to the Soviet Union in hopes of achieving a solution that
enabled the GDR to make the best of a less than perfect situation.
While the Quadripartite Agreement can in no way be viewed as the ,final
solution to the West Berlin issue for the SED, it does, in view of East
Germany's efforts to accommodate its policy with that of the USSR,
provide the ,GDR with the assurance that it can enjoy the prospect of
firm support from the ,Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The situation which

existed prior to Ulbricht's removal as First Secretary was one in which
East Germany was in danger of being isolated from its own allies and
thereby losing its viability as a state.

Ulbricht's efforts to impede

the process of a Soviet supported detente threatened to estrange East
Germany from the \'ITO without bringing any change in its position relative
to the West.

The SED's recognition of the futility of such a course was

reflected in Ulbricht's ouster in May, 1971 as First Secretary and his
replacement by an individual who enjoyed the backing of the Kremlin.
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'flle Soviet Union's interest in the West Berlin question has been a
reflection of its global interests in the development of detente between
itself and the United States.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

which demonstrated beyond all doubt. as Roger E. Kanet has written, that
East Europe is "considered a sphere of primary intere.st or domination
that will be prevented at all costs from significantly lessening its
dependence on the Soviet Union,,,42 cleared the way for tne Soviet policy
of detente by restoring, even if by force of arms, the unity needed for
extensive dealings with the West.

For both East and West, Berlin was

the symbol of a willingness to work for progress in the normalization
of relations between the two superpower blocs.

Brezhnev, as previously

noted, had described Berlin as a "detonator of tension and crisis," a
statement with which few could disagree.

Therefore, Berlin became a

convenient symbol because of a widely held view of the city as a
potential source of international tension.

In addition, the Berlin

issue was an extremely important segment of the overall German problem
and an important issue in the Western alliance because of the concern
of West Germany for the city.

Furthermore, while the USSR had a stake

in the Berlin problem, the disposition of that matter was not so great
as to prevent at least some prospects for compromise in view of the
crucial technological needs of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's

perenial lag in technology was such that by the end of the 1960's in

42Roger E. Kanet, '~zechos1ovakia and the Future of Soviet Foreign
Policy," in The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on
Eastern Europe, edited by E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz
(New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 95.
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some areas it was behind the United States by as much as forty years. 43
This Soviet need for technology
side of detente.

cons~itutes

for the .USSR the practical

An improvement in East-West relations could bring

Western technology to the Soviet Union and an improvement in the West
Berlin situation could bring the necessary changes in East-West
relations.

Therefore, post-Czechoslovakia East European unity, coupled

with a continuing need for Western technology, made the time right for
progress in normalization of West Berlin's situation.

Ratification of

the FRG's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland was also made
conditional on progress on the .West Berlin question by the Brandt
government.

Therefore, a resolution of the West Berlin problem, even,

if only a partial one, became an absolute necessity for the Kremlin.
The primary consideration for the USSR became one of overcoming East
Germany's resistence.
first was revealed in

This obstacle was removed by two steps.
Eri~h

The.

Honecker's report.to the SED Central

Committee in May, 1971, upon his return from the Twenty-fourth Congress
of the CPSU.

In his report, Honecker stated that the Congress had

confirmed both the rightness and the necessity of the SED's Abgrenzung
44
policy with regard to the Federal Republic.
By giving this assurance,
the Soviet leaders had relieved the SED of its fear that

de~ente

would

lead to an infiltration of East Germany by West German influences.

They

43Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Technology: System vs. Progress,"
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, September/October, 1970, pp. 19-21.
44ND , May 4, 1971, pp. 2-3.
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had also given support to the SED's resistance of contacts with the West
which, in the minds of the party leaders, might spell disaster for their
politically insecure regime.

The second step in the removal of the GDR

as an obstacle to the Soviet Union's global aspirations was achieved by
the forced retirement of Ulbricht.
Therefore, it is not necessary to conclude that either the GDR was
forced into a reversal of its rigid policy on.West
made the decision solely on its own.

Be~lin

or that it

The GDR's leadership made the

decision on the basis of what it perceived as being in its best interest
in terms of maintaining its viability as a member of an alliance system
directed by the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and what it saw as
advancing its position relative to West Germany on the other hand.
By pursuing a policy compatible with the global interests of the USSR,
the SED was able to stress the community of interests existing within
the Bloc and demonstrate its support for the concept of a unified
socialist foreign policy.

It also avoided a self-imposed isolation

from its allies which could have aggravated the East European situation
as much as the Czechoslovakian developments in 1968, developments which
the SED was most active in denouncing.

The GDR improved its position

relative to West Germany by the further development of the Abgrenzung
policy with an endorsement by Moscow.

The process of the complete

demarcation of East Germany from its western neighbor could now be
completed with the assurances that it had the support of the alliance
system which was presented as the foundation of every success enjoyed
by the GDR.

The SED's position on the West Berlin question itself
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improved as the GDR was now in a position to act as a competent

autho~ity

for the resolution of the many details to be worked out pursuant to the
Quadripartite Agreement.

This included such matters as traffic

arrangements which, in the past, had been viewed by the West as matters
for resolution by the World War Two allies themselves, with East Germany
specifically excluded.

The SED enjoys the right to take political

initiatives, but only as long as they fall within the ,boundaries of
Soviet guidelines.

Thi~

is at the heart of the discussions of a

coordinated socialist foreign policy.

Independent actions may be taken

only within the framework of a generally approved policy.

The

Quadripartite Agreement specified certain subsidiary agreements which
were to be negotiated by the GDR and the FRG and these secondary matters
are those concerns which would be clearly considered the responsibility
of the SED.

In the future, one could anticipate that the GDR may take

independent initiatives affecting GDR-FRG relations, but not altering
the ,fundamental East-West relationship.

Ulbricht's efforts to slow

the process of detente obviously fell into the latter category and for
that reason were considered beyond the limits of tolerable independence.
V.

THE WEST BERLIN PROBLEM IN THE ERA OF DETENTE

The groundwork for the present policy of detente pursued by the
Soviet Union in Europe today was laid in 1968 with the WTO's invasion
of Czechoslovakia.

With its intervention, the USSR demonstrated the,

firmness of its intention to maintain its control over the East European
communist party states and, at the same time, established the principle
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that Eastern contacts with the West must be made only with the approval
of Moscow.

West Germany's prompt acceptance of this principle was

indicated by its

e~forts

to negotiate a treaty on the renunciation of

force with the Soviet Union before attempting to do the same with
Poland.

The theme of East-West negotiations became the recognition

of realities rather than the earlier discussions of bridge-building
to the East by exploitation of polycentrism.

Such.efforts were all

too often perceived by the USSR as little more than attl;:J1lpts to
undermine the basis of the USSR's security system in Eastern Europe.
The reactions of the Soviet and East German presses to the Czech reforms
expressed the disapproval with which the Soviet leadership regarded
these developments.

However, after 1968 and the renewed stress on

unity which could be seen in the frequent calls for a coordinated
foreign policy, it became possible to speak of detente in Europe.
This relaxation of tensions was possible only because Moscow no longer
had reason to fear that it constituted a threat to its East European
system.
The Soviet Union's dialogue with the West was facilitated by the
policy which it began to enunciate regarding West

Be~lin.

Whereas in

the past, the USSR had issued frequent calls for an immediate withdrawal
of all Western troops and the creation of West Berlin as a "demilitarized
free city," as Krushchev had demanded in 1958,45 by 1971 it was talking

4S

Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 90-92.

(Baltimore~
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ab.out the recognition of the status quo regarding the city.

The

Quadripartite Agreement proclaimed that "ties between the Western
sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained
46
and developed,"
a sharp contrast with the Soviet pronouncements of the
previous decade.

It also declared that West Berlin-West

Germ~n

traffic

would be "unimpeded" and would "receive preferential treatment.,,47
These pledges, by themselves., constitute what would have seemed an
impossibility considering most of the past rhetoric on the West Berlin
problem.

The reactions of the West were summarized in the introduction

of the West German Press Office's release of the text of the agreement
and related documents.
Berlin lies in the heart of Europe. To reach.a settlement
t4erehas been described not only by the .Federal Government
but also by its Allies as a test of . . . the serious desire
of the Soviet Union to enter into unquestionable and irrevocable
obligations for detente and security in Europe . . . . When
the representatives of the Four Powers have set their
signatures under the important work, the peoples of Europe
will have reason to hope that they will be able to address
themselves, with prospects of success, to the further great
tasks of detente and cooperation that lie before them. 48
This statement clearly reveals the extent of expectations regarding the
completion of what is often referred to as a settlement of .the Berlin
problem.
The implicit assumption that the West Berlin issue has been
settled, however, seems lacking in justification.

46The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (Bonn:
Information Office of the FRG, 1971), p. 12.
47 Ibid ., pp. 11-12.

The interruptions

Press and

48 Ibid ., pp. 9-10.
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of traffic between West Berlin and the ,Federal Republic during the
49
summer of 1974 were a particularly vivid illustration .of the ease
with which agreements can lose.their meaning.
inter~uptions

Even in the absence of

in the flow of traffic to and from West Berlin, the

question of the value of the guaranteed transit rights by themselves
remains.

The insistence of the Soviet Union and the GDR that they have

the right to prevent the entry into

W~st

Berlin of certain individuals

or classes of individuals SO indicates that the city remains considerably
less than sovereign in the eyes of its Communist neighbors.

If it is

possible for the USSR and the GDR to raise this issue, then it is
equally possible to question the course of domestic affairs in West
Berlin in

othe~

respects.

If the USSR and its East German allies

insist on creating, through pressure, a West Berlin that differs very
little from Leipzig, what value should the West attach to transit rights
to the city?

After all, the .right to travel to West Berlin has been

only one aspect of the total West Berlin problem.

Talk of transit

rights has been based on an assumption that West Berlin's internal
affairs may remain as they are or be altered only by the West
themselves.

Be~liners

Yet, events subsequent to the conclusion of the Berlin

agreement lend substance to the belief that the .internal situation of
West Berlin might have to be altered as the price of guaranteed transit
rights.

The confidential nature of these rights was clearly demonstrated

49New York Times, July 23, 1974, p. 3.
SOIbid., July 21, 1974, p. 3.
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by the ruptures in West Berlin traffic following the announcement by the
FRG that a branch of the FRG Environment Office would be opened in the
.
51
c~ty.
Is one justified then in the belief that the West Berlin problem
has been

resolved by

the process of detente?

one could justifiably make such a claim.

It seems

unlik~ly

that

Detente has brought a

relaxation of the tensions surrounding the West Berlin dispute, but the
basic situation remains essentially as it has been since the end of
World War Two.

The Soviet Union and the GDR have made concessions,

but they are of such a nature that their reversal is possible at
literally a moment's notice.

The ease with which such a reversal could

be accomplished was shown by the events of·the summer of 1974.
What effect has detente had on the independence of the GDR?

All

evidence points to the conclusion that detente has been accompanied by
a lessening of the independence of the USSR's German ally.

In this

regard, the GDR's situation is not markedly different from that of its
other East European neighbors.

As Walter Laqueur has written, "the

Communist 'pluralistic universe' is largely mythical.

On the contrary,

the Soviet Union has reestablished its authority over most Communist
parties in the world. . .

This process of consolidation started

in 1968 with the invasion of Czechoslovakia and, ironically, resulted
in the removal of Walter Ulbricht as SED First SecretarY, a man who had

5l Ibid ., July 22, 1974, p. 2.
52Walter Laqueur, Neo-Isolationism and the World of the Seventies
(New York: The Library Press, 1972), p. 5.
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been one of the most enthusiastic advocates of the invasion.

Detente,

therefore, has resulted in a diminution of East German independence and
has made the West Berlin problem a central concern of Soviet policy as
the Kremlin has sought to demonstrate its desire for detente by
"progress" on the Berlin question.

The effect has been to charge the

SED with the implementation of the subsidiary details of the

agreeme~t

on West Berlin without giving it any real authority in determining the
overall configuration of that agreement.

Today, the .GDR is limited ,in

its initiative-making power to questions that fit within the framework
of general Soviet foreign policy.

Soviet policy sets the direction

while the GDR may do no more than act as an advocate of that policy.
The West Berlin problem remains with us in spite of the signing
of the Quadripartite Agreement, which was widely hailed as a
of the problem.

sett1~ment

Detente has brought recognition of West Berlin's ties

with the Federal Republic, but those ties existed prior to 1971 and did
not come as a result of detente.

The Quadripartite Agreement, as an

example of the recognition of realities, merely noted the existence the
"ties between the Western sectors of Berlin and the FRG" and asserted
that they "will be maintained and developed taking into account that
these sectors continue not to be a consistent part of the FRG.,,53

Of

greater importance is the nature of the Soviet conception of detente.
This conception is predicated on a belief that detente involves change.
As a recent commentary in World Marxist Review observed, "the dialectics

53The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, p. 12.
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of international detente" must be seen as a "combination of cooperation
and stl:'uggle." 54 Accordingly, the Soviet Union and its allies cannot be
expected to regard the status que in Berlin as final.

It is simply one

point in a continuing process which, as they, see it, will result in
victory for the Uprogressive forces" of the world.

This problem is not

unique to the USSR on the Berlin question, but affects the Soviet view
of international relations with the West in general.
Since the Soviet policy is predicated upon an assumption of change,
it is appropriate to consider the factors that will condition change
regarding the West Berlin situation.
is Soviet politics.

One of the most crucial factors

The potential for confrontation in West Berlin

continues to exist and represents a serious threat to the perpetuation
of the policy of detente.

Should shifts in the distribution of power

in the Soviet Union occur in such a way as to increase the Kremlin's
desire for confrontation and decrease its need for detente the West
Berlin issue could serve as a convenient occasion for a dramatic
reversal of policy.

The relationship between Soviet internal politics

and Soviet foreign policy have been explored by Michel Tatu in his
analysis of the 1962 Cuban missle crisis.

Tatu concludes that

Khrushchev's Cuban move was part of a series of Soviet initiatives
designed to bolster his standing within the Kremlin hierarchy while

54 Jan Prazsky, "The Dialectics of Detente," World Marxist Review,
Vol. 17, No.9, September, 1974, p. 130.
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fundamentally altering the world balance of power. 55 The same thing
could happen again involving a crisis over West Berlin.

While it is

impossible to predict, the continuation of the Berlin problem means
that confrontation remains a future possibility.
East German politics is a second conditioning factor.

Internal

political demands could affect the GDR's West Berlin policy, especially
if West Berlin should pose.a serious threat to .the stability of the
SED's regime.

Should the West Berlin

comrnunicatio~s

media present the

GDR with what its leaders might perceive as a serious threat to the
power of the SED, one would expect to see considerable agitation for
a reversal of the present West Berlin policy.

It would always be

possible for the SED to argue that the influence of

Wester~

media

api1ling over into the GDR is creating difficulties in the construction
of socialism.

It might even be able to present a case that would

persuade the Russians to allow the implementation of East German
initiatives against West Berlin.

The continuation of the loss of

valuable personnel to the West as a result of the attractions of West
Berlin and the FRG might also serve to trigger demands for sanctions
against the city.

If the SED was able to present a reasonable case

that large numbers of people trained by the GDR were fleeing to West
Berlin as a result of the promise of higher salaries, then the USSR
might agree to go along with East German demands for "reparations" from

55Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York:
pp. 261-276.

Viking Press, 1968),
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West Berlin industries.

Such an eventuality would dramatically alter

the present West Berlin situation.
West German political developments will also affect future changes
in the West Berlin situation.

Should the leftward drift of the Social

Democratic Party be accelerated by the activities of the party's young
militant left wing, a possibility which has been noted frequently,56
the impact on West German policy could be considerable.

An equally

sharp turn toward the right as a result of an increased appeal by the
more conservative parties, something which might happen should the SPD
move leftward, might also bring a reversal of the current policy on West
Berlin.

More spy scandals might have a similar effect.

Finally, NATO politics will have an important effect on the West
Berlin situation.

NATO policies, of course, are to a large degree a

function of American political developments and the increase of
isolationist sentiments in the United States would clearly have a
significant impact on NATO.

It would lead to a weakening of the

Atlantic Alliance which would, in turn, make a unified Western policy
on issues such as West Berlin more difficult than at present.

The

lack of Western unity would obviously give the Soviet Union an advantage
in any negotiations of West Berlin.

A shift in the opposite direction

of isolationism is also a possibility.

If this should be the case, the

USSR might witness the formulation of a NATO policy calling for detente
at a higher price and with demands for more meaningful concessions on

56 Laqueur, p. 42.
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all matters subject to negotiation.

Communist organs have noted this

possibility and expre!i.sed thei,r firm belief that such an eventuality
,
57
would result in defeat for the West.
West Berlin's situation is, therefore, one which is a function of
a variety of conditioning factors.

The central point, however, is ,that

the West Berlin problem has neither disappeared nor been totally and
finally stabilized.

F~ather,

it is subj ect to change and will likely

continue to evolve in the years ahead.

The final chapter will consider

the present status we have arrived at and the possibilities for
resolution of the problem in the future.

In each of the possible

scenarios of resolution, consideration will be given to the impact on
the continuing issue of independence for the East German leadership.

57

Prazsky, pp. 130-131.

CHAPTER VII
SCENARIOS FOR A FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BERLIN PROBLEM
This chapter proposes to evaluate the Quadripartite Agreement of
1971 in order to determine its effect on the status of West.Berlin.
What has changed now that the Agreement has gone into force?

The answer

to this question will enable us to ascertain West Berlin's present
situation in terms of its advancement toward a final resolution of the
Berlin problem.

In addition, this chapter will attempt to plot a

variety of prospective solutions to this lingering post-War issue.
These solutions will be presented as though part of a continuum from
the most to the least desirable on the basis of what may be logically
determined as in the interest of East Germany.

In each case, the impact

on the GDR's independence from Soviet influences will be considered.
I.

THE EFFECT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1971

The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was intended not to resolve
the West Berlin problem as such, but rather to settle those questions
which have been responsible for most of the quarrels and difficulties
regarding the status of the city.

Expectations that the agreement would

"settle" the problem were neither justified nor fulfilled.

An

examination of the agreement itself quickly demonstrates its intentions
regarding the city.

Its primary concern seems to have been the

stabilization of the West Seriin

~3sue
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by a recognition of the status quo

2;)6

in most respects.

The principle questions with which the Agreement

dealt were the traffic problem, the

~atter

of representation of West

Berlin ,abroad, the participation of West Berlin in international
activities of the FRG, visits by West Berlin residents to the GDR,
and ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin.
The traffic problem is first considered in paragraph A of Part II
of the Agreement.

In this section, the four occupying powers agree that

traffic to and from West Berlin and the FRG will be "unimpeded" and that
"such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place in the most simple
and expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential treatment."l
Annex I of the Agreement specifies the details of the arrangements for
implementing this provision.

The essential point is that traffic

through the GDR's territory becomes the responsibility of the East German
authorities who are to work directly with the West German and West Berlin
officials.

Costs related to traffic on the communication routes to West

Berlin are to be paid in an annual lump sum by the FRG to East Germany.2
This is a departure from the previous situation in which traffic matters
were always and exclusively referred to the occupying powers because
East and West German officials would not work together.

Air traffic and.

military traffic are not considered in the Agreement and remain the
exclusive responsibility of the Four Powers.

The positions of the major

powers in Berlin change little as a result of the Agreement leading to

on Berlin (Bonn:

--~~~~~~~~~--~------------

, p. 12.

2Ibid ., pp. 14-16.

Press and Information

297
the conclusion by three scholars of international law that the FRG and
the GDR sti11 have "only limited sovereignty" in control of transit
traffic. 3
The matters of representation of West

Be~lin

residents abroad and

the participation of West Berlin in international activities of the
Federal Republic were considered in Annex IV.

Provisions are made for

the FRG to perform consular services for permanent residents of West
Berlin.
Union.

This step constitutes an important concession by the Soviet
The provision relating to West Berlin's participation in

international activities also must be seen as an example of the
willingness of the Soviet leaders to grant an additional concession.
In section C of Part 2 of the Annex, the FRG is given the right to
represent the "interests of the Western sectors of Berlin in
international organizations and international conferences.,,4

In the

next paragraph, this right is broadened to include West Berlin's
participation with the Federal Republic in international exchanges
and exhibitions.
Paragraph C of Part II of the Agreement considers the issue of
visits by West Berliners to the GDR and declares that such visits will
be possible for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial
r.easons in addition to tourism. 5 For this purpose, additional border

3Gunther Doeker, Klaus Melsheimer, and Dieter Schroder, "Berlin and
the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971," American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 67, No.1., January, 1973, p. 59.
4The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, pp. 19-20.
5Ibid ., p. 13.
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crossing points were opened and five offices were established in West
Berlin where permanent residents of the city could apply to visit the
GDR.

The conside!'eble delays which were immediately assoc.iated with

this system gave credence to the belief that the SED did not actually
welcome the prospect of a sharp increase in human contacts across the
Wall. 6 The doubling of the entry fees and the required minimum exchange
amounts in 1973 was another indication that the East German leadership
wanted to discourage such contacts.
The most important concession to the West comes in paragraph B of
Part II .with the assertion that "ties between the Western sectors of
Berlin and the Federal Republic will be maintained and developed. .

,,7

The importance of this expression of a special relationship between the
FRG and West.Ber1in has already been discussed in terms of its impact
on the .position of the GDR at that time.

This clearly represents a

reaffirmation of the status quo by the USSR favorable to the Western
position.

However, this is coupled with a Western disavowal of any

claims that West Berlin is a "constituent part" of the FRG.

Accordingly,

the West German Bundestag and the Bundesrat will be denied the right to
hold any future plenary sessions in West Berlin, no small concession in
itself in view of the symbolic value attached to these demonstrations of
West German ties with West Berlin.

This prohibition extends to other

constitutional or official acts by eoverning bodies of the .FRG and

6Suddeutsche Zeitung, March 21, 1972, p. 3.
7The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, p. 12.
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meetings by committees of the West German political parties. 8 An
additional shortcoming for the West in this provision of the Agreement
is the lack of a definition of "ties."

The period after the

implementation of the Agreement has been filled with East German
arguments about the difference between "ties" and "bonds" between
9
the FRG and West Berlin.
Experiences of the three years following the completion of the
Quadripartite Agreement have justified statements of those who denied
that a situation had evolved in which all the differences of the past
twenty-five years would be forgotten.

The official view of the Bonn

government was expressed early in 1974 by President Gustav Heinnemann
who, while visiting West Berlin, asserted,
. What has emerged for Berlin and its citizens could
surely be no ideal solution; and yet it ,is something that is
easier to live with than the ,previous circumstances . . . .
With this Four-Power Treaty, a circumstance emerged that has
been tediously created, and that nobody considers the best of
all possible solutions, an arrangement that has been accepted,
has been recognized as being a basis on which Berlin can
function .10
The present situation is, therefore, viewed by the West German government
as an improvement over the previous arrangement, but by no means a
perfect or final solution.

In this regard, their position is like that

of the Soviet and East German leaders who advocate a conception of

8 Ibid .,

p. 17.

9Neues Deutschland, November 9, 1973, p. 3.

(Hereafter noted as

NO.)
lOThe Bulletin (Press and Information Office of the FRG), Vol. 22,
No.8, February 28, 1974, p. 52.
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detente based.on a belief in the continuation of change.

There is a

generally held view that the status quo is less than desirable, in spite
of concessions that each side might justifiably regard as an improvement
in terms of their particular interests.

According to Doeker, Melsheimer,

and Schroder, in te,rms of international law, Greater Berlin remains as a
"special area in Germany" and the status of that special area has not
been changed by the Quadripartite Agreement. ll
clearly not been resolved.

The Berlin problem has

It is, then, at this point appropriate to

turn to a consideration of alternatives to the present Berlin situation.
II.

TOTAL INCORPORATION:.

THE MAXIMUM SOLUTION

Professor Elmer Plischke has hypothesized that there are two
primary sets of options for consideration in an effort to formulate a
resolution of the Berlin problem.

The first matter is the prospects

for reama1gamation of the two halves of the city.

Considering the

present conflict of interests between the major powers involved, he
concludes there is little prospect for a reunification of the city.
second option relates to the method of settling the Berlin question
within the context, of the broader German problem.

This, according to

P1ischke, is the most appropriate and reasonable of the options but,
life reamalgamation of Berlin, remains unattainable under present
circumstances. 12 The problem of present-day realities is obviously

11Doeker, Me1sheimer, and Schroder, p. 61.
12Elmer Plischke, "Resolving the Berlin Question: an Option
Analysis," World Affairs, Vol. 131, No.2, July, 1968, pp. 94-99.
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the major stumbling block in a.n effort to formulate scenarios for
resolution of this pro'lJlem.

The~efore,

in those which are discussed

here, there will be no assumption that the status quo is our starting
point.

Rather, each

w.i~l

be approached in terms of its desirability

and the status quo will be evaluated as it helps or hinders such a
resolution.
Certainly the best and most final settlement of the Berlin issue
would be the total incorporation of West

Be~lin

into the GDR.

From

the East German point of view this would represent the maximum gain for
the GDR in resolving this problem.

It would mean

tha~

West Berlin would

finally become, as Ulbricht liked to say, the "western suburbs of the
capital of the GDR." Through an implementation of this solution, the
basic abnormality of the Berlin situation, the physical division of the
city between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, would be eliminated.
The benefits that the East German regime would accrue as a result
of this would be considerable.

First, the GDR would be able to add

one hundred and eight-five square miles of territory to its capital
city.

At present West Berlin comprises over 54 percent of what was

formerly Greater Berlin,13 thus by its addition to East Berlin, the
GDR capital would be more than double in size.

Second, the GDR would

gain over two million new inhabitants,14 asswning that the majority of
West Berlin's residents either chose to remain or were unable to leave.

13John Brose and Kathleen Kerr, Berlin in Brief (West Berlin:
Press and Information Office of the Land Berlin, 1969), p. 61.
l4 Ibid ., p. 64.
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For a nation with a population of only seventeen million"the addition
of two million people would be an extremely significant increase.
Likewise, the industry of West Berlin would also be a valuable boon
to the East German economy.
While the material advantages that the .GDR would gain from the
incorporation of West Berlin are of great value, the psychological
benefits that East Germany would enjoy are even greater when the SED's
most pressing needs are taken into consideration.

First, there would

be a significant increase in the GDR's prestige by virtue of having the
largest city in both Germanies as its capital. lS This would help dispel
the impression of East Germany as a "rump" nation created out of the
poorer sections of Hitler's Germany.

In addition, this would lend to

the enhanced stability of the ,GDR since the region which for many years
seemed to call into question the permanence of East Germany as a separate
state would have finally become part of that state.

For many years West

Berlin served as what many West Germans regarded as a pan-German
symbol. 16 The removal of this symbol once and for all would be a
serious psychological setback for those desiring German reunification.
Furthermore, with West Berlin no longer existing as a separate entity
inside East German territory, the Berlin Wall could at last be
dismantled.

This would enable the SED to claim that it, not the FRG,

had succeeded in restoring the unity of Berlin.

lSIbid., p. 61.
l6Die Welt, August 31, 1971, p. 6.
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tremendous propaganda value out of its demolition of the Wall erected in
1961 to prevent an "imperialist invasion" of the GDR, as East German
spokesmen have claimed.

Finally, the SED would have removed what Erich

Honecker described as a "thorn in the .flesh of the GDR, . . . a
front-line city and bridgehead of revanchist policies against the
'1'~s t s t a t es . . . . ,,17
Soc~a

West Berlin would no longer be a potential

base for either escape organizations or espionage

operatio~s.

Nor would

non-Communist radio and television stations exist inside the territory
of a Communist state.

This itself would improve East Germany's situation

relative to preventing unwanted communications with the West.
There is, however, a potential loss associated with this solution.
Melvin Croan has written that the SED regime has grown accustomed to
tension since its creation and still needs a degree of.tension in order
h bsence
to compensate f or tea

0

f aura
d bl e sense

'
" 1 ~""dent~ty.
0 f nat~ona

18

West Berlin's situation inside the GDR provided the SED with its best
opportunity for confrontation with the West on an occasional basis and
for stressing to its citizens that there were enemies within their midst
on a permanent basis.

It was not difficult for Ulbricht, Honecker, and

others to create a sense of tension as the GDR was presented in constant
confrontation with Western spies, agents, and provocateurs.

Without

West Berlin as a "thorn in the flesh," the SED will be deprived of one
of its important unifying elements.

17

NO, June 7, 1972, p. 1.

l8Melvin Croan et a1., "The Role of the GDR Within Eastern Europe,"
Eastern Europe in the'1970s, edited by Sylva Sinanian, Istvan Deak, and
Peter C. Ludz (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 245.
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In terms of its effe(:t on East Germany's evolution toward
independence, this solution provides both positive and negative aspects.
The GDR would gain independence in that its dependency on the Soviet
Union as the representative of East German interests with the Four-Powers
would be eliminated.

In addition, the successful resolution of the West

Berlin problem would mean that the SED would no longer need fear a
Soviet "sellout" of East German interests on this question because the
question would no longer exist.

However, the possible methods for

accomplishment of this solution might leave the SED even more indebted
to the Kremlin than in the past.

This brings us to the question of the

feasibility of this solution.
How would it be possible for the East Germans to gain control of
West Berlin? Obviously, they lack the resources to achieve control of
the city by themselves.

Only the ,USSR has the political and military

power to do this and there seems to be little prospect for change in
this situation in the foreseeable future.

Clearly, Soviet action of

some sort would be necessary for the East Germans to achieve this
objective.

One way in which the Soviet Union could secure the ,city

would be by a coup.

Given the proper circumstances, one of which would

be a diminished Western interest in West Berlin, a real possibility in
the wake of the 1971 Berlin Agreement and the subsequent progress of
detente, the Soviet Union and its East German allies could quickly seal
off the city in a fashion similar to that used in 1948 and couple this
with a series of moves inside West Berlin by civilian supporters designed
to rupture the city's communications as much as possible.

Assuming that
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the Western military presence in West Berlin is considerably reduced, or
still better, completely terminated, such an effort might well succeed.
This action would, however, require the USSR to be willing to risk war
unless it is reasonably certain that the West will not, in fact,
actually go to war for Berlin.
A more likely avenue, however, would be for the USSR to work out an
exchange with the Western powers whereby they would be given control of
West Berlin in return for some other concession to the West.

This would

involve no risk of an armed confrontation with the West and might
actually be presented as an action consistent with detente.

As a result

of Soviet military advances during the era of detente, the USSR enjoys
the very real prospect of military superiority over the Western powers,
according to a.number of Western scholars on Soviet and world

10
affairs.-~

If this materializes, it is possible that in the not too distant future,
the USSR might be able to negotiate an exchange by which the West would
yield West Berlin in return for some much less important compensation.
The West, negotiating from a position of decided weakness, might be
forced to accept unfavorable terms.
Obviously, whichever route is used to effect Communist control over
West Berlin, the East Germans would be more indebted to the Soviet Union
than ever before.

However, an important distinction here is that they

would be indebted for something already delivered.

At present, they are

dependent upon the USSR to fulfill a continuing service for them, a

..
19Robert Conquest et al., "Detente: an Evaluation," Survey,
Vol. 20, Nos. 2/3, Spring/Summer, 1974, pp. 8-9.
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service which can be altered depending upon the mood of the J(remHn's
leadership.

In

sh~!"t.

increased indebtedness.

the SED would be replacing dependency with
The latter seems preferable fl'om the East

German point of view.
III.

TOTAL INCORPORATION:

A TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE

This alternative is similar to the previous solution in that its
end is the same. a reunified Berlin.

However, in several important

aspects. it differs from the total incorporation of West Berlin by a
more or less unilateral action.

Accordingly,it enjoys at least two

advantages over the former method of resolution.
This settlement would come about as the result of an exchange of
territory between the GDR and the FRG.

It would have to be something

upon which both sides were in agreement.

It is not inconceivable that

the East Germans might decide that an exchange of, possibly, Suhl bezirk
in the southwestern part of the GDR plus parts of Erfurt bezirk,
including the city of Erfurt, might be acceptable in return for West
Berlin.

In order to avoid the sort of thing that occurred in the first

months after the construction of the Berlin Wall when many people chose
to risk death rather than resign themselves to remaining in East Germany,
a population transfer should be arranged.

The population of Suhl bezirk

is over half a million and, assuming that approximately one half of the
population is Erfurt bezirk is involved, there is an additional half
million to be moved, plus the population of Erfurt, which is two hundred
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thousand.

20

Therefore, the East Germans will have approximately

1.2 million people to move while the West Germans will have to consider
the transfer of two million people.

In spite of the trouble involved,

such a massive transfer is preferable to the alternative.

This movement,

of course, is not a particularly monumental task compared with those
which took place in Europe in the first years after World War Two.
There would be an obvious disparity in terms of the actual amounts
of territory involved in this exchange.
what formula

However, regardless of exactly

was used in determining which land the GDR would

sacrifice~

it is almost certain to have to surrender a larger amount of territory
in order to, one, provide the West Germans with at least one fairly
large city, and two, to approximate the number of people involved in
the exchange.

Considering the real estate the East Germans would be

receiving, this exchange would still be to their advantage.
Such an exchange would be characterized by orderliness and bilateral
negotiations between the East and West Germans.

A political precondition

for these negotiations would be an extremely favorable atmosphere of
detente involving both Germanies and their major allies.

It could never

take place in the. presence of serious, basic disputes between the two
alliance systems.

In this respect, this solution differs markedly from

the first one considered.
All that is required of the USSR in this case is that it allow its
East German ally to participate in the negotiations and attempt to work

20Statistical Pocket Book of theGDR (Berlin, GDR:
DDR, 1973), pp. 11-12.

Staatverlag der
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out an arrangement for the Berlin problem on its own.

The four occupying

powers in Berlin would all have to be in agreement to a .surrender of
their rights in Berlin for this solution to be feasible.

It is

reasonable to conclude that, for the Western powers, this would present
little problem.

First, they are there ostensibly to defend.the interests

of the population of West Berlin.

Should the. West Berlin Senate express.

its desire for such a solution, and such a desire would be a prerequisite
for this plan, then there would be no reason for the West to object.
Second, considering the current economic and political problems of the.
Western powers, it would be in their interest to eliminate at least part
of their German commitment.
The situation for the Soviet Union is somewhat more complex.
Agreement would require a willingness on their part to yield what amounts
to a powerful lever that it exerts in limiting East German freedom of
action.

By virtue of its status .as the protector of East German

interests in relation to the West Berlin problem, the USSR has an
advantage in dealing with the SED.

A complete resolution of the West

Berlin question would deprive them of this advantage.

At the same time,

this solution also involves the sacrifice of a jointly held lever that
the USSR and the GDR hold against the West.

For years the existence of

West Berlin as an outpost of Western prestige gave the WTO powers a
convenient target at which to strike in the .event of a serious East-West
disagreement.

This solution, as well as the previous one, would require

a loss of·one of the Warsaw Pact's .best weapons.
The effect of this solution upon East German-Soviet relations would
be to increase the GDR's independence.

East Germany's dependence upon
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the USSR as the protector of its sovereign interests in West Berlin
would be terminated.

Also, unlike the previous settlement, this one

requires no Soviet action which would measurably increase the GDR's
indebtedness to the Kremlin.
The principal advantages of this plan over the previous one are,
first, that no hostile East-West confrontation is required, and, second,
that this proposal could actually be presented as serving the .interests
of detente.

Obviously, by this method, there is no threat or possibility

of·an outbreak of military hostilities between the powers

involve~.

This very fact increases the feasibility of this alternative.

Regarding

the second advantage of this over the first plan, it must be kept in
mind that this route would be consistent with current Soviet policy.
Furthermore, since no show of force by the East.is involved, there is
nQ necessity for a humiliation of a West which might see itself as
militarily inferior.

Notions of military inferiority or superiority

do not play any part at all in this scenario.
It is also important to note that all the gains which the GDR would
have enjoyed by the previous alternative are preserved in this plan with
two exceptions.

First, the GDR would not gain the entire population of

West Berlin and, second, since this plan involves an orderly transfer of
the population, it is reasonable to conclude that much, if not most, of
the material wealth of the city, including industrial installations,
would also be removed.

In addition, of course, the East Germans are

required to surrender some territory of their own.
The primary disadvantage of this route is that it would likely
require that the FRG be recognized as a power with the right to act on

310

the full and final disposition of the West Berlin issue.

West Germany

would not only be acting on behalf of West Berlin, but would also be
inheriting the population and most of the movable resources of the city.
IV.

A COMMUNIST CONTROLLED WEST BERLIN

The two previous alternatives for a settlement of the Berlin
problem resulted in the disappearance of West Berlin as a separate
entity.

In this scenario, West

essentially a

sep~rate

Be~lin

continues to exist as what is

city with its own government.

While the city

is Communist controlled, the ,control is exercised, not through the SED,
but rather the ,SEW, the West Berlin branch of theGDR's Socialist Unity
,Party.

The SEW is responsible for the operation of the city government

and acts through the West Berlin Senate.

Other political parties would

either be surpressed or would operate as "echoes" of the

~EW.

Such

political parties as the Christian Democrats would almost certainly have
to be completely abolished while the Social Democrats might be merged,
with the SEW just as the East German Social Democratic party was united
with the Communist Party after the war to form the ,SED.
In this scenario, the matter of Allied rights in Berlin becomes a
special concern.

To allow the Four Powers to continue as so-called

occupying powers in the city would be to perpetuate what would be, by
this time, an obviously uneeded relic.
Berlin would most likely be terminated.
reasons.

Therefore, Four-Power rights in
This seems probable for two

First, the SED's anti-Western attitude would make the

continuation of American, British, and French rights in West Berlin
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most difficult.

The SED, as a communist party, would be inclined to

regard the Western forces as a hostile element.

Second, and most

obvious, there would be little need for maintenance of the Western
garrisons to defend the rights of a pro-Soviet West Berlin.

The

rationale of the maintenance of Western forces in the city was that
they would provide protection against the USSR and the GDR.

Under the

terms of this settlement, the East Germans and the Russians would be
regarded as West Berlin's protectors.
A West Berlin controlled by the SEW would, of necessity, have to
be subjected to a social revolution such as that undertaken in the
Soviet Zone of Occupation after the war.

West Berlin's economy is on

a capitalistic basis with Western banks and other financial institutions
in operation there.
Berlin.

The Federal Republic's currency is used in West

Branches of West German commercial enterprises are situated

in West Berlin.

All of these as well as any other vestiges of capitalism

would have to be eliminated or brought under the control of the state.
The schools would also have to be remodeled so as to reflect the views
of the SEW.

The West Berlin police force would have to be carefully

examined and purged of any "hostile" elements.

In short, the SEW would

face a task of completely restructuring the society of a city of two
million people so as to make it compatible with the society of the GDR.
How could the SEW manage to gain control of West Berlin?

Its

ascension could most easily come about as a result of political and
economic turmoil.

Should the Western nations suffer from a serious

economic depression, West Berlin would be

affected~

A consequence would
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well be the political upheaval that would facilitate the SEW's seizure
of power through the electoral process.
c~rtainly

In its efforts, the SEW would

be able to count on substantial support from the GDR.

The

GDR might even be expected to engage in covert intervention in West
Berlin politics or in some other manner attempt to subvert the
processes so as to aid the SEW.

politic~l

The GDR and the USSR together could

apply external pressure on West Berlin at this time.

They could issue

a series of protests against "fascist provocations" by the .SEW's
opponents or they could promise the city that it would enjoy special
benefits as a result of indicating its "political maturity" by electing
the SEW.

The prospect of removing the Berlin Wall could even be raised

as an incentive to vote for the.SEW.

The main point is that the SEW's

elevation to power would be as a result of the operation of the West
Berlin political system.

Its control would be gained by essentially

democratic methods aside from the external pressure of its allies across
the Wall.

There would be no organized violence although there might be

considerable unorganized violence through demonstrations and riots
designed to show the failure of the non-Communist political forces.
Nor would Soviet or East German troops play any role in the SEW's
victory.

It would be important to avoid the introduction of direct

military pressure on West Berlin lest the Western powers take
countermeasures.

The atmosphere of detente would be helpful in aiding

the SEW's victory since it would diminish fears of a "Communist menace"
among the West Berlin electorate.
weaken that favorable atmosphere.

Military confrontations would likely
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The advantages of this scenario over the previously discussed ones
are that it involves no serious East-West confrontation, it requires no
exchanges of territory, nor does it demand that the FRG be re·eognized as
the authoritative agent of the ,West Berliners.

The GDR still enjoys the

benefits of an increase in its real Sstate holdings, enhanced prestige
and stabil-;'ty, and the removal of what Honecker described as a "thorn"
in the GDRls flesh.

It would also be possible to remove the Wall once

"hostile elements" in West Berlin were subdued.
In terms of East German-Soviet relations, the GDRls position would
improve as a result of the ,implementation of this scenario.

The Soviet

contributions in this case would consist of a willingness to give up its
special rights in Berlin and any assistance which it might possibly give
in the application of external pressure on West Berlin.

Consequently,

the GDR does not substantially increase its indebtedness since the ,USSR
would not be required to make any extraordinary efforts.

East German

independence is increased as a result of the settlement of the Berlin
problem in this fashion.
The nature of the arrangement that results from this sequence of
events raises a question as to the permanence of West Berlin as a
separate SEW-controlled entity.
to endure indefinitely?

Would such an arrangement be expected

It would probably be maintained just long

enough to enable the SEW to complete its social revolution and to allow
the Western powers to leave and forget Berlin.

If the separate status

was officially terminated too soon, the Western powers might feel
compelled to make some response, even if only to indicate that they
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realized they had been outmaneuvered or deceived.

The West, however,

might prefer to overlook any Communist duplicity in order to avoid a
confrontation in which they would have little to gain in view of a fait·
accompli in West Berlin.
V.

A "FINLANDIZED" WEST BERLIN

In this variation West Berlin continues to exist as an independent
entity under non-Communist control.

There has been neither a social nor

a political transformation of the city.

East German-West Berlin

relations are essentially cordial or, at the very worst, not openly
hostile.

West Berlin is viewed as neutral and allied with neither

East nor West.

In spite of its neutrality, West Berlin's trade with

the GDR is extensive and of special importance to the city's economy.
There is no

l~er

Western troops

a Four-Power status for the city and there are no

present~

West Berlin is not operated as a United Nations

protectorate but is regard~d as a'sovereign political entity.
In spite of West Berlin's independence and neutrality, it is
subject to intervention in its internal affairs by the GDR.

In this

regard, the pattern of East German-West Berlin relations resembles that
of the Soviet Union and Finland.

This relationship is characterized

by frequent Soviet intervention in Finnish domestic political affairs.

21

The Finnish government was initially described as sufficiently to.the

21Bengt Matti, "Finland," Communism in Europe, Vol .. Two, edited by
William E. Griffith (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 374-375.
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left to allay Soviet suspicions, but sufficiently representative of the
center and bourgeois elements not to seem a prelude to communist
· t ators h'l.p. 22
dl.C

With the passage of time, Soviet influence over Finland

increased, but there was no move to establish a dictatorship under the
control of the Finnish Communist Party.

West Berlin's position is

geographically much worse than that of Finland in relation to the USSR,
so one might expect a speedier increase in East German influence over
the city than occurred with the Finnish-Soviet relationship.

Should.

West Berlin's political affairs reflect an increase in the influence
of what the SED considers "anti-Communist" elements, GDR-West Berlin
relations will undergo a distinct chill,

This deterioration in their

relations may be.characterized by anyone or several of a variety of
actions that the East Germans could take in response to West Berlin
developments.

First, trade and economic agreements could be jeopardized

as the East Germans announce an intention to suspend trade in areas
vital to West Berlin's economy.

This is probably one of the more

restrained tIn'eat::; that the East Germans could take.

A second step

that they could take to indicate their displeasure would be to recall
the East German ambassador or any other GDR representatives that are
stationed in West Berlin.

An even more drastic step could be the

announcement by the GDR that in view of a "threat to peace" originating
in West Berlin the East Germans and the West Berlin authorities should

22Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," The Conduct
of Soviet Foreign Policy, edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J.
Fleron, Jr. (Chicago:. Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971), p. 241.
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engage in military consultations.

The purpose of such consultations

would be, according to the GDR, to consider the estab1.ishment of an East
German military base in West Berlin to protect the population of the
city from "anti-Communist elements."

This corresponds to a similar

threat maqe by the Soviet Union when political developments in Finland
in 1961 took a turn hostile to Soviet interests. 23 This announcement
by the GDR would have the effect of a threat to take military action
against West Berlin.

The objective of these East German measures would

be, not an actual takeover of the city, but rather the suppression of
those elements viewed as hostile to the GDR.

The goal would be achieved

if the West Berlin authorities agreed to take the necessary steps to
suppress the offending political movement or individual.

The key point

is that the West Berliners themselves would be correcting the situation.
It would not be desirable for the .East Germans to actually take the
steps unilaterally.
Just as unfavorable domestic developments in West Berlin would
inspire threats from the GDR, good relations would be rewarded by
favorable economic arrangements, the exchange of official state visits
by East German and West Berlin political figures, and symbolic gestures
such as the waiver of certain passport and visa requirements for visits
by West Berliners to the GDR.

Similar developments took place in

Finnish-Soviet affairs during those periods of especially good relations.
The situation between West Berlin and the GDR would be one in which the

23Matti, p. 374.
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West Berliners could enjoy a cordial atmosphere with their East German
neighbors, but only at the price of sacrificing certain of its freedoms
on occasion.
This situation is one which could develop as the product of
continued East-West detente and Western neglect of West Berlin.
upheavals in West Berlin are required.

No

No East German-Soviet external

pressures are necessary to create a neutral West Berlin.

In fact, the,

opposite, Communist benignity, would do more to advance the development
of such a West Berlin since it would encourage a belief that West Berlin
could coexist peacefully with its neighbors.

The only Soviet

contributions in this scenario are, first, the continuation of its
policies of detente, and, second, a willingness to surrender Four-Power
rights in Berlin.

Neither would have the effect of measurably

increasing East Germany's indebtedness to the USSR.
The principal advantage of this arrangement for the GDR is that
West Berlin ceases to act as an irritant to the East German regime.
West Germany's political presence in West Berlin could be completely
eliminated.

Anti-Communist political activities and demonstrations

could also be banned in West Berlin.

The feasibility of this scenario

is indicated by the success of detente so far in promoting an image of
the USSR and its allies as status quo powers.

West Berlin has also

witnessed steps toward eliminating anti-Communist demonstrations, such
as the annual observance of the 1953 East German uprising which was
24
cancelled for the first time in 1974.
As West German and

24New York Times, June 13, 1974, p. 3.
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anti-Communist influences are terminated in West Berlin, they can be
gradually replaced by an East German political presence.

A shortcoming

of this arrangement, however, is that the GDR is deprived of the
material and psychological benefits that would have accrued to it by
the total incorporation of West Berlin.
same time that

the~e

It should be stressed at the

benefits are not completely lost for all time since

this arrangement could not be considered a final
Berlin question.

settle~3nt

of the West

It seems more likely to be simply one phase in a

transitional development of the city's status.
The effect. of such an arrangement on East German independence
relative to the Soviet Union would be positive.

With West Berlin no

longer representing a serious problem, the GOR's dependence on the USSR
in dealing with the West would be decreased.

At the ,same time, East

Germany would be\in a position to handle its West Berlin affairs with
much less help from the Soviet Union by means of economic and political
arrangements.
VI.

WEST BERLIN AS A FREE CITY UNDER UN SPONSORSHIP

This alternative and the previous one probably come closest to
approaching the situation as it now exists in West Berlin.

This

scenario, however, represents a departure from the previous ones in
that it does not overwhelmingly favor the East German interests.

In

this case there would be an internationally sponsored effort to
perpetuate what is essentially the status quo.
political presence is to be muted.

The West German

West Berlin's political affairs
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are to be free from outside intervention by either the East or the West.
The economy of West Berlin would retain its capitalistic features and
its trade would continue to be oriented toward the West.

The Four-Power

status of the city would have been terminated by the establishment of a
United Nations protectorate and transit rights to the city would be
guaranteed by the UN which would likely be responsible for control of
the westward corridors.
This arrangement could come about as a product of detente and
Western efforts to provide a stable foundation for West
independence.

Be~lin's

The Western powers would no longer act as the guarantors

of West Berlin's rights since the city would have become a UN
responsibility just as Danzig before World War Two was supervised
by the League of Nations.

This solution would have to be worked out

by the former occupying powers under United Nations aegis.

It seems

reasonable to assume that the.FRG and the GDR, who are also now members
of the UN, would also be. consulted regarding the arrangement and that
their support would be essential.

The two Germanies could hardly be

expected to oppose this very strenuously since it is a plan which could
be presented as in the best interests of peace.

Therefore, their

support could almost be taken for granted although they would obviously
work for the most advantageous arrangements for themselves as the
program was formulated.
As with the .previous scenario, East Germany would no longer be
dependent on the USSR as the sole protector of its interests regarding
the West Berlin problem after the adoption and implementation of this
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policy by the UN.

The problem, of course, is not removed by this

program, but it is out of the hands of the East Germans and the Soviets.
In the .United Nations the .Soviet-Ied bloc would ha,ve to act with the
GOR in order to advance the East Germans' interests relative to West
Berlin should there be any conflict regarding the city's status or
operations.

This means that the East German government would remain

dependent on the Soviet Union for support in the General Assembly and
the Security Council.

However, the USSR alone would not be able to

guarantee the protection of East German rights.

This is especially

true in the General Assembly where the USSR would have to rely upon
the votes of not only the .WTO states but also the so-called Third World
nations as well.

Therefore, the GOR's dependence would become diluted,

as it has to appeal to a variety of groups in order to secure support
necessary for successfully waging a fight in the United Nations.
Overall, the GOR's independence would be increased by the implementation
of this program for West Bel'lin.

TIte

incl~ea.5e,

ho~~ver,

would not be as

great as in those scenarios where the West Berlin question was given a
final resolution.
There are several advantages that would accrue to the GOR under
this plan.

First, the removal of U.S., British, and French troops from

West Berlin is, by itself, a victory for East Germany.

The maintenance

of hostile garrisons inside the GOR's territory could hardly be regarded
as a minor consideration by the SED.
considered a minor accomplishment.

Thus, its removal would not be
Second, the East Germans profit

under this plan by virtue of not having to recognize a special FRG-West
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Berlin relationship.

By having the UN work out the arrangements, the

GDR is insulated from that denger.

What the East Germans accept through

the plan is the authority and responsibility of the United Nations.
Finally, the East Germans would benefit by the fact that the West Berlin
problem is being handled in an atmosphere of relative harmony and
reconciliation, a necessity for agreement by the former occupying
powers.

By their participation in this process, the East Germans can

boast that they have made a contribution to the cause of detente in
Europe.
The proposal considered here is not without its disadvantages for
the East Germans.

First, the GDR is deprived of the enjoyment of the

important material gains that corne with total incorporation.

The

psychologicai boost that it would get from possession of the entire
city of Greater Berlin is also lost through this formula.

Probably

most important is the fact that United Nations supervision of West
Berlin makes any future unilateral Communist moves regarding the city,
such as those involved in some of the preceding scenarios, much more
difficult.

Of course, the same prohibition is operative against future

Western moves in West Berlin.
VII.

WEST BERLIN IN AN EAST-WEST GEru4AN CONFEDERATION

This option would bring reamalgarnation of Berlin by reunification
of the two Germanies in a genuine confederation.

Representatives would

be elected throughout all of Berlin and Germany to an all-German
legislature.

Districts could most easily be formed by adherence to
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preexisting polit:i,cal subdivisions, bezirks in the GDR and Lander in the
FRG.

They could be formed in Berlin on the basis of the boroughs

established in 1920 and thus avoid lumping East and West Berliners
together in one district.

The representatives would all sit together

as equals in one legislature which might well be located in Berlin.
The most appropriate method of

apportio~ent

of the districts would be

by population.
In an article in 1969, Professor Elmer Plischke discusseu the ways
in which reunification of the ,two Germanies might be achieved.

The only

feasible method, he concluded, was by agreement among the ,four ,wartime
25
allies with theGDR and the FRG.
In addition, it should be observed
that agreement among these six powers would be possible only during an
era of detente.

Both blocs must also be willing to sUl·rendera maj or

ally to create what would probably have to be a neutral Germany.

The

problem of a formula for representation in the national legislature
would be the major sticking point since the prospects of both sides
for achieving dominance in the confederation would be dependent upon
it.

Straight population might be the most appropriate formula, but

it is one which would reduce the political forces of the GDR to the
status of a permanent minority.

Acceptance of that would be difficult

for both the USSR and the GDR.
The effect of this option on GDR-Soviet relations would be
revolutionary since the GDR would cease to exist as a separate entity.

25Elmer Plischke, "Reunifying German: An Options Analysis," World
Affairs, Vol. 132, No.1, June, 1969, p. 34.
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The principal concern would now be all-German-Soviet relations.

The

implementation of this option would probably result in an increase in
the feelings of goodwill toward the USSR in Germany since Soviet
approval would have been a necessity for its coming into force.

The

USSR would be unlikely to approve of the .creation of a reunified Germany
unless it felt that the new state would be reasonably friendly toward
the USSR.
The main advantage of this plan is that
would have a chance to win

contro~

th~

East German

ele~ents

of both West Berlin and West Germany

by becoming the .dominant force in the confederation.

Should that happen,

the result would be a communist Germany that could be much more
independent of the USSR than the GDR could ever hope to be.

This

independence would be a function of the fact that power would most
likely have been gained without any major Soviet efforts, assuming the
GDR elements take control on their own through legal processes, and that
the reunified German state would be considerably stronger economically
and politically.

The only hope for an SED victory in the new Germany

would rest in the prospect for a union of communist and procommunist
forces in the West with the SED.

Even at that, it would require much

more than their combined strengths as of this time.

Therefore, the

prospects for an SED takeover would not seem to be too good.

This leads

to the major disadvantage of the plan, the prospect that the SED could
lose everything.
confeder~tion

Not only would it fail to take control of the.

if its union with the left wing elements of the Western

part of Germany should prove weak, but it would also have lost. its own
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preserve in the East.

The smaller population of the GDR and its

relatively weaker position with regard to the FRG increases the
likelihood of defeat and at the same time diminishes prospects for
the implementation of such an option.
VIII.

WEST BERLIN AS A LAND OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

In this scenario, West Berlin becomes a full-fledged Land of the
Federal Republic.

In spite of the fact that the .Ber1in Constitution of

1950 and the FRG Basic Law proclaimed West Berlin a Land of the FRG,26
West Berlin's membership in the Federation was never realized.

The

Constitution was more an expression of a wish than a statement of fact.
In order to effect

We~t

Berlin's membership as a Land of the FRG

several steps would, of necessity, be taken.

First, West Berlin would

have representatives in the West German legislature who would be voting
members, not merely observers.

Prior to 1971, West Berlin sent

representatives to Bonn, but they lacked the right to vote.

After the

conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement in 1971, the practice of
having representatives from West

Be~lin

was terminated with the

arrangement whereby the West German legislature periodically held
27
sessions in West Berlin.
To make West Berlin's status as a Land
a reality, both customs would have to be revived with the one
modification regarding the voting status of the West Berlin

26

Brose and Kerr, p. 66.

27Frankfurter Allgemeine, August 24, 1971, p. 3.
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representatives.

A second necessary step is that the Federal Republic

would require extraterritorial rights on at least one corridor from
West Germany to

W~st

Berlin.

This, of course, would harken back to

the experiences of the 1930s when Hitler demanded a German highway and
railroad from East Prussia across Polish territory to the port city of·
Danzig.

Hit1e~

at the time insisted on German extraterritorial rights

over the superhighway and the railroad which his country was to
28
construct.
Yet, a West German controlled access route to West

Berl~n

would be the only absolute guarantee of West German transit rights to
the city.

Finally, there would be the introduction of elements of toe

FRG military into West Berlin.

The Four-Power status of the city would

have been terminated out of recognition of the fact that West Berlin's
status has been "normalized." This scenario is based on the assumption
of agreement by the Western powers to a West German acquisition of.
West Berlin as a Land, therefore, their willingness to withdraw from
West Berlin need present no problem.

The USSR could refuse to assent,

but since it has no troops in West Berlin, its refusal would be no bar
to realization of this scheme.
Such a development as described above would be unlikely during the
era of detente.

It would require a complete reversal of present Western

policy and, at the same time, a considerable weakening of the position

York:

28William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New
Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 455-457.
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of the Soviet Union and its allies relative to the Western powers.

The

best chance for this happening is the chain of events described by
Andrei Ama1rik in analyzing the possibilities for the weakening of
Communist power in Russia due to mirtority unrest and Chinese pressures
29
in the East.
In short, this scenario requires the West to be able
to act from a position of strength.

In so doing it can force the Soviet

Union and East Germany into making the concessions necessary for
incorporation of .West Berlin into the Federal Republic.
This development would have a deteriorating effect on East GermanSoviet relations.

The GDR would view the .USSR as having failed to

protect its interests on a particularly vital question.

It might even

feel impelled to pursue its interests without the aid of the Soviet
Union.

However, the USSR, feeling the threat of Western pressure, could

be expected to view any deviations from its policy line much more
seriously than as under normal circumstances.

Even a small departure

would become a luxury that the .B1oc could not afford.

As a result,

while GOR-Soviet relations are subjected to a severe strain, the
independence of the East Germans will likely be subjected to further
restrictions.
While this development offers no advantages for the East Germans,
it does present the SED regime with serious disadvantages.

The GDR

would suffer a tremendous psychological defeat as a result of what

29Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?
(New York: Harper &Row, 1970), pp. 62-65.
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could be seen as the complete loss of West Berlin.

Furthermore, the

permanence of the GDR would once more be placed under serious doubt as
the Pan-German role of West Berlin is reemphasized.

This arrangement,

however, is not likely to be final because of the doubt that it creates
regarding East Germany's future.

It has the effect of reopening basic

questions concerning the future of Germany, questions which have lain
dormant for almost two decades.

Therefore, attention is immediately

directed to the possibility of the reunification of the two Germanies.
There is, however, another possibility concerning this option.
Should West Berlin become a Land of a Finlandized West Germany, the
impact on the GDR and the requirements necessary for the implementation
of this program would be very different.

First, a union with a

Finlandized FRG would be possible during the era of detente and would
not require a weakening of the USSR and its allies.

Second, under these

circumstances there need not be a deterioration of East German-Soviet
relations.

The Soviets could present this action as part of a long-range

program for advancement of the GDR's interests.

Certainly, there would

be no embarrassment as a result of an apparent defeat of major
proportions for the Bloc.
IX.

WEST BERLIN AS THE KEY TO REUNIFICATION

The loss of West Berlin to the GDR does not represent a direct
challenge to the existence of the Federal Republic.

The incorporation

of West Berlin into East Germany would not inspire the SED to annex
West Germany if only because it lacks the power to do so.

The SED
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would simply feel that it had taken what was rightfully its own.by
consolidating its territory and removing a foreign social and political
body.

The Soviet Union and East Germany's military impotence wquld

restrain any further expansionist tendencies.

Also, West German

stability would serve to discourage the SED from harbouring any such
ambitions.

At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the FRG

could probably endure the psychological defeat that would be brought
on by the loss of West Berlin.

While it might bring the downfall of

a government, it would not likely lead to the overthrow of the system.
The inability of parties such as the National Democratic Party of.
Germany (NPD) to take hold in the West German political climate is an
indication of the .basic stability of the system.
By contrast, the incorporation of West Berlin into the FRG as a
Land would undoubtedly inspire the .Bonn government to push for more.
Such an event could only take place during a time of extreme weakness
of the Soviet Bloc or fluidity on the part of the USSR.

This weakness,

coupled with the GDR's political instability, would make East Germany
a tempting target for the FRG.

Under these circumstances, the old dream

of reunification on terms favorable to West

Ge~any

could be rekindled.

Thus, after West Berlin assumed membership in the Federation, Bonn
might well begin to pressure for a truly "special relationship" with the
GDR.

It might suggest closer economic ties and intensified cooperation

on certain projects.
might

al~o

Proposals for some sort of political

be advanced.

attractive to the SED.

cooperatio~

Soviet weakness might make West German offers.
This would be especially true if those offers
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gave the SED assurances of some satisfactory role in an enlarged
Federation.

The West Germans might even be able to rely upon

anti-Russiall attitudes to appeal to the East Germans as "fellow Germans."
If the Western powers raised no objections, the West Germans could talk

about the ,potential role of a reunified Germany in Europe.

'(his

development is, of course, highly dependent on either the willingness
of the other Western powers to accept the idea of a stronger, reunified
Germany or their inability to prevent it.

If such a union should be

effected, it would naturally mean a blow of immeasurable proportions
to the USSR.

This would be the Soviet Union's first really big setback

internationally, its first significant territorial loss.

While the idea

of a reunified Germany might have fit in with Soviet policy twenty years
ago, there seems to be no chance of its fitting in with the ,USSR's
policy today.

East

Ge~many

militarily, and politically.

is too important to the USSR economically,
EVen a pro-Communist reunited Germany

could hardly be considered good news for Moscow since such a Germany
might well ,become a major rival within the world Communist movement as
China has become.
The feasibility of such a development as this should not be
dismissed lightly.

In discussing the long-term question of the concept

of the German nation, Professor Joachim Remak has observed that "every
German frontier is artificial, therefore impermanent. . .

,I:

Hls

studies indicate that on the average, there has been one major change
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in its borders and political organization every twenty-one years. 30 The
last major changes, of course, took place over a quarter of a century
ago, so it would not be unrealistic to anticipate some additional change
in the years immediately ahead.

A major change in the

fG~tunes

of the

Soviet Union could be a factor which would contribute to such events.
In examining the matter of a union between the GDR and the FRG,
Professor Remak writes,
Yet the idea of a union is one whose time will come again;
it is used to being recycled. How soon? Who knows? In what
form? Who can guess? Perhaps it will be an association
between the two German states, or a wholly new beginning, or
a European confederation tnat will blur the old borders--no
one can foretell the future's precise shape. But change there
will be; it has been the law of German life. Federal Republic
and GDR arc no more likely to be the final stages in the
development of German history than the Deutsche Bund or the
North German Federation were. 31

30Ibid ., p. 186.

31 Ibid •

CHAPTER VI II
SUMMARY
i

•

East German foreign po11cy on the West Berlin issue since 1968 has
moved toward the assertion of independence and subsequently returned to
what must be regarded as a more traditional pattern.

The last Ulbricht

years witnessed a growing East German pride coupled with

independe~t

expressions on not only the West Berlin question but also a number of
related matters.

The West Berlin policy should be viewed essentially

as a symptom of a larger pattern of resistence to Soviet desires.

This

trend began most conspicuously with the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention
in Czechoslovakia which gave the GDR an opportunity to emphasize both
its ideological firmness and its co~ception of itself as enjoying a
s.pecial relationship with the USSR.

This direction was reversed in 1971

with Ulbricht's replacement by Honecker, an action which clearly
involved the support if not the actual participation of the Soviet
leadership.

Honecker's loyalty has been reflected in the SED's

enthusiastic support for the major elements of Soviet foreign policy.
This support has extended to active East German participation in the
anti-Chinese polemics.

The new leadership has made no claims of a

special position in the Bloc during this time nor has it asserted the
uniqueness of East Germany's example to Communist and developing nations
as during the last Ulbricht years.
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The insecurity of the East German regime has been reflected in

th~

SED's strenuous efforts to develop its concept of the nation and to
create a ,distinct developed socialist society in the GDR.

These efforts

have been coupled with the policy of,Abgrenzung by which the ,SED hopes
to cement its rupture from the western part of the former German Reich
and the ,emphasis on the ideological struggle which is said to ,be
intensifying during the period of detente.

While there is no evidence

of a desire for a military confrontation with West Germany, the ,GDR has
not neglected military preparedness and has placed even greater emphasis
on the military class mission of its youth.

This program has involved

the broadening of ,military training efforts and, at,the ,same time, a new
civil defense campaign.

The idea that the ,GDR is being continually

subjected to hostile attention from West Germany has been retained, thus
preserving the element of tension that many observers feel the GDR needs
to compensate for its lack of a fully developed sense of nationality.
West Berlin's position as a Western outpost provides the SED with its
most convenient opportunity for intensifying tension.

For this reason"

a renewal of conflicts between the GDR and West Berlin must be viewed,
at least in part; as evidence of the ,SED's insecurity.
An evaluation of the apparent influence of the Soviet Union on East,
Germany's foreign policy relative to West Berlin during this period
demonstrates the development of a relationship in which the USSR no
longer has to dictate to the GDR in the manner assumed to be
characteristic of the major power-satellite relationship.

Enough shared

attitudes have been developed that it is now possible to speak of an
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essential community of interests between the GDR and the .USSR on basic
issues.

While East Gernmn statements assert that this holds true for

every case, it is reasonable to assume that differences do occur.

Yet,

these have not been nearly great enough to require a show of force by
the Soviet Union.

The GDR has apparently come to realize over .the years

that its fate is cast with that of the Soviet Bloc.

Therefore, its

perception of its self-interest has become such that it has been
possible for the GDR to enjoy a status .much more like that of a junior
ally than a traditional satellite.

There are differences, but the ,SED

seems to realize the limits of tolerable diversity.

Ulbricht's stands

during his last years indicate that he failed to appreciate the fact
that there were limits beyond which he could not go .without incurring
the serious disapproval of the Kremlin's leadership.

Ulbricht's removal

by his comrades in the SED indicates that his "revolt" was largely a
personal one; he did not carry with him a majority of the SED Politburo.
The fact that no other high-level removals followed his also indicates
that he was largely alone in his defiance.

The dismissal of Ulbricht

illustrates the continuing importance attached by the Soviet Union to
the maintenance of its hegemony within the East European system and, at
the same time, it shows that Soviet conceptions have not changed enough
during the nuclear age to permit a devaluation of the importance of a
ring of "buffer states" between itself and the West.
Finally, the presentation of the scenarios for resolution of the
West Berlin problem indicates the persistence of. the question of West
Berlin as a factor .in the stability of the SED regime and in the.
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expansion oX' contraction of East Germany's independence fl'om the Soviet
Union.

It is significant that only the extreme solutions, either a

total incorporation of West Berlin into the GOR or complete loss of the,
city to the West with the possible reunification of the two Germanies,
completely eradicate the problem and thus enhance the ,GOR's independence
from the VSSR.

However, in the latter case, the question of independence

becomes meaningless in view of the GOR's

u~ion

with West Germany.

essential point is that those resolutions which are favorable

t~

The
the.

GOR require either the active support of the Soviet Union or the
successful continuation of a Soviet policy, such as detente, that
facilitates the evolution of a favorable situation.
In discussing East German-Soviet relations, David Childs has
writte~

of a change which has come about largely as a result of the

development of the economic power of the GDR.

According to Childs,

Apart from the Soviet Union itself, East Germany is the
most important industrial power in the .Communist camp. It is
the Soviet Union's biggest trading partner, being responsible
for roughly one-quarter of Soviet imports and 75 percent of
its import of machine tools . . . . In addition, . . . the GOR
has the largest reserves of uranium in Europe, apart from
those in the Soviet Union itself. l
Childs also sees the GDR as being of value to the USSR militarily.
First, the GDR's territory

allow~

the Soviet Union to have an outpost.

of troops to keep hostile forces further from Russian territory.
Second, the East German coastline is of interest for Soviet naval
squadrons which lack ports that are open all year round.

IDavid Childs, East Germany (New York:

Finally,

Praeger, 1969), p. 272.
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the ,East German armed forces

are probably, technically
speaking, more efficient thall most other WTO allies of the USSR. 2
the~selves

Therefore, East Germany's status certainly seems to have risen
considerably since the first years after the end of the war.

Yet, there

is little reason, based on an analysis of the West Berlin question, to
anticipate a dramatic increase in its independence.

East Germany simply

lacks the ability to be a viable state, both in terms of its foreign
policy needs and its domestic situation, outside of its membership in
the Soviet alliance system.
East German dependency on its alliance with the USSR and the very
definite limits on East German independence are demonstrated by several
factors.

First, the GDR is tied firmly to the Soviet Bloc by ideology

and by its general orientation.

The Marxist-Leninist ideology has had

a profound influence on the GDR as on the other Bloc nations.

As a

result, they share numerous common characteristics that serve to bind
them together.

In addition, the SED has worked assiduously to orient

its nation toward the USSR.

As mentioned previously, East German

cultural policy under both Honecker and Ulbricht was particularly close
to the Soviet model.

East German spokesmen have repeatediy stressed the

need for alliance with the USSR as Honecker did in 1974 when he spoke of
the alliance with the Soviet Union as the key to every success of the.
GDR. 3 The GDR's close adherence to the Soviet Union in so many areas,

2Ibid ., p. 273.
3Neues Deutschland, May 13, 1974. p. 2.
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in spite of Ulbricht's brief "revolt,"would make a rupture from the
Soviet Bloc at this point probably as disruptive as its severance from
the rest of Germany in 1945.
The GDR's lack of international stature also serves .to bind it
closer to the Soviet Union.

Until recent years, the GDR had diplomatic

relations with very few non-Communist states and enjoyed membership in
also no non-Communist international organizations.
to improve

it~

While it has worked

prestige through its technical accomplishments and now

has diplomatic relations with well over one hundred nations, including
the United States, the GDR still lacks the .stature of West Germany.

As

a result, East Germany remains dependent upon the Soviet Union as its
chief advocate in most international questions.

The GDR is likely to

retain a negative image as long as the Berlin Wa1l stands and GDR
citizens in fairly large numbers still risk their lives to flee their
country.
Finally, the GDR seems to lack the \.,rill as well as the ability to
break away from the Bloc.

Ulbricht'S inability to stall detente on the

Berlin question best illustrated the weakness of a GDR attemptir,g to
pursue an independent policy.

Even more recently, the East German

compromise on the minimum required exchange amounts, following the
refusal of the Soviet Union to enthusiastically advocate the SED
position, demonstrates the GDR weakness.

Furthermore, the statements

of SED spokesmen indicate, if anything, a desire to bring the ,GDR even
closer to the Soviet Union.
In conclusion, it might be appropriate to consider the partition
of Berlin and Germany in comparison with other partitions.

The
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best-known partitioned states, in addition to Germany, are Korea and
Vietnam.

A comparison of the situations of these states with that of

Germany indicates both similarities and differences.
The Korean and Vietnamese cases are like the German case in that
their. divisions were not seen initially as permanent.

No power is on

record as advocating the permanent division of Korea at the 38th
parallel.

Officially, a line was arbitrarily drawn at that point simply

to expedite the surrender of Japanese troops. 4 Likewise, in Vietnam
the demarcation along the 17th parallel was intended to be a prOVisional
ml'1'ltary measure. 5 Just as in the German case, these divisions became
permanent frontiers.
These three cases are also alike in that there was no internal
justification for their division along the lines designated.

In Korea

there were no significant cleavages before 1945 which corresponded to
the political division of the country today.

Though there were

regional differences between north and south, they were not extreme
6
and communication between both sections was intense prior to 1945.
While Vietnam contains numerous minority groups, there is no ethnic
boundary there which corresponds to the north-south political division

4Gregory Henderson, "Korea: The Preposterous.Division," Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 27, Number 2, 1973, p. 206.
c:

"'Harvey H. Smith et a1., Area Handbook for South Vietnam
(Washington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 257.
6

Henderson, p. 205.
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. h ere 7 The Vietnamese, like the Koreans and the Germans, were
e1t

essentially one people before they were divided by the major powers.
The hosti1ization of division which occurred as a result of the
conflicts between the Communist anq non-Communist blocs is a phenomena
experienced by all

t~ree

of these nations.

Germany, of course, was

seen as the front line for both blocs in Europe and confrontations in
Berlin and elsewhere in that nation have frequently corresponded to
the general mood of relations

b~Lwe~n

the two blocs.

In the same

fashion, confrontatory groups were organized in Korea after the division
in 1945 and were soon polarized against one another.

8

In Vietnam

hostility has developed as .the two Vietnams became reflections of the
Communist and non-Communist worlds of which they had become parts.
The result was a North Vietnamese hostility to South Vietnam based upon
a dislike for the general character of the southern regime rather than
on negotiable substantive disagreements. 9 The result in Korea and
Vietnam was the outbreak of armed hostilities lasting for long periods
and involving the direct participation of major powers.

No such

hostilities have occurred in Germany and this good fortune has
undoubtedly contributed to the much better prospects for rapprochement
between the two Germanies.

7Smith et al., p. 69.
8

Henderson, p. 207.

9David C. Jordan, World Politics in Our Time (Lexington,
Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1970), p. 179.
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Unlike East Germany, the ,Communist regime in Korea, as well as in
Vietnam, has followed a policy stressing self-reliance and
lO
independence.
While both the Korean and Vietnamese regimes were
integrated into the Communist world, neither assumed a position similar
to that of East Germany.

In short, they simply lacked the importance

to the Soviet Union that the ,GDR seemed to enjoy.

Also, because both

regimes were subject to cross-pressures from the Chinese and the
Russians, their integration became more difficult.
their independence was greater.

At the same time,

As a result, the major powers today

do not have such vital positions in the two countries that
becomes almost impossible.

comprom~se

The Korean case has been the best

demonstration of this major power flexibility in the era of detente. ll
The prospects for reunification have been affected dramatically by
the major power stakes in these three countries.

Because of the vital

positions of the major powers in Germany, external factors make
reunification of that country a virtual impossibility at this time.
This is true in spite of the fact that the personal animosities between
East and West Germans have never developed as in the Korean and
Vietnamese cases where northerners and southerners were actually
shooting at each other.

The flexibility of the major powers has

resulted in some fairly significant steps toward the ,advancement of
detente in Korea.

The most notable gain has been the decrease in

lOBruce G. Cumings, "Kim's Korean Communism," Problems of Communism,
Vol. XXIII, March-April, 1974, p. 41.
11

Henderson, p. 210.
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provocative miH tary actions by the North Korearls.

12

The maj or

accomplishment in Vietnam was the withdrawal of American troops from
the south.

Progress toward bringing North and South Vietnam closer

together have been negligible.

In the Korean case there has at least

been serious talk, though little actual progress, about reunification. 13
In summary, one must conclude that reunification is made difficult
in the German case because of the pOSitions of the major powers and the
importance of the stakes involved.
important industrial powers.

Both East and West Germany are

In the cases of Korea and Vietnam, while

the partitions are much like the German partition in terms of their
origins, the outlooks for reunification are affected differently.

In

both cases, the positions of the major powers are more open and less
opposed to reunification.

However, the internal factors make an

elimination of the partition much more difficult.
were no extreme

diff~rences

Even though there

separating the people in these nations

prior to partition, the hostilization of division has been so great
that armed cvnflict has been a result of the creation of separate
states.

While the prospects for reunification in the near future are

slim in all three cases, more progress has been made in the German case
toward bridging the gap between the people involved.

Should the major

powers' positions be altered, this progress would greatly ease the
difficulty of a reunion.

The Koreans and the Vietnamese, by contrast,

l2Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies in North
Korea," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXII, January-February, 197~, p. 69.
l3 Ibid ., pp. 69-70.
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in spite of a softening of the positions of the major powers, have shown
an inzlination to want to continue the old policies of open hostility.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
A bis Z: Ein Taschen-und Nachsch1agebuch uber den anderen Teil
Deutsch1ands. Bonn: Germa~ Federal Press, 1969.
Adenauer, Konrad.
1965.

Memoirs, 1945-1953.

Arnt, Herbert, et al.
Bild, 1973.

Chicago:

Introducing the GDR.

Arntz, Helmut. Facts About Germany.
Office, 1968.

Henry Regnery Company,

Dresden:

Bonn:

Verlag Zeit im

Press and Information

Amalrik, Andrei. Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? New York:
Harper and Row, 1970.
Ambrose, Stephen. Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945.
Company, 1967.

New York:

Norton and

Axen, Hermann. The Development of the Socialist Nation in the GDR.
Dresden: Verlag Zeit im BiId, 1973.
Berlin: Crisis and Challenge.
1963.
Bradley, Omar.

New York:

A Soldier's Story.

German Information Center,

New Yori::

Brandt, Willy. A Peace Policy for Europe.
and Winston, 1968.
Brant, Stefan.

The East German Rising.

Simon and

New York:

New York:

Brose, John, and Kerr. Kathleen. Berlin in Brief.
and Information Office of West Berlin, 1969.

Schuste~t

1951.

Holt, Rinehart,

Praeger, 1957.
West Berlin:

Press
~

Brzezinski, Zbigniew.

Between Two Ages.

New York:

Viking prp3s~!970.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew.
Press, 1967.

The Soviet Bloc.

Cambridge:

Harvard University

Brezhnev, L. I. Following Lenin's Course.
Publishers, 1972.

343

Moscow:

Progress

344

The Bundeswehr:
Bild, 1970.

Spearhead of Revanchism.

Dresden:

Verlag Zeit im

Cantori, Louis J., and Spiegel, Steven L. International Politics of
Regions. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
Campbell, John C. The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947.
New York: Harper and ROW, 1947.
Campbell, John C. The United States in World Affairs 1947-1948.
New York: Harper and Row, 1948.
Childs, David.

East Germany.

New York:

Praeger, 1969.

Czerwinski, E. J., and Pieka1kiewicz, Jaros1av, editors. The Soviet
Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe. New
York: Praeger, 1972.
Davison, W. Phillips. The Berlin Blockade.
University Press, 1958.

Princeton:

Princeton

Dietze, Lutz, and Gorodnov, Vladimir, editors. Through the Eyes of
Friends. Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bi1d, 1974.
Dornberg, John.

The Other Germany.

Duchacek, Ivo D. Nations and Men.
Winston, 1971.

New York:
New York:

Doubleday, 1968.
Holt, Rinehart, and

Dulles, Eleanor. Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever.
University of North Carolina Press, 1967.

Chapel Hill:

Dulles, Eleanor. The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts.
University of North Carolina Press, 1962.

Chapel Hill:

Farrell, Barry. Approaches to Comparative and International Politics.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
Feis, Herbert. Between War and Peace:
Oxford University Press, 1960.
Griffith, William E.
Press, 1965.
Hager, Kurt.
1972.

The Potsdam Conference.

Communism in Europe, Volume Two.

Socialist Cultural Policy.

Dresden:

Hassner, Pierre. Europe in the Age of Negotiations.
Sage Publications, 1973.

London:

Cambridge:

MIT

Verlag Zeit im Bi1d,
Beverly Hills:

345
Handbook of Statistics for the FRG.
Office of the FRG, 1968.

Wiesbaden:

Handbuch Militarisches Grundwissen.
DDR, 1972.

Berlin, GDR:

Hanrieder, Wolfram F.
1970.

The Stable Crisis.

Federal Statistical
Militarverlag der

New York:

Hartmann, Frederick. Germany Between East and West.
Prentice-Hall, 1965.
Hayek, Friedrich A. The Road to Serfdom.
Chicago Press, 1944.
Herspring, Dale Roy.
Praeger, 1973.

Chicago:

Harper and Row,
Englewood Cliffs:
University of

East German Civil-Military Relations.

Hildebrandt, Rainer. Es Geschah an der Mauer.
Arbeitsgemeinschaft 13 August e. V., 1968.

New York:

West Berlin:.

Hoffman, Erik P., and Fleron, Frederick J. The Conduct of Soviet
Foreign Policy. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.
Honecker, Erich. Unter dem Banner des Internationalismus.
Dietz Verlag, 1972.
Hubatsch, Walther, editor.
Center, 1967.

The German Question.

New York:

Berlin, GDR:
Herder Book

Jamgotch, Nish, Jr. Soviet-East European Dialogue: International
Relations of a New Type? Stanford University: Hoover Institution,
1968.
Jordan, David C. World Politics in Our Time.
D. C. Heath and Company, 1970.
Kahn, Herman.
1962.

Thinking About the Unthinkable.

Lexington, Massachusetts:
New York:

Kegel, Gerhard. Twenty Five Years After Potsdam.
Zeit im Bi1d, 1970.
Khrushchev, Nikita. Khrushchev Remembers.
and Company, 1971.

Avon Books,

Berlin, GDR:

New York:

Verlag

Little, Brown,

Klein, Helmut, and Reischock, Wolfgang. Bildung fur Heute und Morgen.
Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1973.

346
Laqueur, Walter. Neo-Isolationism in the World of. the Seventies.
Ne\\' York: Library Prl~ss, 1972.
Lenin, V. I. Selected Works, Volume Three.
Publishers, 1967.

Moscow:

Progress

Lippmann, Heinz. Honecker and the New Politics of Europe.
MacmiJ Ian Company, lSI72.

New York:

Ludz, Peter C. The Changing Party Elite in East Ger.many.
MIT Press, 1971.

Cambridge:

Ludz, Peter C. The GOR From the Sixties. to the Seventies. Cambridge:
Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1970.
Macridis, Roy, editor. Foreign Policy in World Politics.
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
MacIver, R. M.
Man, John.

The Web of Government.

The Berlin Blockade.

Mander, John. Berlin:
Books, 1962.

New York:

New York:

Norden, Albert.
1970.

Blockade.

Hostage for the West.

New York:

Thus Wars Are Made.

Free Press, 1965.

Ballantine Books, 1973.

Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967.
Publishers, 1967.
Morris, Eric.

Englewood

Baltimore:

Penguin

Moscow:

Progress

Norton and Company, 1962.
Dresden:

Verlag Zeit im Bild,

Norden, Albert. Active Partners for Mankind's Noblest Cause.
Verlag Zeit im BUd, 1~/2 •.
Payne, James L.
1970.

The American Threat.

Chicago:

Dresden:

Markham Publishers,

Planck, Charles R. The Changing Status of German Reunification in
Western Diplomacy, 1.955-1966. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1967.
l'O!lomaryov, B. , editor. Historl of Soviet Foreign Policl, 1917-1945.
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969.
Ponomaryov, B. , editor. Historl of Soviet
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973.

For·ei~n

rolicl, 1945-1970.

347

Reinhold, Otto, editor.
Verlag, 1971.
Rzhevsky, Yuri.

Seht, welche Kraftl

West Berlin.

Moscow:

Berlin, GOR:

Dietz

Novosti Press, 1969.

Sanakoyev, Shalva. The World Socialist System.
Publishers, 1972.

Moscow:

Progress

Scherner, Erhard. Kultur und Kunste in Der OOR. Berlin, GDR:
Staatsekretariat Fur West Deutsche Fragen, 1970.
Scholz, Arno. Stacheldraht urn Berlin.
Verlagsgessellschaft, 1961.

West Berlin:

Scientific Council for Sociological Research. Sociological Research in
the GOR. Berlin, GDR: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschafter, 1970.
Sevruk, V., editor.

How Wars End.

Shears, David .. The Ugly Frontier.

Moscow:

Progress Publishers, 1969.
Alfred A. Knopf, 1970.

New York:

Shirer, William. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.
Simon and Schuster, 1960.

New York:

Sinanian, Sylva, Deak, Istvan, and Ludz, Peter C., editors.
Europe in the Seventies. New York: Praeger, 1972.
Slusser, Rebert M. The Berlin Crisis of 1961.
Hopkins Press, 1973.

Baltimore:

Smith, Harvey H. et al. Area Handbook for South Vietnam.
Government Printing Office, 1967.
Smith, Jean Edward.
Press, 1963.
Speier, Hans,

The Defense of Berlin.

Divided Berlin.

New York:

Statistical Pocket Book of the GDR.
1973.

Baltimore:

Eastern
Johns
Washington:

Johns Hopkins

Praeger, 1961.

Berlin, GDR:

Staatsver1ag der DOR,

Stebbins, Richard P., editor. The United States in World Affairs, 1949.
New York: Harper and Row, 1950.
Stern, Carola.

Ulbricht.

London:

Pall Mall Press, 1965.

Stolper, Wolfgang. The Structure of the East German Economy.
Harvard University Press, 1960.
Tatu, Michel.

Power in the Kremlin.

New York:

Cambridge:

Viking Press, 1967.

348

Ulam, Adam B.

Expansion and Coexistence.

Whitaker, Urban G.
San Francisco:

New York:

Praeger, 1968.

Nationalism and International Progress.
Chandler Publishing Company, 1961.

Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970.
Hopkins University Press, 1970.

Baltimore:

Johns

Periodicals and Newspapers
ABSEES.

National Association for Soviet and East European Studies.

Adam. Horst, and Zapf, Helmut. "Sozialistischer Patriotismus and
Proletarischer Internationa1ismus in der ideologigischen Erziehung
der Jugend." Einheit, No.6 (June. 1973). 675-684.
Albert, E. H. "Bonn's Moscow Treaty and Its Implications."
International Affairs (London). No.2 (April, 1971), 310-332.
Berlin, GDR.

Armeerundschau.

Berliner Morgenpost.
Berliner Zeitung.

\~est

Berlin.

Berlin, GDR.

Bleimann, Robert. "Ostpolitik and the GDR."
(Summer, 1972), 36-53.
The Bulletin.

Survey, XVIII, No.3

Press and Information Office of the FRG.

Conquest, Robertet a1. "Detente; An Evaluation."
Nos. 2/3 (Spring/Summer. 1974), 1-27.

Survey, XX,

Croan, Melvin. "After Ulbricht: The End of an Era?" Survey, XVII,
No. 79 (Spring, 1971), 74-92.
Cummings. Bruce G. "Kim's Korean Communism."
XXIII (March-April, 1974), 27-41.

Problems of Communism,

Current Digest of the Soviet Press.
Democratic German Report.

Berlin, GDR.

Doeker, Gunter, Melsheimer, Klaus, and Schroder, Dieter .. "Berlin and
the Quadl'ipartite Agreement of 1971," American Journal of
International Law, LVII, No.1 (1973), 44-62.

349
Doehring, Rolf. "Unsere Jugend und die Anspruche an die
geschichts-ideo1ogische Arbeit,"Einheit, No. 10 (October, 1973),
1209-1217.
Dohlus, Horst. "Die Leninschen Normen in Lebel unserer Partei."
Einheit, No. 10 (October, 1973), 1172-1181.
Dolgin, V. "Unity of Goals and Action."
(Moscow), No.7 (July, 1974), 3-12.

Internati.onal Affairs

Ebert, Friedrich. "Stadt und Demokratie unserer sozialistischen
Gessellschaft," Einheit, No.4 (April, 1974), 396-403.
Fetjo, Francois. "Moscow and Its Allies." Problems of Communism,
XVIII (November-December, 1968), 30-42.
Foreign Affairs Bulletin.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR.

Frankfurter Allgemeine.
Frankfurter Rundschau.
Franklin, William M. "Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin."
Politics, XVI (October, 1963), 18-32.

World

Gaeb1er, Klaus, and Puder, Heinz. "Weltanschauung und Oekonomie."
Einheit, No.6 (June, 1973), 696-704.
Geggel, Heinz. "Keine ideologische Wafferruhe."
(January, 1973), 6-9.

Einheit, No. 1

Gotting, Gerald. "Growing International Reputation of the GDR."
Foreign Policy, XIII, No.1 (1974), 3-12.

German

Hager, Kurt. "Werte und Errungenschaften unseres Lebens." Einheit,
Nos. 9/10 (September/October, 1974), 1070-1077.
Handelsb1att.

Federal Republic of Germany.

Hanisch, Werner. "The GDR and Its International Relations."
Foreign Policy, XII, No.6 (1973), 632-647.

German

Hanisch, Werner, and Busse, Hartwig. "Peaceful Coexistence: Principle
of GDR Foreign Policy." German Foreign Policy, XIII, No.1 (1974),
13-21.
Henderson, Gregory. "Korea: The Preposterous Division." Journal of
!~ternational Affairs, XXVII, No.2 (1973), 204-212.
Horizont.

Berlin, GDR.

350
Informationen.

Federal Minister for Inner-German Relations.

IWE-Tagesdienst.

West Berlin.

Johnston, Ray E. "Partition as a Political Ins~rument." Journal of
International Affairs, XXVII, No.2 (1973), 159-174.
Junse Welt.

Berlin, GDR.

Katushev, Konstantin. "Toward Closer Unity of the Socialist World."
World Marxist Review, XVI, No.8 (August, 1973), 3-14.
Keren, Michael. "The New Economic System in the GDR; an Obituary."
Soviet Studies, XXIV, No.4 (April, 1973), 554-587.
Kosing, Alfred, and Schmidt, Walter. "Zur Herausbilding der
sozia1istischen Nation in der DDR." Einheit, No.2 (February,
1974), 179-188.
Latzo, Anton. "Foreign-Political Coordination in the Interests of
.~ . Socialism and Peace." German Foreisn Policy, XI II, No. 2 (1974),
. 162-173.
Ludz, Peter C. "Continuity and Change Since Ulbricht." Problems of
Communism, XXII (March-April, 1972), 56-67.
Ludz, Peter C. "The SED Leadership in Transition." Problems of
Communism, XX (May-June, 1970), 21-36.
Markowski, Paul. "Common Foreign Policy of the Socialist Community
of States." German Foreign Policy, XII, No.5 (1973), 499-514.
Meier, Helmut. "Sozialistisches Geschischtsbe\'lUsstsein in Unserer
Zeit." Einheit, No.6 (June, 1973), 705-712.
Neubert, Harald. "Interrelationship of National and International
Aspects in the Socialist Community of States." German Foreisn
Policy, XIII, No.2 (1974)1 131-141.
Neue Deutsche Literatur.
Neue Zeit.

Berlin, GDR.

Neuer Weg.

Berlin, GDR.

Neues Deutschland.
New York Times.

Berlin, GDR.

Serlin, GDR.

351
P1isc.hke, Elmer. "Resolving the 'Berlin Question' --an Option Analysis."
World Affairs, CXXXI, No.2 (July, 1968), 91-100.
Plischke, Elmer. "Reunifying Germany--an Options Analysis."
Affairs, CXXXII, No.1 (June, 1969), 28-38.
Prazsky, Jan. "The Dialectics of Detente."
XVII, No. 9 (September, 1974), l26-l3!.

World Marxist Review,

Raupach, Rudi. "Initiator der Kulturarbeit."
1974), 330-340.
RBI-Journal.

World

Einheit, No.3 (March,

Radio Berlin International, Berlin, GDR.

Remak, Joachim. "Two Germanies--and Then?"
Affairs, XXVII, No.2 (1973), 175-186.

Journal of International

Sanakoyev, Sh. "Socialist Foreign Policy: Coordination and
Effectiveness." International Affairs (Moscow), No.6 (19'71),
3-12.
Schroeder; Gertrude E. "Soviet Technology:, System vs. Progress."
Problems of Communism, XIX (September-October, 1970), 15-29.
Shakov, V. "European Security Systems: Soviet Effort."
Affairs (Moscow), No.5 (1971), 32-37.

International

Shinn, Rinn-sup. "Foreign and Reunification Policies in North Korea."
Problems of Communism, XXII (January-February, 1973), 55-71.
Sonntag.

Berlin, GDR.

Soviet Military Review.

Moscow.

Der Spiegel.
Spit tmann , Use. "The Soviet Union and the DDR." Survey, No. 61
(October, 1966), 165-176.
Suddeutsche Zeitung.

I~nich.

Summary of World Broadcasts.
Der Taggespiegel.

British Broadcasting Corporation.

West Berlin.

Toeplitz, Heinrich. "The New Penal Code."
GDR, No. 2 (1968), 5-14.
Translations on Eastern Europe.

Law and Legislation in the

Department of Commerce.

352
VagI, Dieter. "The Warsaw Treaty States and the European Security
Conference." German Foreign Policy, X, No. 1 (1971), 20-31.
Vo1ksarmee.

Berlin, GDR.

Die Welt.
Wettig, Gerhard. "Sowjet Politik zur Westeuropa."
(1974), 849-867.

Osteuropa, No. 7

Documents
Act on the Integrated Socialist Educational System of the GDR.
Panorama DDR, 1974.
Beethoven Commemoration of the GDR.
1970.
The Berlin Settlement.
1972.

Bonn:

Dresden:

Berlin:

Verlag Zeit im Bild,

Press and Information Office of the FRG,

Documents on the Eighth Congress of the SED.
BUd, 1971.

Dresden:

Verlag Zeit im

"Draft Treaty on the Establishment of Relations of Equal Right Between
the GDR and the FRG." Documents on the National and International
Policy of the GDR, No.7 (1969).
International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.
and Socialism Publishers, 1969.

Prague:

"Interview Granted by Erich Honecker to the US News Agency."
Documents of the GDR. No.3, 1974.

Peace

Political

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR. How Germany Was Divided:
Documents. Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1966.
The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.
Office of the FRG, 1971.

Bonn:

Press and Information

Secretariat of the Christian Democratic Union. Gedenkstatten des ganzen
Vo1kes. Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1970.
U. S. Department of State. Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950.
Die Volkskarnrner.

Berlin, GDR:

Staatverlag der DDR, 1972.

Youth in the Socialist State: Youth Act of the GDR.
Staatyer1ag der DDR, 1972.

Berlin, GDR:

VITA
Stephen Reed Bowers was born on March 13, 1946 in Athens,
Tennessee.

After attending Carson-Newman College, he transferred to

the University of Tennessee in Knoxville where .he received a B.A.
degree in June, 1967.

After serving with the ,Third Armored Division

in Germany for two years, he returned to the University of Tennessee
and c(\)npleted a master's degree in 1971.
Since 1972. he has been on the faculty of Tennessee Wesleyan
College in Athens teaching political science and speech.

During the

time he was conducting research on this dissertation, he traveled to
East Germany twice in order to aid his research efforts.

353

